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INTRODUCTION
Three patients leave the United States for surgery. The first is self-employed
and has no health insurance. He needs life-prolonging heart surgery that would
cost at least $50,000 in the United States. On the Internet, he finds a cardiac
surgeon at a private hospital in New Delhi, India, who can perform the surgery
for no more than $10,000.1 Terms and conditions on the hospital's website
require patients to resolve any complaints in Indian courts or in one of India's
consumer dispute forums. Civil litigation in India can take fifteen to twenty years
to resolve, and India's consumer forums cannot grant non-economic damages
like pain and suffering.
The second patient works for a large, self-insured manufacturer. To compete
with foreign manufacturers, his employer must cut jobs and benefits. After seeing
a segment on medical tourism on the news, the manufacturer's benefits manager
contacts a medical tourism facilitator in North Carolina.2 Together, the
companies craft a plan to outsource expensive surgeries by paying employees for
travel expenses and offering them 25% of the cost-savings, up to $10,000. 3 The
employee needs knee surgery, so the facilitator arranges for it at a famous private
hospital in Bangkok, Thailand. The contract stipulates that the facilitator shall not
be held responsible for any negligence committed by the Thai hospital or
physicians. Moreover, the employee must sign a waiver agreeing not to hold the
employer liable. The average malpractice payout in Thailand is less than $2500.'
The third patient buys health insurance through her employer. The insurance
company recently added to its provider network a private hospital in Monterrey,
Mexico, and it now offers a plan with much lower premiums and deductibles to
patients willing to visit Mexico for certain procedures. The patient visits
Monterrey for cataract surgery. The insurance policy states that all network
providers are independent contractors and are not agents of the insurer. Mexican
law pegs tort compensation to very modest awards in its federal workers'
compensation statute. Moreover, under Mexico's new medical arbitration system,
1. All amounts are in U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated. Though the legal details are
hypothetical, I adapted this scenario from the highly publicized case of Howard Staab. See The
Globalization of Health Care: Can Medical Tourism Reduce Health Care Costs?: Hearing Before
the S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of
Maggi Ann Grace).
2. Some argue that the label "medical tourism" trivializes the phenomenon. See, e.g., Michele
Masucci & Scott Simpson, Outsourcing Care: Medical Tourism Is the Globalization of the
American Operating Room, 238 N.Y. L.J. 11 (2007). Though I agree, I use "medical tourism"
because it reflects the dominant nomenclature.
3. Though the legal details are hypothetical, I adapted this scenario from the highly publicized
example of Blue Ridge Paper Products. See Senate Hearing, supra note I (statement of Bonnie
Grissom Blackley).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 312-316.
X:! (2010)
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the average malpractice recovery is roughly $4800.5
These patients have three things in common. They are gainfully employed.
They are leaving the United States to save money on medical expenses. And they
have very little legal recourse should they fall victim to medical negligence.
These three scenarios reflect the essential tradeoff. The first patient, by
agreeing to Indian jurisdiction, sacrifices potential legal remedies in exchange for
life-prolonging medical care that he otherwise could not afford. The risks and
benefits accrue directly to the patient. The second and third patients also sacrifice
potential legal remedies, as jurisdiction likely resides in Thailand and Mexico.
But the benefits accrue diffusely--outsourcing saves money for the patient,
employer, and insurer alike.
Do these parties fully appreciate the tradeoff? Employers and insurers seem
to-they use releases, waivers, disclaimers, and other contractual devices to limit
their legal liabilities when sending patients abroad. And the medical tourism
companies that facilitate these transactions use a similar combination of legal
prophylaxes. However, it is unclear whether patients fully understand the legal
risks. Patients may vaguely comprehend that they might not receive the same
legal or regulatory protections overseas. But there is reason to suspect that they
do not fully digest just how few legal remedies remain or what options they have
if something goes awry.
More and more patients are accepting this tradeoff, wittingly or not. The
patients diligent enough to investigate these legal disparities will not find much
helpful information. Currently, the literature assumes that foreign jurisdictions
provide lesser legal remedies, but until now, no one has tested or supported these
assumptions.6 To date, there are no reliable, comprehensive sources for patients
5. See infra text accompanying note 601.
6. See, e.g., MILICA Z. BOOKMAN & KARLA R. BOOKMAN, MEDICAL TOURISM IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 156 (2007) (stating, without identifying jurisdictions for comparison, that other legal
systems may not handle disputes as efficiently as U.S. courts); Nathan Cortez, Patients Without
Borders: The Emerging Global Market for Patients and the Evolution of Modern Health Care, 83
IND. L.J. 71, 106-07 (2008) (briefly identifying problems with malpractice suits in Malaysia,
Singapore, India, and Thailand); Michael Klaus, Outsourcing Vital Operations: What if U.S. Health
Care Costs Drive Patients Overseas for Surgery?, 9 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 219, 235-39 (2006)
(stating, without citing authority, that malpractice laws "either do not exist or are not enforced" in
Asia and that patients in India and Thailand "bear the full costs of the medical errors" by
physicians); Masucci & Simpson, supra note 2 (stating, without citing authority, that "a medical
malpractice plaintiff is unlikely to be made whole by a foreign judgment"); Nicolas P. Terry,
Under-Regulated Health Care Phenomena in a Flat World: Medical Tourism and Outsourcing, 29
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 421, 464 (2007) (asserting that medical tourists may experience "reduced
legal outcomes (compensation)" overseas, but acknowledging the lack of information on this
point); Marcia S. Wagner, Medical Tourism and Group Health Plans, J. CoMP. & BENEFITS,
Sept./Oct. 2006, at 26 (stating, without citing authority, that most host countries "have weak
malpractice laws"); Kristen Boyle, A Permanent Vacation: Evaluating Medical Tourism's Place in
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to learn about legal recourse for malpractice committed in those jurisdictions.7
As such, it is highly doubtful that most U.S. patients fully appreciate the
legal risks of medical travel.8 The three scenarios above reflect increasingly
common arrangements. Patients are being asked to forego potential legal claims
in U.S. courts, leaving them to rely on foreign judicial systems for compensation,
venues where it is unlikely they will recover adequate compensation by U.S.
standards. For example, the mean and median recoveries by malpractice victims
in the United States ($311,000 and $175,000, respectively) dwarf the average
recoveries in Thailand ($2500) and Mexico ($4800). 9 Perhaps for this reason,
industry observers and representatives warn patients not to travel overseas if they
are at all concerned with their potential legal remedies.,0
If patients travel overseas for less expensive health care (particularly if they
are encouraged to do so), they should understand precisely what remedies they
are sacrificing.ll
This Article recalibrates the legal risks of medical travel by assessing
whether patients injured overseas have adequate legal recourse either in the
the United States Healthcare System, HEALTH LAW., June 2008, at 42, 46 (stating, without citing
authority, that patients have more difficulty suing overseas); Howard D. Bye, Shopping Abroad for
Medical Care: The Next Step in Controlling the Escalating Health Care Costs of American Group
Health Plans?, HEALTH LAW., Apr. 2007, at 30, 31 (stating that lawsuits against foreign providers
"can be severely limited by local law" and citing only Klaus, supra).
7. R.K. Nayak, Medical Negligence, Patients' Safety and the Law, REGIONAL HEALTH F., Vol.
8, No. 2, 2004, at 15, 23 (noting that except for India, there is very little information on medical
malpractice law in Southeast Asia). There are impressive comparative works on medical
malpractice laws. See, e.g., DIETER GIESEN, INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY OF CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM MEDICAL CARE (1988). But these tend
to focus on highly developed countries rather than on the developing countries that patients
increasingly visit.
8. Of course, medical travel presents non-legal risks as well. For example, traveling for
surgery may complicate a patient's recovery. See Cortez, supra note 6, at 103-04. This Article
focuses on the legal element to these risks, particularly the risk that patients will not have adequate
legal recourse if subject to medical malpractice.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 99, 317-320, 611.
10. See, e.g., Julie Davidow, Thousands of 'Medical Tourists' Are Traveling Abroad To Save
Money And at Their Own Risk, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 24, 2006, at Al (quoting the
author of a medical tourism guide, who says, "My sort of blunt advice is that if your primary
concern in going to a doctor, surgeon, or dentist is whether or not you're going to have legal
recourse if you don't like the work you get, you shouldn't go overseas"); Toby Manthey, Surgery
Costs Drive Americans Abroad: Arkansans Join Tourism Trend for Cheaper Meds, ARKANSAS
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, May 6, 2007, at 60 ("If someone is considering suing someone, for whatever
reason, don't [seek treatment abroad.] That's all we have to say.").
11. In Subsection III.B.3, infra, I discuss whether patients should be able to waive legal
remedies in exchange for less expensive health care.
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United States or in one of four common destinations: India, Thailand, Singapore,
and Mexico. I conclude that U.S. medical tourists will struggle to obtain adequate
compensation, either here or abroad. Patients looking to sue in U.S. courts for
medical malpractice abroad will face difficulties locating a proper defendant,
venue, and theory of liability. Patients suing overseas will also face obstacles
recovering adequate, timely compensation in legal systems that use unfamiliar
procedures, communicate in foreign languages, limit the remedies available, and
impose more onerous burdens of proof. Moreover, I argue that patients cannot
accurately appraise the legal risks because 1) no dispositive case law exists
indicating whether medical tourists can recover in U.S. courts and 2) until now,
there were no reliable resources that explained the remedies patients might have
in foreign jurisdictions. In this Article, I attempt to fill this void. Given this
information, I also discuss how policymakers might reallocate these risks more
fairly and efficiently.
Part I begins by evaluating whether medical tourists can recover in U.S.
courts. I use existing scholarship to outline the legal theories patients might use
against certain defendants. I emphasize the term "theories" here because courts
have yet to test these claims. First, I discuss how patients will struggle to prevail
on issues of jurisdiction, venue, and choice of law if they sue foreign providers in
U.S. courts. I then discuss how patients will face different obstacles if they
attempt to recover from U.S.-based employers, insurers, and medical tourism
facilitators. I evaluate several theories of liability, including corporate
negligence, informed consent, vicarious liability, and negligent credentialing.
Part I concludes by discussing how the industry uses releases, waivers,
disclaimers, and other contractual prophylaxes to shift the legal risks in two
directions-toward patients and toward foreign jurisdictions.
Part II proceeds on the assumption that patients will have difficulty suing in
U.S. courts for malpractice committed overseas. I evaluate the means of redress
available in four popular destinations: India, Thailand, Singapore, and Mexico.
In India, patients can sue in civil court or in one of India's consumer forums.
India also relies on criminal prosecution, self-regulation, and hospital
accreditation to impose quality standards on providers. But none of these systems
enforce much accountability. Civil litigation is an extremely long process, even
by U.S. standards. India's consumer forums provide an efficient alternative, but
patients must contend with procedural hurdles and overcome difficulties securing
medical records and expert testimony simply to recover rather modest
compensation. Criminal prosecution is rare. Government regulation is virtually
non-existent, and self-regulation by the medical councils is deeply flawed.
Hospital accreditation is establishing some standards, but does not pretend to
address negligence. India should be credited for acknowledging these
shortcomings and attempting to mitigate them through its consumer forums. But
given the relatively small size of malpractice recoveries reported by the Indian
5
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media, it is doubtful that U.S. patients will be satisfied with the remedies offered
by these forums.
In Thailand, patients also struggle to hold someone accountable for medical
negligence. Few patients file any sort of complaint-either in civil court or with
the Thai Medical Council, the Ministry of Public Health, or the Consumer
Protection Agency. Those suing in civil courts face several obstacles. Thai
malpractice law is underdeveloped. Patients often cannot access their medical
records. Thai courts communicate solely in Thai, do not allow pretrial discovery,
and seem hostile to tort claims in general. Finally, the average Thai patient
recovers less than $2500, which most U.S. patients would find unsatisfying. But
like most countries, Thailand is searching for the appropriate balance and is
considering several major reforms, including no-fault liability and a patient's
compensation fund. Thus, the Thai system remains in flux.
In Singapore, patients face yet other obstacles. In negligence cases,
Singapore adheres to the notorious Bolam rule, an English trial court opinion
from 1957 that strongly favors physicians by instructing courts to use a
deferential interpretation of the appropriate standard of care. Patients in
Singapore also remain exceedingly reluctant to sue, in part because Singaporean
law imposes costs on the losing litigant and prohibits contingency fee
arrangements. Finally, compensation is modest not only by U.S. standards, but by
standards we might expect for a nation with Singapore's wealth. Nonetheless,
Singapore comprehensively regulates its health care providers, and the
government seems to be committed to understanding and reducing the frequency
of medical errors.
Finally, patients in Mexico must contend with a legal system that uses
neither juries nor stare decisis and a civil code that pegs compensation to a
formula used in workers' compensation cases. Tort litigation is virtually non-
existent in Mexico, and most U.S. tort victims injured there prefer to sue in the
United States if they can. Although Mexico has implemented an innovative new
medical arbitration system that is viewed favorably by both patients and
physicians, the average recovery is only $4800 per patient, which, again, most
U.S. patients would find inadequate.
In addition to obstacles unique to each jurisdiction, suing overseas could
discourage even the most resolute plaintiffs, who must retain local counsel,
navigate a foreign legal system (most likely in a foreign language), travel to
hearings, prove their cases, and perhaps even enforce judgments in their favor.1
2
These factors may combine to effectively preclude legal recourse.
Part III concludes by exploring how the public and private sectors might
12. See Thomas R. McLean, The Offshoring of American Medicine: Scope, Economic Issues
and Legal Liabilities, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 205, 247-55 (2005); Terry, supra note 6, at 465; Jorge
A. Vargas, Mexican Law and Personal Injury Cases: An Increasingly Prominent Area for U.S.
Legal Practitioners and Judges, 8 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 475, 505 (2007).
X:I (2010)
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reallocate-and perhaps mitigate-the legal risks of medical travel. In the private
sector, an industry association recently began certifying medical tourism
facilitators, and this process seems to encourage companies to disclose the legal
remedies their customers might have, including remedies in foreign jurisdictions.
Also, at least one insurance company now offers medical tourism insurance, and
the American Medical Association has published industry guidelines. Part III
examines the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches, and concludes by
proposing ways the public sector could intervene. Legislatures could impose
statutory strict liability on employers, insurers, and intermediaries that send
patients overseas. Lawmakers could require these companies to insure against
medical errors or pay for any pre-screening or post-operative care that may be
necessary. They could invalidate any releases or waivers of liability. Or,
policymakers might simply try to correct the information asymmetries that
contribute to the current misallocation of legal risks. I propose a combination of
these methods that would ease legal impediments to suing in the United States
and inform patients of the risks of agreeing to assert claims in foreign courts.
Even if these efforts do not generate precisely the same remedies as those
available to patients treated in the United States, they should better spread the
risks among the parties that benefit from these transactions.
This Article has two major goals, one descriptive and one prescriptive. First,
the descriptive goal is to provide much-needed basic information about the legal
systems in four countries that foreign patients increasingly visit. As I describe the
medical malpractice compensation systems in India, Thailand, Singapore, and
Mexico, I try to outline the basic mechanics of each system and the obstacles that
might preclude foreign patients from receiving meaningful compensation.'
3
Hopefully, this information will be useful to patients, the industry, and
policymakers alike.
The second, prescriptive goal of this Article is to suggest how both the
public and private sectors might reallocate the legal risks more fairly and
efficiently, so they do not fall solely, or even squarely, on patients. I scrutinize
private-sector responses to the legal imbalance and recommend specific public
sector options that would both eliminate impediments to hashing out these legal
claims in the United States and better inform patients who agree to foreign
jurisdiction just what they are sacrificing. Again, the goal is to guide this market
toward a more optimal allocation of risks and responsibility.
13. I should note that this Article is not a traditional comparative work. I do not attempt to
compare the malpractice systems of these countries to the American system, nor do I try to extract
any policy lessons or identify the most fair and efficient method of compensating aggrieved
patients. Rather, my goal is to fill a void in the literature by examining how patients might fare in
select jurisdictions and whether U.S. patients will be satisfied with these remedies. Each
jurisdiction deserves much closer scrutiny than anyone can provide in one article, and a pure
comparative analysis would require better empirical data than is currently available.
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I. SEEKING REDRESS IN THE UNITED STATES
Many believe cross-border medical treatment could be the next big trend in
global health care. The phenomenon has triggered a torrent of media coverage
and academic articles trying to predict what will come of it., 4 Health economist
Uwe Reinhardt says it "has the potential of doing to the U.S. health care system
what the Japanese auto industry did to American carmakers."15
Estimates vary widely on the precise number of U.S. patients that travel
overseas for treatment each year. A 2008 report estimates that only 5000 to
10,000 Americans travel each year specifically for inpatient procedures.1 6 But a
separate report estimated that 750,000 U.S. patients traveled overseas for medical
care in 2007, and some predict that five or six million will do so in 2010.17 In
either case, a mounting number of employers and insurers is garnering national
media attention for adding foreign hospitals to their provider networks.
18
Moreover, foreign hospitals and governments are intensifying their efforts to
attract American patients.' 9 Because the industry remains embryonic, now may
be the perfect time to influence how it allocates legal risks.
Before evaluating how aggrieved patients might fare abroad, I describe how
they might fare in the United States. In this Part, I draw on existing scholarship to
summarize whether U.S. patients who obtain treatment overseas might be able to
recover from specific defendants in U.S. courts, including the legal theories they
might use. I emphasize the word "theories" because these suits have not been
tested. A major caveat in any legal analysis of medical tourism is the pervasive
uncertainty over who might be liable for malpractice overseas. It remains entirely
unclear whether medical tourists can recover in U.S. courts. My research found
no reported opinions or test cases, and I suspect that providers and facilitators
have strong incentives to settle complaints outside the public eye. Moreover, the
14. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 6, at 72 n.5 (noting that the World Trade Organization, World
Health Organization, World Bank, and U.S. Senate have all studied medical tourism).
15. Unmesh Kher, Outsourcing Your Heart, TIME, May 21, 2006, at 44 (quoting Reinhardt).
16. Tilman Ehrbeck, Ceani Guevara & Paul D. Mango, Mapping the Market for Medical
Travel, McKINSEY Q., May 2008, at 2-3, 6 (acknowledging that a substantial number of patients
may travel for outpatient rather than inpatient procedures and distinguishing treatments given to
medical tourists from those given to visitors and expatriates).
17. DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, MEDICAL TOURISM: CONSUMERS IN SEARCH OF
VALUE 4 (2008), available at http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/
us chs MedicalTourismStudy(3).pdf, Ann Tatko-Peterson, Going Abroad for Health Care, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 16, 2006, at A3.
18. See, e.g., Janet Fullwood, Medical Tourism: Booming Trend is Standard Operating
Procedure, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 2, 2008, at J4 (citing BlueCross BlueShield of South Carolina);
Roni Caryn Rabin, Insurer Offers Options for Surgery in India, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/21 /health/2 1 abroad.html (citing Wellpoint).
19. See Cortez, supra note 6, at 89-95.
X:l (2010)
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industry is quickly formulating ways to avoid liability, and patients may not
appreciate just how few legal remedies remain.2°
A. Suing Foreign Providers in the United States
Victims of medical malpractice overseas might logically seek recourse
directly from the foreign hospital or medical professional that caused the injury.
However, the most obvious defendants may also be the most difficult to haul into
U.S. courts.
1. Personal Jurisdiction
The first obstacle to suing a foreign provider in the United States is
establishing that a U.S. court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 2 The
law of personal jurisdiction generally requires that a defendant has "minimum
contacts" with the forum state through some purposeful contacts or through
substantial and continuous connection with the forum.22 Finding minimum
contacts is never straightforward, but medical tourist arrangements complicate
the analysis by involving foreign health care providers who communicate with
patients to varying degrees over the Internet.23
First, in the medical context, courts traditionally have been reluctant to assert
jurisdiction over physicians who reside and practice even in another state,
particularly if the physician does not make any "systematic or continuing effort"
for his or her services "to be felt in the forum state. 24 Although this analysis
should differ if foreign providers systematically target U.S. residents through
websites or other avenues, my research uncovered few cases on point.25
20. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 6, at 4 (recommending that health plans have patients release
the plan from liability, noting that such a release "may or may not be valid in a court of law... but
could have a chilling effect on potential plaintiff litigation"); Scott A. Edelstein, Partner, Squire,
Sanders, & Dempsey, Addressing Liability Issues in Structuring Medical Tourism Programs:
Address at the 2008 World Medical Tourism & Global Health Congress (Sept. 9, 2008) (slides on
file with author).
21. Philip Mirrer-Singer, Medical Malpractice Overseas: The Legal Uncertainty Surrounding
Medical Tourism, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211, 212-15 (2007).
22. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8-9 (1984)
(distinguishing "specific" and "general" jurisdiction); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 291-92, 297-98 (1980).
23. I use the term "Internet" here to denote contacts through cyberspace and other computer
networks. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to Traditional
Principles To Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 71.
24. Mirrer-Singer, supra note 21, at 213 n.9 (quoting Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287, 290
(9th Cir. 1972)).
25. For example, a U.S. court has extended jurisdiction over a foreign website operator that
targeted U.S. students as customers. Graduate Management Admission Council v. Raju, 241 F.
9
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An aggrieved patient might also argue for jurisdiction based on a state's
long-arm statute if the foreign provider transacts or solicits business in the state.26
27But courts have been reluctant to exert jurisdiction on this basis alone. Even a
steady stream of referrals from the United States may not establish personal
jurisdiction. 28 However, courts have exercised personal jurisdiction over out-of-
state health care providers that have ongoing relationships with referral sources
in the forum. 29 Thus, a signed contract between a foreign provider and a U.S.
referral source may establish jurisdiction,30 even though, again, some courts have
refused to find jurisdiction based solely on a contract-particularly if the contract
does not pertain to conduct being challenged in the litigation. 31 For example, in
Romah v. Scully, a federal district court recently held that a Toronto hospital
being sued for malpractice by a U.S. patient was not subject to the court's
jurisdiction.32 Although the hospital had signed contracts with entities in the
forum state, the contracts were executed in Canada, and the hospital performed
the required work in Canada.33
Pervasive contact via the Internet, however, could establish jurisdiction over
a foreign provider that specifically targets U.S. patients.34 At least one court has
exercised jurisdiction over an Indian defendant based on a website that
specifically targeted U.S. customers.35 Moreover, in Romah v. Scully, part of the
reason the court did not accept jurisdiction over the Toronto hospital was that the
patient offered weak evidence that the hospital had targeted patients in the forum
state.36 Although many medical tourists may be able to muster more concrete
evidence that the foreign entity solicited U.S. patients, these analyses are so fact-
specific that it is difficult to predict whether any given U.S. court would assert
Supp. 2d 589, 599 (E.D. Va. 2003). See Spencer, supra note 23, for a thoughtful analysis of
personal jurisdiction based on Internet contacts.
26. See Mirrer-Singer, supra note 21, at 213 (citing New York's long-arm statute, at N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1), (a)(3)(i) (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2007)); Kerrie S. Howze, Note, Medical
Tourism: Symptom or Cure?, 41 GA. L. REv. 1013, 1031 (2007).
27. Mirrer-Singer, supra note 21, at 213 (citing cases).
28. Id. (citing cases).
29. Id. at 214 (citing cases).
30. Id.
31. Romah v. Scully, No. 06-698, 2007 WL 3493943, at *5-*6 (W.D. Pa., Nov. 13, 2007)
("The mere existence of a contract, standing alone, does not confer general jurisdiction over a
defendant.").
32. Id. Importantly, the patient was not a medical tourist, but was treated while in the custody
of Canadian law enforcement.
33. Id. at *7.
34. Howze, supra note 26, at 1032.
35. Graduate Management Admission Council v. Raju, 241 F. Supp. 2d 589, 599 (E.D. Va.
2003).
36. Romah, 2007 WL 3493943, at *8-*9.
X:l (2010)
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personal jurisdiction over a foreign provider. 37 Recent critiques of Internet-based
jurisdiction suggest ways courts might better balance concerns of fairness and the
limits of state sovereignty, 38 which are particularly applicable in medical tourist
arrangements.
Aggrieved patients might also argue for U.S. jurisdiction under a continuing
tort theory if the patient continues to be affected in the forum state by the foreign
provider's tortious conduct.39 But U.S. courts may be reluctant to make this leap
unless the patient has some sort of continuing relationship with the provider,4°
which is less likely in medical tourist arrangements.
Notwithstanding these hurdles, patients might be comforted to know that
U.S. courts often provide remedies when Americans are tortiously injured in
Mexico.4' In fact, U.S. courts decide far more tort cases arising in Mexico than
Mexican courts do.42 One study found that Americans can sue in U.S. courts if
the injury is egregious enough. For example, if a company with U.S. ties books a
vacationer's travel and strongly recommends a particular hotel in Mexico, a hotel
guest injured in the hotel can often sue in the United States.43 This scenario
suggests that U.S. courts might find ways to exercise jurisdiction in egregious
medical tourism cases as well.
2. Venue and Forum Non Conveniens
Even if a patient can establish jurisdiction in the United States, most foreign
defendants would move to dismiss under forum non conveniens-a doctrine that
allows courts to dismiss cases that would excessively burden the defendant and
when a more appropriate forum exists elsewhere.44 For example, if the defendant
resides overseas along with most of the witnesses and evidence, a court would
likely dismiss the case. In Jeha v. Arabian American Oil Co., a U.S. court
dismissed a medical malpractice suit filed by an employee's wife against a Saudi
Arabian-based employer because the critical evidence and witnesses were all
located in Lebanon.45 Courts considering a forum non conveniens motion must
37. Howze, supra note 26, at 1031-32.
38. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 23.
39. Mirrer-Singer, supra note 21, at 214 (citing cases).
40. Id. (citing cases explaining that refilling a prescription or receiving "incidental" phone
calls from a resident of the forum state did not establish personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state
doctor).
41. Vargas, supra note 12, at 477.
42. Id. at 478.
43. Id. at 505.
44. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981).
45. 751 F. Supp. 122, 126-28 (S.D. Tex. 1990). Note that Jeha involved a particularly
complicated fact pattern. The plaintiff was the wife of the employee and was treated by the
employer's doctors in Saudi Arabia. Both the employee and his wife were Lebanese citizens, who
11
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also consider which country's laws to apply and, more importantly, whether there
is an adequate alternative forum.46 Courts commonly invoke forum non
conveniens if foreign rather than domestic law governs the conduct at issue.
47
Thus, for example, a U.S. court might be reluctant to accept venue and be forced
to apply Thai law to malpractice allegedly committed in Bangkok.
Courts typically recognize forum non conveniens if an alternative forum can
provide adequate legal redress, even if the remedies available are "substantially
less than provided by U.S. laws. 48 Though courts are reluctant to find that a
foreign forum is inadequate, some have.49 For example, in Bhatnagar v.
Surrendra Overseas Ltd., the Third Circuit denied a motion to dismiss a personal
injury case against an Indian shipping company on forum non conveniens
grounds because the alternative forum in India (the Calcutta High Court) was
beset by "extreme delays," lasting possibly even a quarter century.50 The court
held that the severe backlog in Indian courts rendered them inadequate. 51
Testimony in the Bhatnagar case suggested that an "average" case before the
Calcutta High Court would take fifteen to twenty years to resolve.52 Thus, the
delayed remedies provided by Indian courts may be "so clearly inadequate or
unsatisfactory" that they are "no remedy at all. 53 However, the availability of
India's consumer forums for malpractice complaints might complicate this
analysis, as consumer forums were designed to resolve cases much more
expediently.54 Nevertheless, medical tourists should know that plaintiffs have had
difficulty convincing U.S. courts that even extremely small recoveries overseas
amount to "no remedy at all."' 55 For example, in Gonzalez v. Chrysler Corp., the
Fifth Circuit held that a $2500 maximum recovery in Mexico did not prove that
sued in federal district court in Texas in part because she traveled to the United States for treatment,
in part because the Saudi company had a Houston-based subsidiary, and most likely in part because
Saudi law does not recognize vicarious liability. A U.S. court might be more sympathetic to a U.S.
medical tourist injured overseas.
46. Mirrer-Singer, supra note 21, at 223-24.
47. Id. at 223 (citing cases).
48. Sector Navigation Co. v. M/N Captain P, No. 06-1788, 2006 WL 2946356, at *4 (E.D. La.
Oct. 13, 2006); Mirrer-Singer, supra note 21, at 223-24; Howze, supra note 26, at 1033.
49. Mirrer-Singer, supra note 21, at 223-24.
50. Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1226-29 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that
the experts "provided both statistical and anecdotal evidence documenting litigation delays" in
India); Mirrer-Singer, supra note 21, at 224.
51. Bhatnagar, 52 F.3d at 1227.
52. Id. at 1228.
53. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981). But see id. at 265 n.22 (noting that
alternative forums would be inadequate only in "rare circumstances"); Howze, supra note 26, at
1034.
54. See Section I.B, infra, for a description of India's consumer dispute redressal forums.
55. Howze, supra note 26, at 1035.
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the Mexican court was inadequate underforum non conveniens.56 Thus, although
concerns about lengthy judicial delays abroad may be sufficient for medical
tourists to gain access to U.S. courts, those same courts may not be sympathetic
to patients' complaints about the meager damage awards available overseas.
3. Choice of Law
Patients that sue foreign providers in U.S. courts must establish not only
jurisdiction and venue, but also may have to litigate complicated choice of law
questions. Defendants no doubt will argue that the laws where the treatment was
provided govern because, as I demonstrate in Part 1I, these laws tend to favor
providers.
Choice of law questions could be dispositive in medical tourism disputes.
Defeating a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens may represent a Pyrrhic
victory, as U.S. courts will frequently be obliged to follow the defendant-friendly
laws of major medical tourism destinations. For example, in Chadwick v.
Arabian American Oil Co., a U.S. plaintiff sued a Saudi Arabian company
incorporated in Delaware, arguing that the company was vicariously liable for
medical malpractice committed by the company's physician in Saudi Arabia.57
The court followed Delaware's conflict of law principles, governed by lex loci
delicti (a choice of law rule that applies the law of the place where the tort was
committed), and applied Saudi law because the physician allegedly misdiagnosed
the plaintiff in Saudi Arabia.58 But because Saudi law does not recognize
vicarious liability, the court dismissed the case.59 Similarly, a U.S. court applying
the law of India to a malpractice case might leave the patient with very little
compensation, yielding the same outcome as if the plaintiff had sued in India.6°
But the Chadwick case may be an unrepresentative and relatively simplistic
example of how courts might resolve choice of law questions in medical tourism
cases. First, very few American jurisdictions use lex loci delicti.61 Instead,
modem choice of law approaches tend to rely on a multitude of "contacts,
factors, and policies" that would require courts not only to examine the content of
foreign laws, but their underlying policies as well.62 Second, choice of law
56. 301 F.3d 377, 383 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Howze, supra note 26, at 1035.
57. Chadwick v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 656 F. Supp. 857, 858 (D. Del. 1987).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Howze, supra note 26, at 1038.
61. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in Cross-Border Torts 8 (Jan. 14, 2009), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=1328191 (unpublished manuscript) (noting how forty-two out of fifty-
two U.S. jurisdictions have abandoned the more straightforward lex loci delicti rule, which applies
the law of the place of injury). Note, however, that in Symeonides's article, "cross-border tort"
refers to conduct that causes an injury in a different state. Id. at 3 n. 1.
62. Id. at 9.
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disputes will be challenging because medical tourism complicates the traditional
analyses. U.S. patients might argue that because foreign providers market
themselves as meeting Western standards of medical care, they should be held to
those standards in court. Otherwise, divergent standards of care between
jurisdictions can affect the choice of law analysis. 63 Moreover, courts assessing
choice of law might consider patients' expectations and role in choosing the
foreign provider. 64 For example, in a domestic cross-border malpractice case, a
Pennsylvania court declined to apply Pennsylvania law and applied the more pro-
defendant law of Delaware, noting that patients who travel out-of-state for care
cannot carry with them the more protective laws of their domiciles, because such
a rule would require providers to comply with the laws of all states that send
them patients.65 In a medical tourism case, the foreign provider could similarly
argue that patients knowingly choose to receive health care in a foreign
jurisdiction and that providers cannot be expected to comply with the laws of all
of their patients' home countries.
Thus, although suing a foreign provider seems to be the most straightforward
avenue for redress, it could be anything but. Patients not only would struggle to
establish jurisdiction and venue in U.S. courts, but they may find that courts
would apply foreign law. Moreover, these legal obstacles are only compounded
by practical ones, such as the burden of properly serving process to a defendant
overseas.66 Combined, these obstacles could insulate foreign providers from
liability in U.S. courts. But until courts are confronted with such cases, we are
left to speculate.
B. Suing Intermediaries in the United States
Although medical facilitators located overseas can use many of the same
defenses as foreign providers, facilitators located in the United States are not
similarly shielded by questions of jurisdiction, venue, or choice of law, making
63. Id. at 30 (discussing Kuehn v. Childrens Hospital, L.A., 119 F.3d 1296 (7th Cir. 1997), in
which Judge Richard Posner held that a medical malpractice claim brought by a Wisconsin plaintiff
against a California hospital was governed by Wisconsin law in part because the state laws differed
primarily "in the scope of liability for negligence, not in the standard of care." 119 F.3d. at 1302).
64. Symeonides, supra note 61, at 31-32 (citing Pietrantonio v. United States, 827 F. Supp.
458 (W.D. Mich. 1993)). In Pietrantonio, the court held that a Michigan patient could sue a
Wisconsin hospital under Michigan law because the patient "did not go to Wisconsin except by
referral from his Michigan doctor" and thus "did not choose Wisconsin as the source of his medical
care and ... would not have expected Wisconsin law to determine [his and his family's] rights."
Pietrantonio, 827 F. Supp. at 462.
65. Troxel v. A.I. duPont Inst., 636 A.2d 1179, 1181-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
66. Romah v. Scully, No. 06-698, 2007 WL 3493943 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2007) (noting
difficulty plaintiff had serving process on a Toronto-based hospital defendant); Edelstein, supra
note 20, at Slide 11.
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them more convenient defendants. 67 U.S. facilitators could be liable under any of
the following theories: corporate negligence, failure to obtain informed consent,
and vicarious liability.
1. Corporate Negligence
Aggrieved patients may sue medical tourism facilitators for corporate
negligence, just as hospitals have been held liable for negligently hiring,
retaining, or supervising unfit or incompetent physicians. 68 However, courts
might be reluctant to extend corporate negligence beyond hospitals, as shown by
decisions absolving HMOs for torts committed by network physicians.69
Moreover, medical tourists could encounter difficulty proving corporate
negligence. For example, proving negligent retention would require
demonstrating not only that the foreign physician was unfit or incompetent, but
also that the U.S. company knew or should have known this based on some
70pattern of misconduct. Patients might find it difficult to muster evidence that a
foreign provider was unfit or incompetent, especially if the standards for
credentialing and practice depart from U.S. standards. Further, courts may be
reluctant to pass judgment on such matters.
2. Informed Consent
Patients may also sue medical tourism facilitators for failure to obtain
informed consent if the company misrepresents the quality or qualifications of its
foreign providers.7 Facilitators often boast about the quality of foreign providers,
and it is not difficult to find marketing hyperbole on their websites. 72 Of course,
patients will face several hurdles proving not only that a facilitator had a duty to
obtain informed consent, but that the facilitator also had failed to do so. Courts
remain wary of extending informed consent liability beyond the treating
physician.73 And it would be difficult to prove that the misrepresentation was
material because it must be shown to have caused the patient's injuries. 74 Most
importantly, it would be difficult for U.S. courts to ascertain whether the
statements were in fact misrepresentations, because this determination requires
67. Cortez, supra note 6, at 113-20; Mirrer-Singer, supra note 21, at 215-16.
68. Cortez, supra note 6, at 120; Mirrer-Singer, supra note 21, at 216.
69. Mirrer-Singer, supra note 21, at 216.
70. Id. at 216-17 (proving negligent hiring or supervision requires similar steps).
71. Id. at 217-19.
72. See, e.g., Global Med Network, Quality, http://www.globalmednetwork.com/htmlU
quality.html ("All our network hospitals have success rates that are in many cases equal to or
higher than their American counterparts.").
73. Mirrer-Singer, supra note 21, at 217.
74. Id. at 217-18 (citing cases).
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courts to assess the quality and credentials of foreign health care providers-a
thorny proposition. 5
3. Vicarious Liability
Finally, patients may argue that a medical tourism facilitator should be
vicariously liable for malpractice committed overseas.76 However, courts
generally refuse to hold HMOs and similar entities vicariously liable for
malpractice by a physician unless the physician is an employee or the agent of
the company.v Even then, most medical tourism facilitators can safeguard
against liability through a well-worded disclaimer.78
C. Suing Employers and Insurers in the United States
Today, many patients venture overseas not on their own planning, but
because an employer or insurer encourages it. In such cases, patients might assert
yet additional theories of liability. In fact, patients sent overseas by an employer
or insurer may have an easier path to redress in the United States than patients
venturing overseas independently.79 Some legal theories available to patients
suing employers or insurers overlap with those that would hold facilitators liable.
For example, patients might argue that an employer or insurer failed to obtain
informed consent or exerted some control over a negligent foreign provider and
should be vicariously liable.8° If an HMO physician recommends a foreign
surgeon, the U.S. physician would probably have some duty to disclose the risks
of the procedure and obtain preliminary informed consent; at least one court has
imposed such a duty on the referring physician in a domestic case. 81 In spite of
this domestic precedent, courts in medical tourism cases would still need to
resolve complicated questions regarding the scope of the risks, disclosures, and
consent required.
82
Like hospitals, insurers could be responsible for negligent credentialing if
75. Id. at 218-19.
76. Cortez, supra note 6, at 120; Mirrer-Singer, supra note 21, at 219-21.
77. Mirrer-Singer, supra note 21, at 219-20.
78. Id. at 221-22.
79. BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 6, at 157.
80. Howze, supra note 26, at 1039-40, 1043-44. Note, however, that the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Aetna v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 209 (2004), held that ERISA preempts state tort
claims against covered HMOs.
81. Howze, supra note 26, at 1046-48 (citing Kashkin v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 538 N.Y.S.2d
686 (Sup. Ct. 1989), which held the referring physician liable for failure to obtain informed consent
because the physician not only referred the patient to a second physician for a specific procedure
rather than a second opinion, but also made hospital arrangements through the referrer's office).
82. Howze, supra note 26, at 1049-50.
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the insurer negligently approved a foreign physician for treating its customers. 83
Some observers argue that if HMOs and other employer-sponsored health plans
outsource surgeries to foreign providers, they may violate their fiduciary duties
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).8 4 Health
plans covered by ERISA must act "solely in the interest" of plan beneficiaries
and must at minimum avoid making any material misrepresentations about the
plan.8 5 Health plans that outsource surgeries risk violating both duties.86 Even
though an ERISA claim would not compensate victims of malpractice, it might
encourage health plans to be more careful about the financial incentives they
offer and perhaps the representations they make about foreign providers.
Otherwise, insurers might be liable for civil damages as a result of the breach.87
Overall, employers and insurers that send patients overseas may be the least
sympathetic defendants because they generally save a significant amount of
money without accepting much risk in return. 88 Some authors even suggest that
offering financial incentives to patients may increase an insurer's risk of
liability.
89
But as with other defendants, there are real obstacles to proving these claims
against employers and insurers. For example, a court would have to resolve
several knotty questions outlined above to hold a U.S. employer or insurer liable
for failing to obtain informed consent from medical tourists. 90 Vicarious liability
is unlikely unless the employer or insurer exerted some control over the foreign
provider,91 which would be relatively unusual. A complaint based on negligent
credentialing may have some teeth but would require courts to scrutinize the
credentials of foreign providers operating in vastly different environments.
D. Inoculating Against Liability
The medical tourism industry is well aware of its potential legal liabilities.
Companies have identified these risks and are taking steps to minimize them.
92
Lawyers are busy formulating ways to avoid liability, particularly in U.S.
83. Id. at 1040-42.
84. See, e.g., Christopher J. Brady, Offshore Gambling: Medical Outsourcing Versus ERISA 's
Fiduciary Duty Requirement, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1073 (2007); see also Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
85. Brady, supra note 84, at 1081-87 (citing cases).
86. See generally id.
87. Id. at 1078-79; 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006) (describing the remedies available).
88. See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 6, at 121-23; Wagner, supra note 6, at 7.
89. BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 6, at 157.
90. Howze, supra note 26, at 1048-49.
91. Id. at 1039-40, 1043-44.
92. See generally Edelstein, supra note 20.
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courts.
9 3 In fact, companies may be able to limit their exposure (or at least
discourage lawsuits) by asking patients to acknowledge disclaimers or sign
releases or waivers. For example, companies can try to use contracts to limit the
remedies available, to cap damages, to allocate liability between suppliers, to
require indemnification, to shift jurisdiction to foreign courts, and to designate
alternative dispute resolution or other non-judicial methods of settling disputes.9 4
As a practical matter, medical tourism companies can also reduce their
exposure by limiting the representations they make about foreign providers,
including any claims about surgical success rates or express comparisons to U.S.
hospitals. 95 The industry might also discourage litigation by informing customers
of medical malpractice accident insurance and other forms of protection,96 which
I explore further in Section III.A. Together, these safeguards may inoculate the
industry against liability, particularly in U.S. courts.
Nevertheless, the unsettled legal questions raised by medical tourism
introduce pervasive uncertainty for patients, providers, and facilitators in the
market. These issues will be litigated eventually, and the first reported opinions
will quickly set standards for the industry. Patients undoubtedly will assert
creative legal theories, and defendants will devise even more creative defenses.
Until then, we are left to speculate. In the meantime, companies that outsource
health care to less expensive jurisdictions will continue to try to outsource
potential legal disputes as well.
II. SEEKING REDRESS IN FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS
Medical tourists who do not have legal recourse in the United States will
have to look elsewhere. In this Part, I evaluate the legal redress provided by four
common destinations-India, Thailand, Singapore, and Mexico. I assess whether
these countries provide adequate recourse to U.S. patients and the obstacles
patients might face navigating various complaint mechanisms in each country.
To date, no scholars or policymakers have tackled these issues, even as
employers and insurers increasingly outsource medical treatments. The current
literature assumes, without scrutiny, that medical tourist destinations provide
lesser remedies or even no remedies at all. In fact, most assume patients will be
on their own. For example, the United Kingdom's National Health Service
(NHS) warns that if patients seek treatment abroad and need to sue a treating
provider, they must rely on the legal system in that country.97 Industry
93. Id.




97. Cara Guthrie & Hannah Volp&, Overseas Treatment for NHS Patients, 2006 J. PERSONAL
X:I (2010)
18
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 10 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol10/iss1/1
RECALIBRATING THE LEGAL RISKS
representatives and observers often warn patients not to travel overseas if they
are concerned with their potential legal remedies. That is, medical tourists are
warned caveat emptor.
A. U.S. Expectations
Before scrutinizing malpractice regimes overseas, it is worth taking stock of
how U.S. patients fare here. In 2006, the National Practitioner Data Bank
(NPDB) received over 12,500 reports of medical malpractice payouts made on
98behalf of physicians, including both judgments and settlements. The mean
payout was $311,965 per patient, with a median of $175,000. 99 The NPDB also
reported that patients waited an average of 4.88 years from the date of the
incident to receive compensation. 00
Malpractice litigation in the United States is criticized as being a "lawsuit
lottery."' 0 1 The system is blamed for not only awarding windfall damages, but
also for awarding damages to meritless claims and denying damages to claims
with merit.10 2 The Institute of Medicine estimated that anywhere from 44,000 to
98,000 U.S. patients die in hospitals each year from preventable errors.0 3 Yet the
vast majority of U.S. patients injured by medical negligence do not sue.
104
Around 70% of those who file claims receive no compensation, and defendants
win most cases that proceed to trial.105 Although several studies conclude that
INJ. L. 12, 15-16; Terry, supra note 6, at 464. NHS's program paying for certain medical treatments
in fellow member states is known as E 112. National Health Service, Going Abroad for Planned
Treatment, Using El12, http://www.nhs.uk/Treatmentabroad/Pages/El12.aspx (last visited Nov.
22, 2009).
98. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NAT'L PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, 2006 ANNUAL
REPORT 27, 65 tbl.4 (2006), http://www.npdb-hipdb.hrsa.gov/pubs/stats/
2006_NPDBAnnualReport.pdf [hereinafter NPDB ANNUAL REPORT]. Congress created the
NPDB in the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3784,
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11,101 (2006).
99. NPDB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 8, 65 tbl.4.
100. Id. at 8. Although the NPDB requires reports in various circumstances (e.g., when state
boards take disciplinary actions, or when hospitals, HMOs, and similar entities discipline
physicians), id. at 14-15, the NPDB has been concerned about under-reporting, id. at 39-40. Note,
however, that very few practitioners dispute reports about them, id. at 8, and false reports can
trigger criminal punishment, id. at 17.
101. David M. Studdert, Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Medical Malpractice, 350
NEW ENG. J. MED. 283 (2004).
102. David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical
Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2025 (2006); Studdert, supra note 101.
103. INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 1 (Linda J.
Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan & Molla S. Donaldson eds., 1999).
104. Studdert et al., supra note 102, at 2024, 2025 (citing research).
105. Studdert et al., supra note 101, at 285.
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"the tort system does a reasonably good job of directing compensation to
plaintiffs with meritorious claims," compensation can still be indiscriminate.
0 6
At the same time, stories are legion of U.S. physicians quitting practice due to
skyrocketing malpractice insurance premiums. 10 7 Media reports of "mega
awards" in states without damage caps further undercut the public's faith in our
medical malpractice compensation system.'
08
Critics of our system are also quick to note that it is expensive and
inefficient: "For every dollar spent on compensation, 54 cents went to
administrative expenses (including those involving lawyers, experts, and
courts)."' 1 9 The consensus in the U.S. health care industry, of course, is that
"malpractice litigation has long since surpassed sensible levels and that major
tort reform is overdue."' 10 Many states have responded by enacting some kind of
tort reform, mostly focusing on capping damages.1"' Critics blame malpractice
litigation for encouraging defensive medicine and raising the costs of health care,
although "that canard has been exposed," ' 1 2 as researchers have found that
defending against medical malpractice litigation accounts for less than one
percent of all health care spending in the United States." 3 The U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services under former President Bush also expressed its
concerns with our system, noting that "Americans spend far more per person on
the costs of litigation than any other country in the world."
' 14
106. Id. (citing five sources concluding that the system generally compensates valid claims
filed, but citing two sources concluding that compensation is indiscriminate). Note also that
Studdert et al., reviewing a random sample of closed malpractice claims from five liability insurers,
found that 72% of malpractice claims not associated with medical errors did not result in
compensation, while 73% of claims associated with medical errors did. Studdert et al., supra note
102, at 2028.
107. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., ADDRESSING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS:
REFORMING THE MEDICAL LITIGATION SYSTEM To IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE 3-7
(2003), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/medliab.pdf [hereinafter NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS].
108. Id. at 13-14 (listing awards of $94 million and $100 million). Note, however, that
appellate courts almost uniformly reduce such awards.
109. Studdert et al., supra note 102, at 2024. A separate study found that sixty cents of every
dollar is spent on administrative costs. See Studdert et al., supra note 101, at 286.
110. Studdert et al., supra note 101, at 283.
111 See David A. Hyman et al., Estimating the Effect of Damages Caps in Medical
Malpractice Cases: Evidence from Texas, 1 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 355, 356 (2009) (noting that thirty
states cap non-economic or total damages); Studdert et al., supra note 101, at 283.
112. NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS, supra note 107, at 7-8; Studdert et al., supra note 101, at 283;
Terry, supra note 6, at 456-57 (describing the debate over the extent to which malpractice litigation
contributes to defensive medicine and rising health care costs).
113. Gerard F. Anderson et al., Health Spending in the United States and the Rest of the
Industrialized World, 24 HEALTH AFF. 903, 910 (2005).
114. NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS, supra note 107, at 1.
X 1 (20 10)
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Thus, there are obvious dangers in juxtaposing any malpractice system with
ours. Our system has gained international notoriety for being excessive,
inefficient, arbitrary, wasteful, and sometimes punitive. 15 Virtually any
comparison using U.S. awards as a baseline might conclude that the foreign
system undercompensates patients. Moreover, scholars cannot say with any
certainty that other systems are more or less adept at resisting meritless claims or
compensating claims with merit, because these data elude us. The best we can do
is to piece together disparate points of information to gauge how patients with
legitimate claims fare in each jurisdiction.
Finally, while each of the four countries I examine seems to be struggling to
make its malpractice system more efficient and just, each country has expressed
grave concerns about the rise of malpractice complaints. Moreover, developing
countries in particular worry about more pressing public health issues that might
relegate patient compensation down the list of priorities. Needless to say, these
tensions may magnify if foreign patients from more litigious jurisdictions begin
suing local providers.
B. India
India has quickly become perhaps the leading new destination for foreign
patients. In 2007, roughly 450,000 foreign patients visited India, up from roughly
150,000 in 2003 and second only to Thailand."l6 By 2012, India may earn over
$2 billion per year from medical tourism."17 India possesses the perfect formula
for attracting foreign patients. Its supply of physicians is world renowned," 8 and
its hospitals are gaining ground." 9 India integrates new medical technologies
relatively well. Widespread use of English makes its private hospitals and
physicians accessible to U.S. patients. Most of all, health care in India is
dramatically less expensive than in most countries that offer comparable
services. 1
20
115. Robert B. Leflar, "Unnatural Deaths," Criminal Sanctions, and Medical Quality
Improvement in Japan, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 1, 3 (2009).
116. DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 17, at 6; Aaditya Mattoo & Randeep
Rathindran, Does Health Insurance Impede Trade in Health Care Services? 2, 12 tbl.2 (World
Bank, Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3667, 2005). Many in the industry believe that India
will eventually attract more medical tourists than Thailand, although projecting the number of
medical tourists that will visit any one country has proven notoriously difficult.
117. Ganapati Mudur, Hospitals in India Woo Foreign Patients, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 1338
(2004).
118. See, e.g., Fitzhugh Mullan, Doctors for the World: Indian Physician Emigration, 25
HEALTH AFF. 380 (2006).
119. Cortez, supra note 6, at 83-85.
120. See, e.g., Aaditya Mattoo & Randeep Rathindran, How Health Insurance Inhibits Trade
in Health Care, 25 HEALTH AFF. 358, 359 (2006).
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The Indian government aggressively promotes its medical tourism industry,
following the lead of Thailand and Singapore.' 2 1 The Ministry of Tourism
partners with the industry to promote medical tourism, and some state
governments have followed suit.1 22 When U.S. health insurers consider
outsourcing surgeries, Indian hospitals often top the list of candidates.
But when observers scrutinize India as a destination for U.S. patients, we
often generalize about the extent to which its legal and regulatory systems fail to
protect patients. In theory, Indian laws attempt not only to punish and deter
medical malpractice, but also to compensate patients. Patients can file complaints
both in civil courts and in India's Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies
(CDRAs). 123 India also relies on familiar mechanisms like criminal prosecution,
self-regulation by medical councils, and hospital accreditation to enforce at least
some quality standards and accountability.
In reality, India does not impose much accountability. Civil litigation in
India is beset by maddening delays.1 24 India's consumer forums were intended to
provide a fair and efficient alternative but suffer from several deficiencies.
12 5
Criminal prosecution for medical malpractice is rare, 26 perhaps as it should be.
Regulation by the government is virtually non-existent, and self-regulation by
medical councils is deeply flawed.127 Hospital accreditation is beginning to take
hold among private hospitals that attract foreign patients, but the patchwork of
accreditation bodies is immature and weak,1 28 and accreditation does not pretend
to address negligence. Notably, an executive with the Confederation of Indian
121. Cortez, supra note 6, at 91-93.
122. Id. at 91.
123. See Subsection II.B. 1, infra.
124. See Subsection II.B. 1, infra.
125. See Subsection II.B.1, infra.
126. See Subsection II.B.2, infra.
127. See Subsection II.B.2, infra.
128. There is no national hospital accreditation in India, and at least seven different groups
have proposed accreditation systems, including 1) states, 2) the Bureau of Indian Standards, 3) the
National Institute for Health and Family Welfare, 4) the Indian Hospital Association, 5) the
Confederation of Indian Industry, 6) the National Accreditation Board for Hospitals and Health
Care Providers, and 7) the Indian Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. The latter three efforts
have emerged with international standards and commerce in mind. See Chandrima B. Chatterjee,
Accreditation of Hospitals: An Overview, EXPRESS HEALTHCARE MGMT. (India), Sept. 2005,
http://www.expresshealthcaremgmt.com/20050915/accreditation0l.shtml; Rupa Chinai & Rahul
Goswami, Medical Visas Mark Growth of Indian Medical Tourism, 85 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG.
164 (2007), available at http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/3/07-010307.pdf, Varsha Zende,
Dynamics of Accreditation of Private Hospitals, EXPRESS HEALTHCARE MGMT. (India), Nov. 2006,
http://expresshealthcaremgmt.com/20061l/accreditation0l.shtml; National Accreditation Board for
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Industry states that "[a]ny litigation launched against an Indian hospital will
expose the poor system of justice that exists here.
12 9
In short, India's legal and regulatory systems impose few standards on the
practice of medicine and do not hold providers accountable in any meaningful
way. In fact, some feel the lack of standards and accountability has led the
medical profession in India to become increasingly "recalcitrant." 130 Finally,
there remains a gap in India between several well-intentioned laws and how they
operate in reality. As one medical malpractice expert observes, laws exist, but in
practice the legal and regulatory systems are beset by delay and apathy.'
31
Ironically, the most concrete incentives to avoid injuring foreign patients derive
from external sources, such as international accreditation, adverse publicity, and
perhaps contracts with foreign payors.
Thus, my research largely confirms our intuition that U.S. patients will
struggle to obtain adequate, timely redress in India. But my research also
complicates this intuition. Recourse is inadequate in India not because of
unreasonable delays or inaccessible tribunals-India's consumer forums still
resolve cases more quickly than most U.S. courts-but because compensation is
several magnitudes lower than what U.S. patients might expect. Ironically,
compensation is lower in India for largely the same reasons that medical care
costs so little: everything is more expensive in the United States. 
132
1. Redressal Options in India
Victims of medical negligence in India have two primary options: sue in a
consumer forum under the Consumer Protection Act or sue in civil court under
the tort theory of negligence. Although the government created consumer forums
to avoid the burdens of civil litigation, they have come to suffer from some of the
same deficiencies that plague civil courts. I discuss both venues and conclude
that although consumer forums provide a much more efficient alternative to civil
litigation, they present discrete challenges for aggrieved foreign patients, not the
least of which is very modest compensation.
a. Consumer Forums
India's Consumer Disputes Redressal Agencies have become the primary
avenue of redress for patients. The forums are a quasi-judicial grievance system
intended to create a fair, efficient alternative to civil courts. Although India
129. Chinai & Goswami, supra note 128, at 165. The Confederation is a not-for-profit industry
organization, much like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
130. ANOOP K. KAUSHAL, MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AND LEGAL REMEDIES 2 (2004).
131. Id. at5.
132. See, e.g., Gerard F. Anderson et al., It's the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States Is So
Different from Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89 (2003).
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should be commended for creating these forums, in practice, medical negligence
suits in consumer forums now impose many of the same burdens as civil
litigation: delays, difficulty securing medical records and expert testimony, low
success rates, and very modest compensation. In this section, I describe how the
consumer forums function and the obstacles U.S. patients might encounter.
i. Creating an Alternative to Civil Litigation
In 1986, the Parliament of India passed the Consumer Protection Act,
133
implementing the United Nations' 1985 Consumer Protection Resolution. 134 The
Act was hailed as a "remarkable piece of legislation" because it created an
economical, quasi-judicial alternative for resolving consumer grievances in a
country that sorely needed it. 135 Although it took several years to clarify that the
Act applied to medical malpractice cases, 136 it has since become the most well-
known law among medical practitioners in India.137 Indeed, the Act is a source of
anxiety for physicians precisely because it supplants India's notoriously
protracted civil litigation system, in which plaintiffs might have to wait well over
ten years for a case to be resolved.
138
The Act established three tiers of consumer forums--district, state, and
national.1 39 States have established at least 604 District Forums and 34 State
Commissions. 4 ° The Parliament structured these forums to be "quicker and less
costly" alternatives to civil litigation. None of the forums utilize juries;
decisions are made by panels of "members" and a president. Each tier generally
appoints members with both judicial and non-judicial backgrounds, in line with
133. The Consumer Protection Act, 1986, No. 68, Acts of Parliament, 1986.
134. G.A. Res. 39/248, U.N. Doc. AIRES/39/248 (Apr. 16, 1985). This resolution asked
signatories, particularly developing countries like India, to improve consumer protection laws,
including "measures enabling consumers to obtain redress." Id.
135. Bharat Jayaraj, A Forum for Redressal, HINDU FOLIO, Oct. 31, 1999, available at
http://www.hinduonnet.com/folio/fo9910/99100100.htm.
136. Consumer forums began operating in 1987. In 1992, the National Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission announced that the Act applied to medical services, and in 1995 the Indian
Supreme Court affirmed. See Indian Med. Ass'n v. V.P. Shantha, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 550.
137. Ramesh Bhat, Regulation of the Private Health Sector in India, II INT'L J. HEALTH PLAN.
& MGMT. 253, 262 (1996).
138. Sanjay Kumar, India: Doctors Dispute Trader Role, 340 LANCET 1400 (1992).
139. The Consumer Protection Act, 1986, No. 68, Acts of Parliament, 1986.
140. National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Addresses of the State Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commissions, http://www.ncdrc.nic.in/sDetails.html; National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, District Forums, http://www.ncdrc.nic.in/districtforums.html (the
database does not include information for the state of Manipur).
141. Bhat, supra note 137, at 264.
X:l (2010)
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the forum's quasi-judicial nature. 42 And each tier has original jurisdiction to hear
complaints based on the damages claimed.143 For example, District Forums may
hear complaints claiming compensation up to two million rupees (roughly
$43,500). 144 State Commissions hear complaints seeking compensation between
two million and ten million rupees (between $43,500 and $217,700).145 The
National Commission hears complaints seeking more than ten million rupees
($217,700).146 These ranges were raised significantly in 2002.147 Both the State
and National Commissions also have appellate jurisdiction to hear appeals from
subordinate forums.
148
In structuring these forums, the Indian Parliament tried to balance the
convenience of non-judicial forums with the legitimacy of courts. For example,
the Act vests consumer forums with the power to summon witnesses, receive
affidavits, request laboratory tests, and review other documentary and material
evidence.1 49 In fact, the Act deems each consumer forum to be a "civil court
' 150
and every proceeding is a "judicial proceeding" under the Indian Code.1 5' Despite
these grants, National Commission regulations recognize that a consumer forum
is "not a regular court. '
ii. Causes ofAction
The Act empowers consumers in India to bring six different causes of
142. For example, the president of each District Forum must be a current or former District
Judge, or someone who is "qualified" to be one. See The Consumer Protection Act § 10(1)(a), No.
68 of 1986, available at http://ncdrc.nic.in/l_1.html.
143. The Consumer Protection Act §§ 9-27A, No. 68 of 1986, available at http://ncdrc.nic.in/
1_1.html.
144. Id. § 11(1). I calculated the U.S. dollar equivalents using the Federal Reserve Bank's
historical foreign exchange rates for the Indian rupee as of September 15, 2008. See Federal
Reserve Statistical Release H.10, Foreign Exchange Rates (Weekly), Historical Rates for India,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h I 0/hist/dat00_in.htm.
145. The Consumer Protection Act § 17(l)(a)(i), No. 68 of 1986, available at
http://ncdrc.nic.in/ 1 .html.
146. Id. § 21(a)(i).
147. The Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002, No. 62, Acts of Parliament, 2002.
148. The Consumer Protection Act §§ 17(l)(a)(ii), 21(a)(ii), No. 68 of 1986, available at
http://ncdrc.nic.in/l_1.html.
149. The Consumer Protection Act § 13(4), No. 68 of 1986, available at
http://ncdrc.nic.in/1 _1 .html.
150. Id. § 13(5).
151. Id.
152. National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Consumer Protection Regulations,
2005, § 3(1), available at http://ncdrc.nic.in/Regulations2005.html [hereinafter Consumer
Protection Regulations].
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action. 153 The most common cause of action used by patients is that medical
services "suffer from deficiency in any respect."'' 54 The Act defines "deficiency"
broadly to mean "any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the
quality, nature and manner of performance."' 155 Of course, the trick for consumer
forums is determining whether a physician provided services that were indeed
faulty, imperfect, or inadequate. This language is widely considered to be a
negligence standard, even though a separate provision in the Act awards damages
for any loss or injury due to "negligence."
156
The Act exempts complaints for services provided "free of charge or under a
contract of personal service." 157 Despite longstanding arguments by physicians
that this exemption excluded medical services from the Act, the Indian Supreme
Court held that the Act allows consumers to sue private (and sometimes public)
physicians. 158 Of course, physicians criticized the Supreme Court's opinion. 159 In
response, one physician castigated his colleagues for their "God complexes" and
implored them to embrace the Act for the sake of patients. 
160
iii. Truncated Procedures, But Delays
Parliament created truncated procedures so consumer forums could dispose
of cases quickly. The Act gives consumers two years to file a complaint from
when the cause of action arose. 161 Forums must hear complaints "as expeditiously
153. Id. § 2(c).
154. Id. § 2(c)(iii).
155. Id. § 2(g).
156. Id. § 14(d); see, e.g., Bhat, supra note 137, at 265; K.K.S.R. Murthy, Medical Negligence
and the Law, INDIAN J. MED. ETHICS, Jul.-Sept. 2007, available at
http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/153oa116.html; Talha Abdul Rahman, Medical Negligence
and Doctors' Liability, INDIAN J. MED. ETHICS, Apr.-June 2005, available at
http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/132hl060.html.
157. National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, supra note 152, § 2(l)(o) (defining
"service"); Bhat, supra note 137, at 264.
158. Indian Med. Ass'n v. V.P. Shantha, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 550, 567-68 (holding that service
rendered to a patient by a doctor qualifies as "service" under the Consumer Protection Act and that
patients in Employee State Insurance hospitals and dispensaries could sue under the Act because
patients partially pay for treatments); Khomba Singh, Government Working on Framing Clinical
Guidelines for Doctors, ECON. TIMES (India), May 2, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 8113374.
159. Bhat, supra note 137, at 265.
160. Mangesh Jalgaonkar, Consumer Protection Act: An Introspection by a General
Practitioner, INDIAN J. MED. ETHICS, Nov. 2007, available at
http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/022mi012.html ("Patients used to consider us as Gods. We
still believe ourselves so.").
161. The Consumer Protection Act § 24A(l), No. 68 of 1986, available at http://ncdrc.nic.in/
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as possible" and must attempt to resolve them within three months from
receiving the defendant's response. 162 The Act anticipates that, from start to
finish, complaints should be resolved within five-and-a-half to six months of
being filed, subject to limited "adjournments.' 63
In reality, very few cases resolve this quickly. Critics complain that delays
cripple India's consumer forums because forums rarely resolve cases within the
recommended deadlines.' 64 Although the Act calls for forums to resolve
complaints within three months of hearing arguments, "cases are likely to take
two or three years."'' 65 The Department of Consumer Affairs estimated that only
27% of cases were resolved within the three-month period required by the Act.
166
Although these delays may not be what Parliament envisioned, the timeframes
still compare favorably to the 4.88 years it takes on average for payouts in the
United States.
167
The forums have tried to mitigate delays, with minimal success. Regulations
require each District Forum to resolve "at least 75 to 100 matters every
month."' 168 The National Commission boasts that all three tiers of consumer
forums have disposed of a large portion of their cases. 169 Yet delays remain a
concern in India, as shown by the sheer number of pending cases. For example,
in September 2007, there were 723 pending cases in Chennai (North) District
Forums and 1,372 in Chennai (South). 70 Karnataka boasted that its State
Commission had resolved 95.4% of cases and that its District Forums had
resolved 96.9%.17 But these clearance percentages may be misleading because it
appears that states and districts are calculating the number of cases resolved
against every complaint that the forums have ever entertained-meaning that
162. Id. § 13(3A). The Act gives a five-month timeframe for cases that require products to be
tested by laboratories, but it is not clear if this would apply to many malpractice cases.
163. Id. §§ 12-14.
164. Jayaraj, supra note 135; Consumer Laws Implementation, HINDU (India), Nov. 6, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 21848658.
165. See Tim Ensor & Sabine Weinzierl, Regulating Health Care in Low- and Middle-Income
Countries: Broadening the Policy Response in Resource Constrained Environments, 65 Soc. Sct. &
MED. 355 (2007) (noting that in the state of Andhra Pradesh, cases typically take three to four
years); Consumer Laws Implementation, supra note 164.
166. K. Srinivasan, A New Era in Consumerism, HINDU FOLIO (India), Oct. 31, 1999,
available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/folio/fo9910/99100060.htm.
167. See NPDB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 8.
168. Consumer Protection Regulations, supra note 152, § 19(1).
169. NCDRC, Total Number of Consumer Complaints Filed/Disposed Since Inception Under
Consumer Protection Law, http://ncdrc.nic.in/statisticsfiles/sheet006.html (posting cases resolved
as of Nov. 13, 2009) (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
170. Consumer Laws Implementation, supra note 164.
171. Consumer Forums Clear 95 Per Cent of Cases, HINDu (India), Dec. 24, 2006, available
at 2006 WLNR 23781013.
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over time, the clearance rates will naturally inflate. To illustrate, despite 95% to
97% clearance rates in Karnataka, 977 cases were still pending before its State
Commission, and 2982 cases were pending in its District Forums. 172 Observers
argue that these delays deter consumers from filing complaints in the first
place, 73 though it is not clear whether a three to four year delay would deter U.S.
patients. 174
iv. The Obstacles to Proving Negligence
Delays may deter claims, but patients in India might be even more
disheartened by other obstacles to proving malpractice in consumer forums. As in
most countries, patients in India alleging medical negligence must bear the
burden of proving it.175 This burden does not seem unreasonable until we account
for two major obstacles. First, it is extremely difficult for patients to find a
qualified medical expert willing to testify that a colleague was negligent. Second,
physicians and hospitals make it difficult for patients to obtain medical records
and other information about the services in dispute.
First, physician defendants easily find experts to testify on their behalf, but
plaintiffs have "faced problems in getting qualified medical practitioners to
testify on their behalf," and most have been "ultimately unable to furnish
qualified witnesses to support their claim.' ' 176 A plaintiffs lawyer who has tried
more than 1,000 consumer forum cases said that malpractice cases often fail
because "[i]n most of these cases, the expert opinion provided by the Indian
Medical Association are always in favour of doctors and hospitals, even if they
have erred.' 77 Thus, patients claiming damages for medical negligence in
consumer forums are often unable to prove their allegations because physicians
are unwilling to testify against other physicians. 178 One observer notes that
''patients are clearly at a disadvantage because of lack of on-the-record testimony
172. Id.
173. Consumer Laws Implementation, supra note 164.
174. American patients suing in U.S. courts might be more patient waiting for judgment or
settlement because they anticipate a relatively large recovery; American patients suing in India's
consumer protection forums may be less patient if they anticipate relatively small recoveries by
U.S. standards.
175. KAUSHAL, supra note 130, at 12, 26.
176. Bhat, supra note 137, at 265.
177. His Brief Is Different, HINDU (India), Sept. 17, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR
14689221.
178. Ganapati Mudur, Indian Doctors Not Accountable, Says Consumer Report, 321 BRIT.
MED. J. 588 (2000). Although securing expert medical testimony can be a challenge in most
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by doctors and also a lack of relevant medical documents."' 7 9 In 2003, the
President of the Consumer Information Center said that "it is very difficult to
prove an act of negligence" because "[m]ost doctors never speak against their
fellow medical practitioners even if they are guilty."'
180
Some observers worry that consumer forums do not have the requisite
expertise or resources to handle complex medical cases. 181 A State Consumer
Affairs Minister agreed that consumer forums need outside medical experts in
negligence cases-possibly an independent advisory panel. 182 Currently, civil
courts can ask experts from government medical colleges to testify, but consumer
courts lack this authority. 183 Others have echoed this recommendation, proposing
that a panel convene monthly to hear all the medical negligence cases on a
forum's docket, or alternatively, proposing that forums assign an additional
medical expert to each two-member panel. 184 One malpractice expert in India
even suggested that forums could require complaints to append a supporting
expert opinion affidavit.' 85 Such a recommendation would likely preclude many
legitimate complaints, given the widely-acknowledged difficulty that patients
have securing expert testimony of any kind. At least one high court has urged
courts not to speculate about medical practices, concluding that court opinions
must be supported by some expert evidence.
186
Second, patients have difficulty proving medical negligence in India's
consumer forums because hospitals and physicians often refuse to provide
medical records or other information about the services in dispute. Providers
regularly fail to give patients written records of the diagnoses they receive, the
medicines they consume,' 87 or their course of treatment. 188 Historically, no laws
in India have required medical professionals to provide such information to
patients or their families. 189 It was not until 2002 that Indian Medical Council
179. Id. at 588.
180. Straight Answers, ECON. TIMES (India), Oct. 1, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 4449878.
181. Bhat, supra note 137, at 265.
182. Debashis Konar, Courting Crisis: Medico Cases in the Docks, TIMES INDIA, Apr. 23,
2005, available at 2005 WLNR 6358838.
183. Id. Dr. K. Mathiharan doubts that many civil courts actually exercise this option. Letter
from K. Mathiharan, Professor, Institute of Legal Medicine (Chennai, India), to Nathan Cortez,
Assistant Professor, Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law (Jan. 4, 2009) (on file
with author).
184. KAUSHAL, supra note 130, at 6-7.
185. Id. at 66.
186. Dr. C.J. Subramania v. Kumarasamy, 1 (1994) C.P.J. 509, 28; KAUSHAL, supra note
130, at 67.
187. Bhat, supra note 137, at 265.
188. Nayak, supra note 7, at 22.
189. Id. at 22; KAUSHAL, supra note 130, at 24. Note, however, that in 1996, the Bombay High
Court held that physicians and hospitals must provide medical records to patients or their close
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regulations required physicians to maintain patient records for three years and
provide them upon request. 190 However, it is unclear whether the Medical
Council has enforced these new requirements. Thus, access to basic information
about one's course of treatment remains alien to most patients in India.191
This unfortunate reality only compounds plaintiffs' burden of persuasion,
because most patients will find it nearly impossible to convince an expert to
testify that a physician was negligent without the benefit of at least some written
records describing the procedure and its outcome.' 92 Notably, the National
Commission has held that a hospital's failure to supply medical records is not
actionable as a "deficiency in service" under the Consumer Protection Act
because no law in India created a legal duty to provide these records. 193 However,
the 2002 Medical Council regulations that require physicians to keep patient
records and provide them upon request might enable such a cause of action.
194
The Medical Council may remove physicians from the Indian Medical Register if
a physician refuses to maintain or provide records,' 95 but this is a punishment the
Council rarely employs. 196 Even though India's Central Consumer Protection
Council "has periodically urged the Indian health ministry to make it mandatory
for all hospitals to provide medical records to patients," in practice, hospitals still
refuse such requests.' 97 In 2003, the Medical Council in the state of West Bengal
passed its own new Code of Medical Ethics requiring physicians to keep records
for every patient for at least three years. 98 Interestingly, one of the putative
purposes of the new Code was to speed up decisions in medical negligence
relatives when requested. Raghunath G. Raheja v. Maharastra Med. Council, A.I.R. 1996 Bom.
198, 203; K. Mathiharan, Medical Records, INDIAN J. MED. ETHICS, Apr.-Jun. 2004, available at
http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/122h1059.html
190. Medical Council of India, Code of Ethics Regulations, 2002, § 1.3, Apr. 6, 2002,
http://www.mciindia.org/know/rules/ethics.htm [hereinafter Code of Ethics Regulations].
191. Nayak, supra note 7, at 22.
192. KAUSHAL, supra note 130, at 27 (citing Dr. Shyam Kumar v. Rameshbhai, Harmanbhai
Kachhiya, 2002 (1) C.P.R. 320).
193. Poona Medical Foundation v. Maruttrao Tikare, 1995 (1) C.P.R. 661 (NC); KAUSHAL,
supra note 130, at 27; Mathiharan, supra note 189.
194. Code of Ethics Regulations, supra note 190, § 1.3.
195. Id. §§ 7.2, 8.3. The Register is a nationwide registry of physicians with recognized
credentials. See The Indian Medical Council Act §§ 21, 23, No. 102 of 1956, available at
http://www.mciindia.org/know/acts/acts.htm; Medical Council of India, MCI Regulations, 2000, §§
61-67, Nov. 15, 2000, http://mciindia.org/know/rules/regulate2000.htm [hereinafter MCI
Regulations].
196. Bhat, supra note 137, at 270.
197. Mudur, supra note 178, at 588.
198. Aditya Ghosh, Negligence Cases Pile Up at Medical Council, ECON. TIMEs (India), Feb.
17, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 7027823.
X:1 (2010)
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cases. 199 But the West Bengal Medical Council seemed to be looking out for its
own constituents-an officer with the Council said that doctors were
disadvantaged in negligence cases because most of the documentary evidence
was produced by patients. 200 By mandating that doctors keep better records, the
West Bengal Medical Council is trying to ensure that physicians control more of
the evidence instead of relying on the documentation of patients. There may be a
move toward more disclosure in India, but this move is by no means a revolution
motivated solely by an interest in protecting patients.
Some patients have sued for alleged manipulation of their medical
records, 20' but these cases seem to be rare. Thus patients in India "are not in a
position to build a case with the necessary information and documents as
evidence., 20 2 Although consumer forums recognize the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur20 3 -which allows a forum to presume negligence when the injury could
not have occurred otherwise-this does not compensate for the significant
hurdles that often preclude patients from accessing expert witnesses and medical
records.
v. Limited Compensation
Perhaps the biggest practical obstacle for U.S. patients seeking recourse in
India is the very modest compensation awarded. Not only does the Consumer
Protection Act not recognize non-economic damages like pain and suffering
204
that often amplify recoveries in U.S. courts, but the awards themselves are
simply magnitudes lower.
As a structural matter, the Act allows consumer forums to award several
forms of compensation. In medical malpractice cases, the most common form is
damages "for any loss or injury suffered by the consumer due to the negligence
of the opposite party. 20 5 The Act also allows forums to grant punitive damages
"in such circumstances as it deems fit." 206 Finally, the Act empowers forums to
"provide adequate costs to parties. 20 7 It is unclear how often consumer forums
actually grant punitive damages or costs. Recently, the Indian Supreme Court
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. KAUSHAL, supra note 130, at 27-28; Mathiharan, supra note 189.
202. Bhat, supra note 137, at 265.
203. Janak Kantimathi Nathan v. Murlidhar Eknath Masane, 2002 (2) C.P.R. 138, available at
http://ncdrc.nic.in/fa7391994.html.
204. Harjol Ahluwalia v. Spring Meadows Hosp., 1986-1999 Consumer 4457 (NS); Spring
Meadows Hosp. v. Harjol Ahluwalia (1998) 4 S.C.C. 39.
205. The Consumer Protection Act § 14(1)(d), No. 68 of 1986, available at
http://ncdrc.nic.in/1_ .html.
206. Id.
207. Id. § 14(1)(i).
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held that awards in consumer forums should not only compensate patients but
should aim to do justice by changing the attitudes of deficient service
providers.20 8 Nevertheless, forums are not explicitly authorized to grant damages
for pain and suffering or most other forms of non-economic damages.20 9 Indian
consumer forums have discretion to "serve ends of justice,, 210 but non-economic
damages are not widely accepted.
As a practical matter, India's consumer forums simply award much lower
compensation than U.S. courts do. There is no reliable data of recovery amounts
as there is in the United States, but anecdotal evidence in cases and media reports
suggest much lower compensation. In fact, major national newspapers in India
report malpractice awards that would barely warrant local media coverage here in
the United States. For example, the Times of India, the highest circulating
English language newspaper in the world,211 reported that a consumer forum
awarded 250,000 rupees ($5443) to the family of a patient who died during an
appendicitis operation.212 My review of other media reports shows similarly
modest awards making national news: 80,000 rupees for a faulty eye operation
($1742);213 100,000 rupees for an eye operation that resulted in death ($2177);214
and 80,000 rupees for leaving a needle inside the body after surgery ($1742).215
Other publications also report awards in these ranges, indicating that payouts of
this magnitude are considered newsworthy.216 There have been significantly
higher awards, but these appear to be the exception rather than the rule.217
Importantly, compensation is modest in India compared to the United States
for largely the same reasons that medical care costs so little. The basic inputs
208. Charan Singh v. Healing Touch Hosp., A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 3138, 3142.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Times Now Masthead of the World, TIMES INDIA, June 27, 2005, available at 2005
WLNR 10154745.
212. Dead Patient's Kin Get Rs. 2.5 Lakh, TIMES INDIA, May 24, 2006, available at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/Dead-patients-kin-get-Rs-25-
lakh/articleshow/1549786.cms (last visited Nov. 22, 2009). For an explanation of how I calculated
the U.S. Dollar equivalents, please see note 144, supra.
213. Konar, supra note 182.
214. Id.
215. His BriefIs Different, supra note 177.
216. See, e.g., KAUSHAL, supra note 130, at 71-72 (reporting awards of $2612 for negligent
death, $2721 for an injury resulting in an amputated leg, and $2177 for negligent death). Kaushal
reports similar awards in a digest of cases. Id. at 120-216.
217. For example, in Harjol Ahluwalia v. Spring Meadows Hospital, 1986-1999 Consumer
4457 (NS), the National Commission awarded Rs.1,250,000 for medical negligence by a nurse, a
physician, and a hospital. The National Commission further awarded Rs.500,000 for mental agony
suffered by the parents of the minor. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the order. Spring
Meadows Hosp. v. Hajol Ahluwalia, (1998) 4 S.C.C. 39.
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contributing to the cost of medical care are higher in the United States than in
other countries.21 8 Thus, it is unrealistic for U.S. patients to expect to pay third
world prices for medical care, but receive first world compensation if something
goes wrong. The prices of wages and other inputs simply do not support U.S.-like
compensation. Yet, even some Indian consumers are not happy with the
compensation awarded by consumer forums, ironically in part because they hope
to receive a huge, "American-like compensation.,
21 9
vi. Few Patients Succeed
There are no reliable, comprehensive, and recent estimates of how medical
malpractice complaints fare in India's consumer forums, but the best available
sources suggest they do not fare well. Between 1988 and 1998, only 73 out of
302 cases (24%) reported by the State Commissions, the National Commission,
and the Supreme Court awarded compensation.220 Another report estimated that
71% of malpractice cases resolved by the Gujarat State Commission between
1990 and 1994 were resolved in favor of the physician. In 1998, even the
Indian Medical Association estimated that district forums dismissed more than
90% of the 10,000 medical malpractice cases filed in a two year period.222 This
data does not, on its face, support the contention by physicians that the Consumer
Protection Act treats them unfairly.223
The final barrier to efficient and effective recourse as envisioned under the
Consumer Protection Act derives from the difficulty of enforcing judgments.
Indian consumers used to face "enormous difficulty" enforcing orders by the
consumer forums, 22 4 and recovery could be "tedious., 225 Even though the original
Act empowered forums to enforce judgments as if they were courts, 226 it did not
218. See, e.g., Anderson et al., supra note 132 (using OECD data to compare health spending
in the United States and twenty-nine other countries, not including India).
219. His Brief Is Different, supra note 177.
220. Letter from K. Mathiharan, Professor, Institute of Legal Medicine (Chennai, India), to
Nathan Cortez, Assistant Professor, Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law (Jan.
4, 2009) (on file with author).
221. Ramesh Bhat, Regulating the Private Health Care Sector in India: The Case of the
Indian Consumer Protection Act, 11 HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 266, 275 (1996); Bhat, supra note
137, at 265.
222. Ganapati Mudur, Indian Doctors Call for Protection Against Patients' Complaints, 316
BRIT. MED. J. 1558 (1998); see also Howze, supra note 26, at 1034 (estimating that 95% of medical
malpractice cases are dismissed).
223. Bhat, supra note 221, at 269; Bhat, supra note 137, at 265.
224. Jayaraj, supra note 135.
225. Id.
226. The Consumer Protection Act § 25, 1986, No. 68, Acts of Parliament, 1986.
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allow forums to attach the property of non-complying parties. 227 To attach a
property, consumer forums had to transfer the case to civil court, creating another
procedural hurdle.228 However, recent amendments vest consumer forums with
new enforcement powers. For example, the forums may attach the property of
non-complying parties or may even impose criminal penalties, such as
imprisonment up to three years or a fine up to ten thousand rupees ($217).229
Nevertheless, it remains to be seen whether consumer forums will use these new
powers or if the gap between the well-intentioned language of the Act and reality
will persist. One physician summarized the recent atmosphere in India as
"absolute chaos.' ' 230
In summary, India's consumer forums serve as an efficient alternative to
civil litigation, although medical malpractice cases can bog down as they do in
civil courts. Nevertheless, they still provide a crucial alternative to India's
notoriously protracted civil litigation system. And though both domestic and
foreign patients may struggle to secure expert testimony or access their own
medical records, the biggest impediment to U.S. patients recovering satisfactory
compensation in India's consumer forums is the comparatively small recoveries
they award. Thus, patients visiting India should know that although consumer
forums provide a palatable alternative to civil litigation, this alternative provides
understandably modest compensation.
b. Civil Courts
Civil courts in India have morphed into a depository for malpractice cases
that cannot or will not be entertained by consumer forums. For example, tort law
in India allows patients to sue for medical negligence even if the service was
provided free of charge, which would disqualify it from consumer forum
jurisdiction.23' More importantly, consumer forums sometimes transfer complex
medical negligence cases to civil courts.232 In Herambalal Das v. Dr. Ajoy Paul,
a consumer forum declined to hear a complaint arising from an allegedly
227. Id.; Jayaraj, supra note 135.
228. The Consumer Protection Act § 25, 1986, No. 68, Acts of Parliament, 1986; Jayaraj,
supra note 135.
229. Consumer Protection Act § 27(1). For the methodology I used to calculate exchange
rates, see supra note 144.
230. George Thomas, Consumate Justice or Complete Folly? Doctors and Consumer
Protection Act, ISSUES MED. ETHICS, Apr.-June 2002, at 28, available at
http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/l02le028.html.
231. Rahman, supra note 156.
232. See Herambalal Das v. Dr. Ajoy Paul, 2001 (2) C.P.R. 498, 498 (dismissing medical
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deficient cataract surgery, 233 referring the case to civil court because the
physicians may have manipulated and fabricated the medical records, which
required the consumer forum to take elaborate oral and documentary evidence
beyond the forum's expertise.234 Another consumer forum referred a case to civil
court because the dispute would have taken too long to resolve.235 There does not
appear to be any predictable doctrinal framework that guides the decisions of
consumer forums to transfer cases to civil courts.
Liability for medical negligence in civil courts derives in part from India's
Fatal Accidents Act, which compensates the heirs of those killed by an actionable
wrong.236 Liability also derives from the common law. Indian courts seem to use
the same formula that U.S. courts generally use in malpractice cases, looking at
duty, breach, causation, and damages.237 But India's legal system derives from
the English system, and as a result, Indian courts generally follow the decisions
of English courts.238 In medical negligence cases, Indian courts adhere to the
controversial Bolam and Bolitho decisions. 239 Bolam v. Friern Hospital
Management Committee, a 1957 English trial court opinion, and Bolitho v. City
& Hackney Health Authority, a 1998 House of Lords opinion, altered the
standards for proving medical negligence, requiring a judgment for the defendant
if any "expert" concludes the physician's actions were appropriate. These rulings
have been criticized for making courts overly reliant on medical testimony and
permitting negligent doctors to escape liability if they can find one expert to
testify on their behalf.2 4°
Perhaps the most significant hurdle for patients in civil courts is their
infamous delays. Plaintiffs may wait well over ten years for a case to conclude. 24'
233. Id.; KAUSHAL, supra note 130, at 27-28.
234. Herambalal Das, 2001 (2) C.P.R. at 498-99.
235. See Basudev Goswami v. Dr. Bhaskar Das, 2001 (2) C.P.R. 501, 503 (agreeing with
decision of Consumer Forum to dismiss case where "adjudication of the dispute in hand cannot be
done within a time frame"); KAUSHAL, supra note 130, at 28.
236. The Fatal Accidents Act § IA, No. 13 of 1855, available at
http://indiacode.nic.in/fullactl.asp?tfnm=185513. The Act does not specify that it applies to
medical negligence cases, but courts have interpreted the statute broadly and have awarded
damages to the heirs of deceased patients. See Dr. Laxman Balkrishna Joshi v. Dr. Trimbak Bapu
Godbole, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 128; Amalgamated Coal Fields Ltd. v. Mst. Chhotibai, (1973) 18
M.P.L.J. 389.
237. KAUSHAL, supra note 130, at 11-12; see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984); Nayak, supra note 7, at 22.
238. Nayak, supra note 7, at 20; Sidhartha Satpathy & Sujata Satapathy, Medical Negligence
or Diagnostic Conundrum? -A Medico-Legal Case Study, 21 MED. & L. 427, 428 (2002).
239. Bolitho v. City & Hackney Health Auth., [1998] A.C. 232 (H.L.); Bolam v. Friem Hosp.
Mgmt. Comm., [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582 (Eng.).
240. See Section II.D, infra, for a fuller discussion of the criticisms of Bolam and its progeny.
241. Kumar, supra note 138.
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In fact, as noted above, a U.S. court refused to dismiss a case on forum non
conveniens grounds because the courts in India have such severe delays, possibly
even "up to a quarter century. 24 2 Testimony in that case revealed that an
"average" case before the Calcutta High Court would take fifteen to twenty
years.243
Aside from the burdens of civil litigation, there are other reasons patients
might prefer India's consumer forums to its civil courts. First, when litigating a
complaint in civil court, the plaintiff cannot file a parallel claim in a consumer
forum.24 4 Thus, the choice to litigate in civil court effectively precludes a
consumer complaint, given the two-year statute of limitations under the
Consumer Protection Act. Perhaps more importantly, some Indian courts have
expressed unabashed hostility toward medical negligence cases. In 2004, a justice
of the Calcutta High Court criticized the rise in medical negligence cases,
claiming that the entire medical system would collapse if physicians were
harassed by lawsuits.245 Though such hostility certainly is not limited to judges,
criticisms of medical negligence claims by judicial officers indicates the type of
legal environment medical tourists must be prepared to encounter.
c. Self-Regulation by Medical Councils
India's medical councils ostensibly govern medical practice in India. The
primary professional organization for physicians is the Medical Council of
India.246 On several occasions, the Indian Parliament has granted more statutory
powers to the Medical Council to "make it an effective regulatory body., 247 The
Medical Council sets and maintains standards for medical education and
credentialing 248 and runs the Indian Medical Register of physicians with
recognized credentials. 249 As health regulation is decentralized in India, several
242. Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1226-27 (3d Cir. 1995) (reporting
that experts who testified about India's legal system "provided both statistical and anecdotal
evidence documenting litigation delays" there); Mirrer-Singer, supra note 21, at 224.
243. Bhatnagar, 52 F.3d at 1228.
244. KAUSHAL, supra note 130, at 69.
245. Hasty Negligence Pleas Annoy High Court, ECON. TIMES (India), Jan. 23, 2004, available
at 2004 WLNR 6999762.
246. The Indian Medical Council Act, 1933, No. 27, Acts of Parliament, 1933, repealed by
Indian Medical Council Act, 1956, No. 102, Acts of Parliament 1956 (amended by the Indian
Medical Council (Amendment) Acts of 1964, 1993, and 2001).
247. Bhat, supra note 137, at 269.
248. Medical Council of India, Introduction, http://www.mciindia.org/know/mci/
mciintro.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
249. Id.; The Indian Medical Council Act §§ 21, 23, 1956, No. 102, Acts of Parliament, 1956;
MCI Regulations, supra note 195, §§ 61-67.
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states have parallel state medical councils that also register physicians. 50
However, India's medical councils are more useful in theory than in practice. The
councils have lost their influence because few physicians are active members,
and most ignore the councils' guidelines.251 Unsurprisingly, Indian patients do
not trust the medical councils to regulate physicians.252
First, the councils are intended to regulate members and promote
compliance,253 but the Medical Council of India is often criticized for protecting
its members rather than the public.25 4 Critics note that "the Medical Council of
India has a poor record in dealing with malpractice, and it cannot award
compensation or pass criminal sentences. 2 55 Council regulations identify forms
of misconduct that can trigger disciplinary action.256 For example, the Council
can punish physicians by removing their names from the register.5 7
Nevertheless, the list of actionable offenses is generally incomplete, outdated,
and does not identify a range of punishments to fit offenses of vastly different
258severity.
Of course, the most glaring weakness with self-regulation by medical
councils is the conflict of interest created when the foxes guard the henhouse.
The Council's Code of Ethics Regulations requires disciplinary cases to be
judged by "peers. 2 59 One critic of the Medical Council's oversight explains:
There have been few instances of medical councils intervening and initiating
disciplinary action against members of their profession even when there is a
formal complaint of negligence. Informal discussions with one of the council
members revealed that not many councils have suspended the registration of
any member even though many complaints are received by the council. In the
case of one council, inquiry was initiated in only three cases and, in those, no
disciplinary action has been taken."
260
In 1996, the Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision, Indian
Medical Ass 'n v. V.P. Shantha, which ruled in favor of those who had criticized
the self-regulation of the medical profession by clarifying that the Consumer
250. Bhat, supra note 137, at 269.
251. Id. at 264.
252. Ensor & Weinzierl, supra note 165, at 359.
253. Bhat, supra note 137, at 269.
254. Id. at 270.
255. Kumar, supra note 138; Bhat, supra note 223, at 269.
256. Code of Ethics Regulations, supra note 190, § 7.
257. Indian Medical Council Act § 24(1), 1956, No. 102, Acts of Parliament, 1956.
258. Code of Ethics Regulations, supra note 190; Bhat, supra note 137, at 270.
259. Code of Ethics Regulations, supra note 190, § 8.6.
260. Bhat, supra note 137, at 270.
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Protection Act applies to medical services. 26 1 The Medical Council of India has
been castigated by consumer groups, the Supreme Court, and even physicians for
being corrupt and for not punishing its own members. 262 A neurosurgeon
declared at a public meeting on medical ethics that the national and state councils
"are inefficient and corrupt., 263 The medical councils in India are subject to
minimal, if any, government oversight,2 64 and the government will intervene only
if the councils do not follow the Medical Council Act.
2 6 5
In short, the medical councils of India do not regulate the practice of
medicine in any meaningful way.26 6 The councils may fail patients more than
anyone, given their unique position to influence practice standards and ethics.
267
d. Criminal Prosecution
Physicians in India may be prosecuted criminally, though it is doubtful this
deters ordinary negligence. The most common provision used against physicians
is section 304A of the Indian Penal Code, which prohibits "causing death by
negligence. '2 68 The Code punishes "[w]hoever causes the death of any person by
doing any rash or negligent act" with imprisonment up to two years, or a fine, or
both.2 69 Although this appears to create culpability from simple negligence, the
Indian Supreme Court has held that physicians committing a mere error of
judgment are not criminally liable under section 304A. 270 Rather, the Supreme
Court read into section 304A a standard of gross negligence or recklessness. 2 71
The Court found a heightened standard in light of two other sections in the Penal
Code that absolve accidents resulting from lawful activities performed in good
faith, which would cover most medical care.272 Physicians in India obviously
261. Indian Med. Ass'n v. V.P. Shantha, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 550, 567-68. Note that this case
originated in part from consumer frustration with the Medical Council's poor record in disciplining
its members. See Lilani Kumaranayake, The Role of Regulation: Influencing Private Sector Activity
Within Health Sector Reform, 9 J. INT'L DEv. 641, 647 (1997) (noting that consumer groups
initiated the litigation in response to the Medical Council's failures to discipline its members).
262. Straight Answers, supra note 180; Thomas, supra note 230.
263. Lack of Medical Ethics Deplored, ECON. TIMES (India), June 25, 2003, available at 2003
WLNR 4399683.




268. Indian Penal Code § 304A, 1860, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860.
269. Id.
270. Dr. Suresh Gupta v. Government of N.C.T. of Delhi, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 4091; Mahadev
Prasad Kaushik v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2008 Criminal Appeal No. 1625.
271. Dr. Suresh Gupta, A.I.R. 2004 S.C. 4091.
272. Id. Indian Penal Code section 80 absolves any "accident" that results from a lawful act.
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were relieved by the Court's opinion.273
Other provisions in the Indian Penal Code may also punish medical
malpractice that does not result in death.2 74 Although it is not immediately clear
how frequently physicians are prosecuted under these latter provisions, they have
been invoked in some cases.275
Of course, proving criminal negligence against medical professionals is
difficult. In 2005, the Supreme Court held that courts should not hear criminal
complaints against physicians without prima facie evidence supporting the
charge from a competent medical expert.276 As noted earlier, finding such an
expert is difficult. The Court also encouraged investigators, often police, to
secure an independent medical opinion, preferably from a government
physician. 277 Most importantly, Indian law departs from most jurisdictions in
placing the burden to collect evidence of criminal liability on the complainant,
even though prosecutors must still prove the case. 27 8 Given weak access to
medical records, this evidentiary demand may preclude many prosecutions.2 79
2. Foreign Patients in India
Although India ostensibly regulates medical practice through consumer
forums, civil and criminal liability, and self-regulation by medical councils, each
of these systems is flawed. Civil litigation is fraught with delay. Consumer
forums present several obstacles. Government regulation is virtually non-
existent, and self-regulation by medical councils is inherently problematic. In
Section 88 absolves actions that were not intended to cause death and were performed with consent
in good faith for the person's benefit. No. 45 of 1860, INDIAN PEN. CODE §§ 80, 88 (2002); Murthy,
supra note 156, at 117.
273. Nayak, supra note 7, at 21; Docs Can't Be Culpable, ECON. TIMES (India), Aug. 6, 2004,
available at 2004 WL 7387190.
274. No. 45 of 1860, INDIAN PEN. CODE § 337 (2002) (punishing those who cause "hurt to any
person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of
others"); id. § 338 (punishing those who cause "grievous hurt to any person by doing any act so
rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others").
275. M.R. Hariharan Nair, Supreme Court Judgment on Criminal Medical Negligence: A
Challenge to the Profession, INDIAN J. MED. ETHICS, Oct.-Dec. 2005, available at
http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/l34ed11 0.html.
276. Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 3180; Murthy, supra note 156; Nair,
supra note 275.
277. Nair, supra note 275.
278. Id.
279. Overall, my research did not reveal much interplay between criminal actions and civil or
consumer forum actions. Physicians acquitted in criminal cases may not use the acquittal as
evidence in a consumer forum, because the standard in consumer forums is mere negligence rather
than gross negligence or recklessness. Dead Patient's Kin Get Rs. 2.5 Lakh, supra note 212.
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short, India's legal and regulatory systems impose few standards on medical
practice and generally fail to hold health care providers accountable in any
meaningful way.
Notably, the best mechanisms for regulating Indian providers that treat
foreign patients may be external sources, such as international accreditation,
adverse publicity that might encourage foreign patients to go elsewhere, and
contracts with foreign payors that might impose some accountability. That said,
all patients in India would benefit from locally-grown oversight. India's state and
local governments could do much more to regulate medical practice. However,
increased regulation does not seem to be a high priority. India is plagued by
extremely pressing public health issues like HIV/AIDS, malaria, a severe
shortage of resources, and extreme poverty.280 In a country where someone dies
every minute from tuberculosis,2 8' other health priorities obviously loom.
C. Thailand
Thailand is a primary destination for foreign patients. In 2006, it treated an
estimated 1.2 million foreigners, more than any other developing country.282
Thailand's Bumrungrad International Hospital itself claims to host some 500,000
foreign patients annually,283 and the country boasts at least 450 hospitals with
internationally trained health care professionals.284 In 2006, Thailand generated
roughly $2.3 billion from treating foreign patients, and revenues grow 40% each
year.285 Thailand has also been one of the more aggressive countries courting
foreign patients. After the 1997 Asian economic crisis, the Ministries of Public
Health and Commerce began coordinating with the Private Hospitals Association
to promote Thai hospitals overseas.286 More recently, the government has
planned to develop and promote health care centers in Bangkok, Phuket, and
280. WORLD HEALTH ORG., INDIA: NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM PROFILE 10, 13 (2002),
available at http://www.searo.who.int/LinkFiles/India CHP india.pdf.
281. Reuben Granich et al., Tuberculosis Control in India, 3 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES
595, 595 (2003).
282. DELOITTE CTR. FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, supra note 17, at 6 (defining this population as
anyone "traveling to another country to seek specialized or economical medical care" as distinct
from emergency or unplanned services provided to foreign tourists or expatriates).
283. Bumrungrad Keeps on Target, NATION (Thail.), Jan. 14, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR
775459.
284. Arthur Saniotis, Changing Ethics in Medical Practice: A Thai Perspective, 4 INDIAN J.
MED. ETHICS 24,24 (2007), available at http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/151 ie24.html.
285. Id.
286. Cha-aim Pachanee & Suwit Wibulpolprasert, Incoherent Policies on Universal Coverage
of Health Insurance and Promotion of International Trade in Health Services in Thailand, 21
HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 310, 311-12 (2006).
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Chiang Mai.287
But Thailand struggles with an emergent dichotomy, part of which embraces
medical tourism and part of which remains uneasy with the drive toward more
commercialized, profit-driven medicine.288 Though medical tourism draws new
revenues to Thailand, critics argue that it crowds out the medical care available to
ordinary Thais.289 There is widespread fear of both a brain and resource drain
from the public to the private sector, 290 although some dispute the severity of the
drain.291 Indeed, officials from the Ministry of Public Health have estimated that
"the resources needed to provide services to one foreigner may be equivalent to
those used to provide services to 4-5 Thais. ''292 While the medical tourism
industry booms, several provincial public hospitals have closed from lack of
resources. 293 There remains a severe shortage of physicians in public hospitals
294
because physicians can earn five to ten times as much in private ones.
2 9 5
287. Joan C. Henderson, Healthcare Tourism in Southeast Asia, 7 TOURISM REV. INT'L 115
(2004).
288. Saniotis, supra note 284.
289. See id. at 25.
290. Id.
291. Professor Eungprabhanth notes that the brain drain from the public to the private health
care sector in Thailand is not as severe as reported. He offers two possible reasons: first, public
hospitals receive a steady stream of new medical graduates who are obligated to work in public
hospitals for three years (with very few opting to pay a hefty fine to exempt themselves); and
second, provisions in Thai law exempt public but not private hospital physicians from legal
liability, allowing public patients to sue the government instead of individual physicians.
Memorandum from Prof. Vithoon Eungprabhanth, Consultant for Health Laws and Ethics Ctr.,
Thammasat Univ., Thailand to Prof. Nathan Cortez, Assist. Prof. of Law, SMU Dedman School of
Law (June 14, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Memorandum from Prof. Eungprabhanth].
292. Suwit Wibulpolprasert et al., International Service Trade and Its Implications for Human
Resources for Health: A Case Study of Thailand, HUM. RESOURCES FOR HEALTH, June 2004,
http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/2/1/10. Note, however, contrary data from
Australian officials, who claim that revenue from one foreign patient can be used to treat two or
three Australian patients on waiting lists. See David D. Benavides, Trade Policies and Export of
Health Services: A Development Perspective, in TRADE IN HEALTH SERVICES: GLOBAL, REGIONAL,
AND COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES 65 (Nick Drager & Cesar Vieira eds., 2002). Note also that according
to Professor Eungprabhanth, many of the large, private hospitals that cater to foreign patients have
chosen not to participate in Thailand's universal health insurance system. See Memorandum from
Prof. Eungprabhanth, supra note 291.
293. Saniotis, supra note 284. Note, however, that Professor Eungprabhanth disputes that
provincial public hospitals have had to close because of resource constraints. See Memorandum
from Prof Eungprabhanth, supra note 291.
294. Id.; Songphan Singkaew & Songyot Chaichana, The Case of Thailand, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE IN HEALTH SERVICES: A DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE 237, 238 (Simonetta Zarrilli & Colette
Kinnon eds., 1998).
295. Wibulpolprasert et al., supra note 292.
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Meanwhile, Thailand recently created a universal health care system by
extending coverage to 18.5 million previously uninsured Thais, 296 and
researchers report that the system "has greatly increased demand for health
care.'297 As in other developing countries, Thailand's public and private sectors
wrestle for finite health care resources.
What do these domestic challenges mean for foreign patients? First, the
struggle for finite resources exacerbates Thailand's two-tiered health care system,
and Thais may view foreign patients as a drain on health care resources rather
than as a source that might replenish them. Second, Thai courts and the
legislature might be more concerned about local public health issues and could
have little sympathy for foreign patients seeking relatively large malpractice
awards. As in India, other health priorities beckon. In short, Thailand's health
care system remains in flux. Not only is there tension between the public and
private sectors, but several legislative proposals may dramatically change the
way Thailand's legal and regulatory systems resolve medical malpractice cases.
In this section, I explain the avenues of redress in Thailand, how those avenues
may change, and what these changes could mean for foreign patients.
1. Avenues of Redress in Thailand
Bumrungrad International, perhaps Thailand's most famous hospital,
explains on its website that Thailand protects patients in several ways:
All patients in Thailand are protected by Thai law, codes of medical conduct,
and a Patient Bill of Rights enforced by the Kingdom's Medical Council ....
Patients may complain directly to the Thai Medical Council, or the Ministry of
Public Health .... You may also complain to the Thai Consumer Protection
Agency or the police, or take legal action in a Thai court.
When considering any overseas treatment it is important to understand that any
legal disputes... will be decided in the country of treatment, not your country
of origin or citizenship.
298
Bumrungrad International assures foreign patients that they are protected by
several legal and regulatory authorities in Thailand. Although Bumrungrad warns
296. David Hughes & Songkramchai Leethongdee, Universal Coverage in the Land of Smiles:
Lessons from Thailand's 30 Baht Health Reforms, 26 HEALTH AFF. 999, 1000 (2007); Pachanee &
Wibulpolprasert, supra note 286, at 310; Adrian Towse et al., Learning from Thailand's Health
Reforms, 328 BRIT. MED. J. 103, 103 (2004). Thailand's reform was called the "30 baht treats all
diseases project" because it provided a generous benefit package for a 30 baht copayment (around
$0.80) per chargeable episode. Hughes & Leethongdee, supra, at 999-1000.
297. Pachanee & Wibulpolprasert, supra note 286, at 311-12.
298. Bumrungrad International, FAQs, http://www.bumrungrad.com/overseas-medical-
care/faq-s.aspx#Q 10 (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
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that complaints will be governed by Thai rather than foreign law, the hospital
conveys the unmistakable message that Thai authorities protect foreign patients
and give them adequate legal recourse. But a fuller understanding of Thailand's
legal and regulatory systems calls these claims into question.
a. Civil Litigation in Thailand
Aggrieved patients in Thailand may sue health care providers in trial court
and may appeal unfavorable decisions to appellate courts and ultimately to
Thailand's Supreme Court. 299 Although Thailand is a civil code country, no Thai
statutes specifically address medical malpractice. Thus, patients most frequently
claim damages under Section 420 of Thailand's Civil and Commercial Code,
which requires any "person who, willfully or negligently, unlawfully injures the
life, body, health, liberty, property, or any right of another person" to pay
remuneration. 30 0 Thus, health care providers in Thailand may be sued for simple
negligence, though the plain language of the statute allows plaintiffs to allege
more creative grounds. As in most countries, medical negligence in Thailand is
defined as deviating from "a degree of care and skill that could reasonably be
expected of a normal, prudent practitioner of the same experience and
standing." 30' Patients bear the burden of proving negligence in Thai courts. 302 As
in India, patients face enormous practical difficulties proving negligence and
recovering meaningful compensation. 30 3 These burdens are magnified for foreign
patients.
First, aggrieved patients frequently fail to recover satisfactory compensation
for medical negligence because Thai malpractice law is underdeveloped. No
significant body of jurisprudence exists governing medical malpractice cases, and
there are few standards to guide courts in granting remuneration.30 4 In addition to
the lack of malpractice statutes, there are very few reported cases, legal
periodical articles, and books that discuss malpractice law there.
305
Second, Thais perceive that medical negligence suits languish in courts,
299. S. Saithanu et al., Management of Medical Liability in Thailand, 12 J. HEALTH Sci. 876
(2003) (Thail.).
300.THAIL. CIVIL & COMMERCIAL CODE § 420.
301. Sukhit Phaosavasdi et al., Physician's Weak Points at Court, 89 J. MED. Ass'N THAIL...
401,401 (2006).
302. Saithanu et al., supra note 299.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Yot Teerawattananon et al., Health Sector Regulation in Thailand: Recent Progress and
the Future Agenda, 63 HEALTH POL'Y 323 (2003). Two well-known books are DR. VITHOON
EUNGPRABHATH, MEDICAL LAW: LIABILITY OF MEDICAL AND HEALTH SERVICE PROVIDERS (2004);
and SAWANG BOONCHALERMVIPAS, LAWS AND CAUTIONS FOR MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS (2002), both
in Thai.
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bogged down in procedure.3 °6 Malpractice suits generally take five to seven years
to resolve,30 7 although like India, this timeframe does not necessarily compare
unfavorably to the United States.30 8  However, there are no official,
comprehensive estimates of how long the average malpractice case in Thailand
takes to resolve, and it is unclear whether these delays would deter U.S. patients.
Third, as in India, patients face enormous difficulty proving medical
negligence because many cannot access their own medical records. Some in
Thailand worry that "patients are systematically being denied access to hospital
medical records" when preparing malpractice complaints. 30 9  Preeyanan
Lorsermvattana, director of the Thai Jatrogenic Disease Network and herself a
malpractice plaintiff on behalf of her son, says that "[i]n many cases, the
hospitals simply claim that the records have disappeared. ' '310  Although
Thailand's professional councils helped promulgate a Declaration of Patients
Rights in 1998, physicians are still reluctant to provide patients with information,
even before treatment. 3 1 Thus, as in India, lack of access to medical records may
effectively preclude many legitimate complaints.
Fourth, even if plaintiffs can prove negligence, compensation is modest both
in judgment and in settlement.312 For example, one author suggests that the
largest award ever issued was around $100,000. 3 13 A Thai newspaper reported
that "about 36.5 million baht in total was paid to 443 victims of medical
malpractice between 2005-2006" 3 4-about 82,393 baht ($2463) per person.31 5
Thus, as in India, compensation in Thailand is dwarfed by the mean ($311,965)
and median ($175,000) payouts in the United States.316
Fifth, of immediate practical significance to foreign patients is the Thai court
system itself, which utilizes judges rather than lay juries, and is conducted
306. Saithanu et al., supra note 299.
307. Health Forum To Debate Medical Malpractice Law, NATION (Thail.), Feb. 21, 2008,
available at 2008 WLNR 3415529.
308. See NPDB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 98.
309. Tunya Sukpanich, The 'Doctor's Devil,' BANGKOK POST, Jan. 6, 2008, available at 2008
WLNR 297194.
310. Id.
311. Teerawattananon et al., supra note 305, at 336.
312. Saithanu et al., supra note 299.
313. Mark Roth, A Cheaper Medical Alternative; For Those with Minimal Health Insurance,
Getting Surgery Abroad May Be a Sound Option, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 10, 2006, at
Gl.
314. Thailand: The Public Health Ministry Drafts New Laws on Compensation for Victims of
Medical Malpractice, THAI PRESS REPS., Apr. 26, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 7811849.
315. See Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.10 (Thailand) (calculated exchange rate on
January 1, 2006), available at http://federalreserve.gov/RELEASES/HIO/Hist/
dat00_th.htm.
316. NPDB ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 98, at 8, 65 tbl.4.
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exclusively in Thai.317 All oral and documentary evidence in foreign languages
must be translated into Thai.318 Moreover, Thai courts do not permit pre-trial
discovery of documents; instead, courts subpoena parties to present documents at
trial, 319 which disadvantages plaintiffs. Consequentially, navigating the Thai legal
system may present an incredible challenge for a foreign plaintiff.32°
Finally, as in India, there is some hostility in Thailand toward medical
malpractice lawsuits and the legal system in general. New malpractice cases still
make national news in Thailand.321 And as in most jurisdictions, physicians
openly lament malpractice litigation. The Medical Association of Thailand
decries litigation as "a win at all costs game that we [find] dishonorable," and has
called for a national discussion "to restore sanity to a system that right now
severely inhibits physicians' efforts to learn from mistakes and make health care
safer for everyone. 322 Physicians complain that litigation can last "many years"
and that they often have no choice but to settle.323 These lamentations are
sometimes published as invective toward patients.324 On the other hand, some
physicians in Thailand believe that a small minority of "egotistic," "selfish," and
"merciless" physicians ruin the profession's reputation.325
On a more basic level, Thais generally distrust the legal system and rarely
317. Interview with Yutthana Srisavat and Pongwut Bamrungsuksawat, L.L.M. Candidates,
Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law, in Dallas, Tx (Mar. 18, 2009) (citing
Civil Procedure Code, Articles 13, 46, procedural rules that require the translation of court
documents into Thai). The Thai Constitution does not mention a right to jury trials, and section 197
ascribes judicial powers to judges. Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 (2007).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. The U.S. Embassy in Bangkok maintains a list of attorney referrals should Americans
need legal assistance. Email from American Citizen Services (ACS), U.S. Embassy Bangkok, to
Prof. Nathan Cortez (Dec. 22, 2008, 09:46 p.m. CST) (on file with author). Because the Embassy
does not ask why U.S. citizens are asking for attorney referrals, it was unable to estimate how many
seek an attorney to handle medical malpractice cases.
321. See, e.g., Couple May Sue Hospitals, THE NATION (Thail.), Dec. 29, 2007, available at
2007 WLNR 25643974.
322. Phaosavasdi et al., supra note 301, at 401.
323. Id.
324. Members of the Medical Association of Thailand complained that physicians "must
always remain calm even when the other party's temper[s] flair, they do not listen to reason, they
always complain about the doctor's privilege, they question everything but do not listen to the
answers and they keep talking nonsense, even when they are wrong." Id. at 402. Despite such
public condescension, the authors recommend that Thailand "actively pursue patient safety
initiatives that prevent medical injury, promote open communication between patients and doctors
and create a just compensation system without hindering the doctor's ability." Id.
325. Sukhit Phaosavasdi et al., Medical Ethics and the Survival of the Medical Profession, 88
J. MED. Ass'N THAIL. 563 (2005).
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pursue formal recourse in part because of Buddhist principles like karma, which
warn that "the assertion of [legal] rights may ultimately prolong conflict and may
in the long run contribute to suffering, misfortune, and distress., 326 In surveying
Thai citizens over several years, Professor David Engel found "diminished regard
for and use of law and legal institutions,, 327 quoting a Thai aphorism that "It is
better to eat dog shit than to go to court. 3 28 Although litigation rates have always
been low in Thailand, 329 rates of tort litigation in certain provinces have
dramatically decreased per capita over the last twenty-five to thirty years,330
which may suggest an unfriendly atmosphere for plaintiffs.
Perhaps reflecting these aggregate difficulties, malpractice complaints in
Thailand seem to be extremely rare,331 and those that exist are not often
successful. Roughly half of the 2726 complaints submitted to the Medical
Council between 1988 and 2006 alleged medical malpractice, but only twenty-
two of those cases went to court.332 At the same time, some researchers have
found a decisive uptick in malpractice complaints in various forums. 333 The
Ministry of Public Health found that the rate of malpractice complaints submitted
to the Thai Medical Council increased sevenfold between 1980 and 2004.334 The
326. See generally David M. Engel, Globalization and the Decline of Legal Consciousness:
Torts, Ghosts, and Karma in Thailand, 30 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 469, 506 (2005).
327. Id. at 471-72.
328. Id. at 493.
329. Id. at 502, n.22.
330. Id. at 497. Note that this seems to counter the assertion by the National Health
Commission Office that Thai patients increasingly assert legal rights. NAT'L HEALTH COMM'N
OFFICE OF THAIL., DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIPS: A CHRONIC PROBLEM WHICH MUST BE
"CURED" WITHOUT PREJUDICE 2 (2008), http://www.nhcthailand.com/admin/data/
FactsheetD-P.pdf.
331. Id.; Kumaranayake, supra note 261, at 644.
332. Thailand: Public Health Minister Wants Doctors To Contribute to Fund To Help Patients
Affected by Medical Malpractice, THAI PRESS REP., Dec. 21, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR
25204659. Patients may sue directly in civil courts, but most Thais prefer to avoid court and
attempt to resolve the dispute via the Medical Council.
333. NAT'L HEALTH COMM'N OFFICE OF THAIL., supra note 330, at 1-2; Phaosavasdi et al.,
supra note 301, at 401; Saithan et al., supra note 299; Teerawattananon et al., supra note 305, at
323; Groups Divided over Bill on Compensation for Medical Errors, NATION (Thail.), May 26,
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 9951397; President of Thailand Medical Council Works To Stop
Malpractice Lawsuits, THAI PRESS REP., Jan. 17, 2006; Pongphon Sarnsamak, New Panel To
Resolve Medical Disputes, NATION (Thail.), Dec. 15, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 24808537.
Note, however, that Professor Eungprabhanth believes that the Thai press sometimes overestimates
the number of complaints, and he believes that the number of malpractice complaints made against
private facilities has definitely not increased. See Memorandum from Prof. Eungprabhanth, supra
note 291.
334. Wibulpolprasert et al., supra note 292. The Thai Medical Council claims that negligence
suits jumped from 250 in 2004 to more than 300 in 2005. President of Thailand Medical Council
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Thai Medical Association claims that from 1973 to 2003, medical malpractice
lawsuits rose from 250 per year to over 500 per year,335 although, proportionally,
the amount of medical services provided during that period has probably risen at
least as much. The National Health Commission Office observed sharper rises in
complaints to the Medical Council in 1999 and 2005 but reported fewer
complaints in 2006 and 2007.336 There are caveats, however, when attempting to
extract any conclusions from these data. There are no official, reliable, and
comprehensive estimates of the number of medical malpractice complaints filed
in Thailand,337 and many sources conflate separate complaint venues, for
example by failing to distinguish lawsuits filed in civil courts from complaints
made to the Medical Council.338 Nevertheless, even if the Medical Association is
correct that malpractice suits have risen to 500 per year, this seems like a
relatively minuscule number for a population of over 66 million.339
One anecdote demonstrates the difficulties aggrieved patients might face in
Thailand. Preeyanan Lorsermvattana, director of the Thai latrogenic Disease
Network, filed suit on behalf of her son, who suffered injuries after being born at
"a famous private hospital. 34° In January 1996, she sued the hospital for 57
million baht ($1.5 million).34' In 2000, the trial court dismissed the case because
she filed it past the one-year statute of limitations.342 Moreover, the court ordered
her to pay the hospital 200,000 baht ($5420) in court fees and 100,000 baht
($2710) in lawyers' fees.343 In 2002, Lorsermvattana sought help from the
National Human Rights Commission, which asked the hospital to compensate her
family and pay for future medical treatments.344 The Commission also asked the
Works To Stop Malpractice Lawsuits, supra note 333.
335. Phaosavasdi et al., supra note 301, at 401.
336. NAT'L HEALTH COMM'N OFFICE OF THAIL., supra note 330, at 2.
337. Professor Eungprabhanth explains that it is extremely difficult to quantify the number of
medical malpractice cases filed in civil courts each year in Thailand. However, he estimates that the
number of cases filed is "not more than 100 cases per year." See Memorandum from Prof.
Eungprabhanth, supra note 291.
338. See, e.g., Phaosavasdi et al., supra note 301, at 401; Thailand: Public Health Minister
Wants Doctors To Contribute to Fund To Help Patients Affected by Medical Malpractice, supra
note 332. The Medical Council governs only professional disciplinary rules, not tort claims. See
Memorandum from Prof. Eungprabhanth, supra note 291.
339. U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Thailand, July 2009,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2814.htm.
340. Sukpanich, supra note 309.
341. Id.; see Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.10 (Thailand), available at
http://federalreserve.gov/RELEASES/HI0/Hist/dat00_th.htm (using the earliest exchange rate
available, January 3, 2000).
342. Sukpanich, supra note 309.
343. Id. (using the exchange rate on January 3, 2000).
344. Id.
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Medical Council of Thailand to reconsider her son's case and requested that the
Ministry of Public Health set better standards for medical care, though these
requests were not legally binding.345  Meanwhile, the hospital sued
Lorsermvattana for 100 million baht ($3.1 million) for defamation, though the
Supreme Court dismissed this claim.346
In sum, aggrieved patients face obstacles to securing compensation nearly
everywhere, but there are significant obstacles in Thailand. Foreign patients may
find Thailand's redressal system to be an unrealistic option. Malpractice suits are
rare. Compensation is meager, especially by Western standards. Litigation is long
and expensive, and generally disfavors patients in fundamental ways. Proving
negligence is exceedingly difficult with lack of access to medical records. Court
proceedings are conducted exclusively in Thai. And the general atmosphere is
hostile to medical malpractice complaints. There have even been reports of
violence-both real and threatened-against those who have brought malpractice
complaints.347 A medical tourism company in the United States states bluntly: "If
someone is considering suing someone, for whatever reason, don't [seek
treatment abroad] .... That's all we have to say. 348
b. Pending Reforms in Thailand?
Aware of these hurdles, the government is considering several legislative
proposals that may fundamentally change how Thailand handles medical
malpractice complaints. Policymakers are considering no-fault compensation and
mediation committees, and they may amend legal burdens of proof, criminal
liability, and other devices that can hold health care providers accountable.
Currently, Thai law provides a limited safety net for some malpractice
victims. The National Health Security Fund compensates victims of medical
errors if the patient does not receive any compensation from the health care
provider within a reasonable time frame.349 Although the National Health
345. Id.
346. Id. (using the exchange rate on October 1, 2007).
347. A member of the Thai Jatrogenic Disease Network was shot dead in front of her house in
2007 after suing a physician who allegedly left her face disfigured after cosmetic surgery. The
police suspect her murder might have been related to her complaint. Sukpanich, supra note 309.
Moreover, the father of a 23 year-old American who died during surgery at Bumrungrad
International hospital has reported receiving death threats after publicizing the death on a website.
See Bumrungrad Hospital Death 2006, http://www.bumrungraddeath.com (last visited Nov. 22,
2009).
348. Manthey, supra note 10 (quoting a MedRetreat spokesperson) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
349. National Health Security Act B.E. 2545, § 41 (2002) (Thail.), available at
http://www.nhso.go.th/eng/content/uploads/files/ThailandNHSAct.pdf; Saithanu et al., supra
note 300. A committee of five to seven reviewers determines whether an application for
X:I (2010)
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Security Act caps medical malpractice compensation provided under the Fund to
200,000 baht ($5764), legislation may raise the cap to two million baht
($57,636).350 The National Health Security Office can then seek indemnification
from the health care provider. 351 The Committee of National Health Security
replenishes the Fund by withholding 1% or less from hospital budgets.352 Article
38 of the Act suggests that the Fund applies to both public and private
hospitals,353 but it is not clear how often patients treated at private hospitals turn
to the Fund for compensation.
In 2008, the Ministry of Health proposed legislation to handle malpractice
complaints through a "no fault" system, utilizing a national fund to compensate
victims of medical errors.3 54 Former Health Minister Mongkol na Songkhla
wanted state physicians to contribute 3000 to 5000 baht to the fund each year, but
some doubt physicians would willingly do so. 355 Others have called for the
government to standardize criteria for awarding compensation.356
Whatever reforms materialize, Thailand seems to be following the
recommendation of health policy researchers who urge it to move further away
from the U.S. medical malpractice system:
There is a risk of creating the environment of the US where fear of litigation
generates unnecessary investigations, overdiagnosis and overtreatment and
hence higher health care costs, and there is a vicious cycle of rising insurance
premia and rising health-care costs.
35 7
The researchers support a "no fault" compensation system not only because
it removes the time and expense spent proving fault, but because it should
compensation complies with the criteria in the regulations, the most important of which is that the
patient suffered damages that would not normally occur and has not yet received compensation. See
Regulation of National Health Security Office on Criteria, Methods and Conditions for Primary
Compensation for Damages from Medical Services, B.E. 2549 (2007).
350. Regulation of National Health Security Office on Criteria, Methods and Conditions for
Primary Compensation for Damages from Medical Services, B.E. 2549 (2007); Samsamak, supra
note 333. For exchange rate methodology, see Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.10, Foreign
Exchange Rates (Weekly), Historical Rates for Thailand,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/Hist/dat00_th.htm.
351. National Health Security Act B.E. 2545, § 42.
352. National Health Security Act B.E. 2545, § 41.
353. National Health Security Act B.E. 2545, § 38.
354. Pongphon Samsamak, A Challenge To Improve Quality of Life, NATION (Thail.), Jan. 1,
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 49326.
355. Thailand: Public Health Minister Wants Doctors To Contribute to Fund To Help Patients
Affected by Medical Malpractice, supra note 332.
356. Saithanu et al., supra note 299.
357. Teerawattananon et al., supra note 305, at 336.
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improve physician-patient relationships.
358
Thailand may be moving precisely in this direction. In early 2008,
Thailand's Health System Research Institute (HSRI) reignited earlier efforts by
proposing more expansive legislation to establish a "Medical Malpractice Victim
Fund, ' 59 which would compensate patients within one month of suffering
"damage" from medical malpractice and provide additional compensation shortly
thereafter depending on the type and severity of damages. 360 The bill would
compensate only "serious cases,"' 36' although it is not clear how the government
would distinguish serious cases from minor ones. The legislation aims to
compensate patients quickly-within five months of being injured.3 62 To build
support for the bill, HSRI noted that five months compared very favorably to
civil litigation, which generally takes between five and seven years.363
Of course, establishing a convenient compensation system comes with a
price. The legislation has hit some political snags, and the Ministry of Public
Health is trying to reconcile several conflicts.364 First, an early analysis of the bill
predicts that the Thai government might spend one billion baht per year ($28.8
million) to compensate malpractice in public hospitals.36 5 Private hospitals would
have to contribute to the fund separately to be covered.366 The bill would
effectively render the system a form of government-sponsored malpractice
insurance.
Second, a proposal would require patients to forego suing in civil court once
they pursue compensation through the fund.367 This provision has become an
obvious point of contention. Previously, Thailand's latrogenic Disease Network
supported the legislation, but it later opposed this new wrinkle and proposed its
own reformulation.368 A separate proposal by the National Health Commission
would require patients and providers to negotiate before patients could receive
369compensation.
Finally, physicians groups have used these legislative efforts as an
358. Id.





364. Groups Divided Over Bill on Compensation for Medical Errors, supra note 333.
365. Health Forum To Debate Medical Malpractice Law, supra note 307 (using exchange
rates on Dec. 31, 2008).
366. Id.
367. Id.; Groups Divided Over Bill on Compensation for Medical Errors, supra note 333.
368. Groups Council Urged to Seek Outside Help, BANGKOK POST, Mar. 12, 2008, available at
2008 WLNR 4790095; Divided Over Bill on Compensation for Medical Errors, supra note 333.
369. Groups Divided Over Bill on Compensation for Medical Errors, supra note 333.
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opportunity to limit criminal and possibly even civil liability for malpractice. The
Medical Council has asked the National Legislative Assembly to revise the
Criminal Code to limit criminal punishment for physicians unless they
intentionally injure a patient.370 The Council has even proposed eliminating both
criminal and civil liability unless the plaintiff proved that the malpractice was
intentional or grossly negligent. 371 Though some recommended that the
legislature focus on amending the National Health Security Act rather than the
Criminal Code,372 it seems likely that the Medical Council will achieve at least
some concessions on this point.
There have been separate but related efforts in Thailand to enhance the
medical expertise available to tribunals that hear malpractice cases. Former
Health Minister Mongkol na Songkhla proposed establishing a mediation
committee to help patients and physicians negotiate settlements.373 As noted
above, the legislation would have increased the maximum medical malpractice
compensation from 200,000 baht to two million baht (from roughly $5700 to
$57,000).174 Although the mediation committee would decide compensation in
each case, the legislation would still give victims the chance to sue in court.375 It
was not clear whether or when the legislation would be considered formally,
376
but the mediation idea seems to be gaining support.3 77
In a similar vein, the Thai Medical Council proposed legislation to ensure
that judges hearing malpractice cases would have access to medical experts.
378
But the Council again combined this proposal with a provision that would
eliminate both civil and criminal liability for physicians unless the malpractice
was intentional or grossly negligent.379
Thus, the medical malpractice system in Thailand remains very much in
transition. The government is considering several different legislative proposals,
and even with ongoing political upheaval, the compensation system available to
patients may look very different, very soon. Of course, this change could be a
370. Sarnsamak, supra note 333; Medical Council Wants New Law To Protect Doctors,
BANGKOK POST (Thail.), Dec. 15, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 24755523; Thailand: The Public
Health Ministry Drafts New Laws on Compensation for Victims of Medical Malpractice, supra note
314.
371. Sarnsamak, supra note 354.
372. Jarun: Plan to Protect Doctors Needs Review, BANGKOK POST, Dec. 20, 2007, available
at 2007 WLNR 25050574.
373. Samsamak, supra note 354.
374. Sarnsamak, supra note 333.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Calls for Law To Protect Doctors, BANGKOK POST, Feb. 12, 2008, available at 2008
WLNR 2651367.
378. Sarnsamak, supra note 354.
379. Id.
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good thing. But it also compounds the uncertainty for foreign patients traveling
to Thailand.
c. Consumer Complaints
In February 2008, the Thai government enacted the Consumer Case
Procedure Act, B.E. 2551, which creates a streamlined procedure for
"consumers" to file complaints against "business operators," 380  which
presumably includes private hospitals.381 Like India's consumer forums, the
intent seems to be to offer a less costly and more convenient alternative forum to
resolve consumer complaints. In fact, the new procedures resemble those in
India's consumer forums, particularly their informality (consumers do not need
to be represented by counsel), their quasi-judicial nature (judges are supported by
judicial officers who try to mediate), and their truncated procedures (cases are
meant to be resolved much more quickly than civil litigation).382 However,
because the law took effect in August 2008, it remains unclear what impact it
will have on medical malpractice cases.
383
d. Thai Ministry of Public Health
Thailand's Ministry of Public Health is the Prime Minister's central cabinet-
level department responsible for regulating health care.384 The Ministry not only
registers and licenses medical professionals 385 but also investigates and reviews
patient complaints. 386 Most importantly, Thai law authorizes the Ministry to act
as a safety net for aggrieved patients by allowing it to order compensation for any
damages resulting from inappropriate medical services, 387 although it is not clear
the Ministry actively exercises this authority.
In spite of its authority, researchers found that the Ministry plays virtually
"no role" in regulating the quality or safety of medical services as a practical
380. Consumer Case Procedure Act B.E. 2551 (2008) (English translation on file with author).
381. See Memorandum from Prof. Eungprabhanth, supra note 291.
382. Id.
383. Id. Professor Eungprabhanth predicts that medical malpractice complaints will increase
through these new consumer procedures. Memorandum from Prof. Eungprabhanth, supra note 291.
But to date, the most notable complaint involved the failure of an airport to use a metal detector.
See Airport Fined for Lack of Metal Detector, NATION (Thail.), Dec. 18, 2008, available at 2008
WLNR 25048009.
384. See Ministry of Public Health: Thailand, http://eng.moph.go.th (last visited Nov. 22,
2009).
385. Singkaew & Chaichana, supra note 294, at 241.
386. National Health Security Act B.E. 2545, § 50 (2002) (Thail.), available at
http://www.nhso.go.th/eng/content/uploads/files/ThailandNHS-Act.pdf.
387. National Health Security Act B.E. 2545, §§ 50(5), 50(8), 59.
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matter.388 Although the Ministry's laws seem to be comprehensive, reviews of
discipline in the 1990s show that "enforcement is poor" and "few severe
penalties were awarded., 389 This comports with a recent analysis of health care
regulation in low- and middle-income countries, which found that "traditional
methods such as licensing and certification frequently fail to control behavior
because of the limited resources available to government [for enforcement] in
low- and middle-income countries, and because of the powerful countervailing
incentives that encourage deviant behavior to continue., 390 Thus, even in more
prosperous low- and middle-income countries like Thailand, enforcement lags
due to lack of resources.
39t
e. Thai Medical Council
The Thai government entrusts the Medical Council, a quasi-governmental
self-regulatory body, to oversee medical professionals by licensing them and
enforcing rules of professionalism and ethics. 392 The Council may also sanction
members, for example by placing them under probation for mild violations or by
393suspending or revoking licenses for more severe ones. The Council uses an
Ethical Committee to handle medical malpractice and ethical complaints against
members.394 The Committee investigates each complaint and then recommends
penalties.395
Complaints to the Council seem to be rising. Between 1990 and 2006,
around 2800 patients filed complaints, more than half alleging malpractice.39 6
Council records claim that malpractice complaints jumped from 250 in 2004 to
more than 300 in 2005. 39 7 Also, the ratio of claims seems to be rising, from 88
complaints per 100,000 physicians in 1975398 to 869 complaints per 100,000
388. Teerawattananon et al., supra note 305, at 331 tbl.3.
389. Id. at 332.
390. Ensor & Weinzierl, supra note 165, at 355.
391. Kumaranayake, supra note 261, at 645.
392. Teerawattananon et al., supra note 305, at 325.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 334.
395. Id. at 330.
396. Media reports conflict on the precise time frame and number of complaints. See
Thailand: Public Health Minister Wants Doctors To Contribute to Fund To Help Patients Affected
by Medical Malpractice, supra note 332 (reporting that between 1988 and 2006, 2726 complaints
were filed with the Council). But see Thailand: The Public Health Ministry Drafts New Laws on
Compensation for Victims of Medical Malpractice, supra note 314 ("More than 2,800 complaints
were submitted to the Medical Council between 1990 and 2006 .... ").
397. President of Thailand Medical Council Works To Stop Malpractice Lawsuits, supra note
333.
398. Note again that media reports differ on the precise number. Compare Teerawattananon et
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physicians in 2003. 399 Nonetheless, researchers report that despite widespread
problems with physicians in Thailand, the Medical Council still receives
relatively few complaints.40 0
Of course, the Medical Council is vulnerable to the same criticisms that
plague other professional medical organizations responsible for regulating their
own members. For example, a study found that the Council and other
professional medical organizations in Thailand "react passively to complaints
made directly by consumers and to reports of ethical misconduct from fellow
professionals," even though most complaints allege negligent or substandard
care.40 The same study found that "punishments of the guilty were mostly mild
with 53% being reprimanded, 23% placed on probation, 22% ha[ving] their
licenses suspended, and 1% ha[ving] their licenses revoked., 40 2 As in India,
professional medical organizations in Thailand seem to lack any real incentive to
actively investigate their members and resolve complaints.40 3 One study
concluded that the Council only disciplined its members when the Thai media
publicized potential violations.40 4
The Medical Council receives many more complaints than it is able or
perhaps willing to handle. 40 5 In 1999, it resolved only thirty-eight of the 173
40complaints filed, and the gap grows over time. 06 The backlog has provoked even
more public criticism of the Council and has raised questions whether the
Council is more concerned with protecting patients or its members.
40 7
Unsurprisingly, there is widespread public distrust of the Council. 4 8 As
noted above, plaintiffs criticize it for protecting its members in complaints. 40 9 Its
investigations are slow and operate under no deadlines. 410 One study notes that
"plaintiffs have little confidence that their cases will be handled fairly., 4 ,
Observers have urged the Council to seek assistance from neutral, outside experts
al., supra note 305, at 330, 332 (identifying 687 complaints per 100,000 physicians in 1999), with
Wibulpolprasert et al., supra note 292 (identifying 114.6 complaints per 10,000 physicians in 1999,
which is equivalent to 1146 complaints per 100,000 physicians).
399. Wibulpolprasert et al., supra note 292 (identifying 86.9 complaints per 10,000 physicians
in 2003, is equivalent to 869 complaints per 100,000 physicians).
400. Kumaranayake, supra note 261, at 644.
401. Teerawattananon et al., supra note 305, at 335.
402. Id. at 327 (based on records from the Medical Council between 1995 and 1999).
403. Id. at 334.
404. Ensor & Weinzierl, supra note 165, at 359.
405. Teerawattananon et al., supra note 305, at 335.
406. Id. at 333 fig.4.
407. Id. at 330.
408. Council Urged To Seek Outside Help, supra note 368.
409. Saithanu et al., supra note 299.
410. Id.
411. Teerawattananon et al., supra note 305, at 335.
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to handle malpractice complaints.412 One respected scholar recommended that the
Council avoid handling any malpractice complaints to avoid conflicts of interest
and to restore the public's faith in the profession.41 3 Of course, the Council's
president claims that the Council already asks neutral experts to help investigate
complaints, noting skeptically that some patients file complaints simply because
"they want to get money and take revenge.A14
Meanwhile, it is becoming even more crucial that the Medical Council and
other regulators hold physicians in Thailand accountable. In 2004, the Ministry
of Public Health wrote that "[w]ith more international trade in health services,
professional ethics may erode," and "[m]ore malpractice lawsuits can be
envisaged if professional councils are not strong enough. 4 15 The Ministry thus
recommended that the government strengthen regulatory oversight by
professional councils and associations.41 6
In short, as in India, foreign patients visiting Thailand cannot rely on
physician self-regulation to provide any meaningful constraints on medical
practice.
f Criminal Prosecution in Thailand
Physicians in Thailand can also be prosecuted for extreme cases of medical
malpractice, but as in most countries, such prosecutions are quite rare. In fact,
only one physician has been sentenced to prison for malpractice in Thailand, and
this case ignited a firestorm of debate.41 7 A rural doctor was sentenced to three
years in prison after injecting anesthetic into a patient during a fatal appendicitis
operation.418 According to press reports, the case has intensified tensions between
physicians and patients in Thailand, and many surgeons have expressed more
reluctance to operate.419 For example, in response to the case, the Rural Doctors
Society threatened to stop operating at rural hospitals.420 The Ministry of Public
412. Sukpanich, supra note 309.
413. Calls for Law To Protect Doctors, supra note 377.
414. Sukpanich, supra note 309.
415. Wibulpolprasert et al., supra note 292.
416. Id.
417. Medical Council Wants New Law To Protect Doctors, supra note 370; Sarnsamak, supra
note 354; Thailand: Public Health Minister Wants Doctors To Contribute to Fund To Help Patients
Affected by Medical Malpractice, supra note 332; see also Engel, supra note 326, at 500 (noting
the drop in private criminal cases arising out of personal injuries). Note, however, that physicians
and nurses have been convicted for non-malpractice-related offenses. NAT'L HEALTH COMM'N
OFFICE OF THAIL., supra note 330, at 1 (reporting what appears to be a case of physician-assisted
suicide).
418. Medical Council Wants New Law To Protect Doctors, supra note 370.
419. Sarnsamak, supra note 354.
420. Medical Council Wants New Law To Protect Doctors, supra note 370.
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Health paid the patient's family 600,000 baht ($15,267) after a civil court ordered
the remuneration. 421 However, the Ministry is appealing the three-year
sentence.422 This example might suggest that criminal prosecution in Thailand
incites more anger than self-reflection by physicians.
2. Foreign Patients in Thailand
Thailand remains a popular destination for patients, and as in India, most
patients visiting will receive competent medical care. Health care regulation in
Thailand is fairly comprehensive,423 but enforcement lags because Thai
regulators dedicate insufficient personnel and resources to monitor and enforce
compliance.424 A study by the World Health Organization and the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development found that Thailand uses "a passive
regulatory system for health-care. 425 The study concluded that "[a]lthough some
mechanisms for health care supervision and monitoring in public facilities are
implemented, there is a lack of continuous, formal appraisal of the quality and
appropriateness of care in public and private hospitals as well as private
clinics., 426 In general, researchers have found that middle-income countries like
Thailand lack the resources to adequately regulate health care.427 Even the
scholars that praise Thailand's relatively comprehensive regulatory system
recommended several fundamental reforms.428 Thus, as in India, lawmakers have
the best intentions, but their efforts thus far have been mostly cosmetic due to lax
enforcement.
Moreover, medical malpractice is a matter of when, not if. Foreign patients
unlucky enough to be injured by malpractice will not, as a practical matter, have
much recourse if left to navigate Thailand's many redressal systems. And though
Thailand's health care regulatory system is fairly broad, it does not promote
much accountability.
As a complicating factor, many in Thailand are uneasy with the growth of
medical tourism and private, commercialized health care. Citizens distrust the
private health care sector, 429 and "[s]ocial attitudes towards the medical
421. Id. (using the exchange rate on Dec. 14, 2007).
422. Thailand: Public Health Minister Wants Doctors To Contribute to Fund To Help Patients
Affected by Medical Malpractice, supra note 332.
423. Teerawattananon et al., supra note 305, at 323.
424. Kumaranayake, supra note 261, at 644.
425. Singkaew & Chaichana, supra note 294, at 240.
426. Id.
427. Ensor & Weinzierl, supra note 165, at 355; Kumaranayake, supra note 261, at 645.
428. Teerawattananon et al., supra note 305, at 335-37.
429. Id. at 292. Note, however, that Professor Vithoon Eungprabhanth suggests that Thais
generally trust the private sector more than the public sector, except for university hospitals. See
Memorandum from Prof Eungprabhanth, supra note 291.
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profession have changed drastically since much of the health care service is now
done by the private sector and it has become a business., 430 As a result, aggrieved
foreign patients treated in private hospitals may not find much sympathy in
Thailand.
D. Singapore
Singapore has long been a regional hub for patients, and like India and
Thailand, it has grand ambitions for its medical tourism industry. Roughly
348,000 foreign patients visited Singaporean hospitals in 2007, up from 200,000
just four years earlier.431 Singapore is being pressured by competition from less
expensive destinations like Malaysia, Thailand, and India.432 And, perhaps as
only Singapore can do, its government has mustered a coordinated, centralized
effort to promote its medical tourism industry and retain its status as Asia's
health care hub.433 Indeed, the government announced that it hopes to attract one
million foreign patients annually by 2012.434
Singapore as a medical destination is a study in contrasts. On one hand,
Singapore is far and away the richest, most developed country I examine in this
Article.435 Its average income resembles the United States more than India,
Thailand, or Mexico.436
But similarities with the United States do not extend much further. Unlike
the United States, Singapore's system for compensating patients is much more
limited, veering more toward India and Thailand. Medical malpractice lawsuits
430. Jarun: Plan to Protect Doctors Needs Review, supra note 372.
431. Maria Almenoar, Stats at Odds: More or Fewer Medical Tourists?, STRAITS TIMES
(Sing.), Jan. 23, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 1270475; Mattoo & Rathindran, supra note 116, at
2, 12 tbl.2; Singapore Ministry of Health, Medical Travelers Update, Jan. 22, 2009,
http://www.moh.gov.sg/mohcorp/parliamentaryqa.aspx?id=20836. Note, however, that the
Singapore Tourism Board estimates elsewhere that 571,000 medical tourists visited in 2007. See
Wong Mei Ling, Medical Tourism Hit by Global Downturn, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Jan. 11, 2009,
available at 2009 WLNR 527972.
432. See Cortez, supra note 6, at 89-93.
433. See id. at 92-93; SingaporeMedicine, Welcome to SingaporeMedicine,
http://www.singaporemedicine.com (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
434. Mattoo & Rathindran, supra note 116, at 2, 12 tbl.2.
435. In 2006, the gross national income per capita was $2460 in India, $7440 in Thailand,
$11,990 in Mexico, $43,300 in Singapore, and $44,070 in the United States. See WHO, WHO
Statistical Information System (WHOSIS), http://www.who.int/whosis/en/index.html (last visited
Nov. 22, 2009) (perform a "Customized Search," selecting India, Mexico, Singapore, Thailand, and
United States, then select "Gross national income per capita (PPP international $)," then select
"2006," the latest date for which data is available).
436. Id.
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are rare.437 Awards are modest not only by U.S. standards but by standards
appropriate for a country with Singapore's wealth.438 Patients in Singapore
remain reluctant to file suit, partly due to a cultural aversion to challenging
medical authority, partly due to modest awards, and partly due to the risks of
unsuccessful litigation in a system that imposes costs on the losing party and
does not allow contingency fee arrangements.439 As in India and Thailand,
patients have trouble finding medical experts willing to testify against
colleagues. 440 And like India, Singapore is one of the former British colonies
saddled with the Bolam decision, the 1957 English trial court opinion that has
made proving medical negligence exceptionally difficult. 44' Finally, Singapore is
a relatively non-litigious society, and the medical profession is winning the
public relations battle against malpractice suits, warning the country that it is
sliding further toward a medical malpractice crisis like that in the United
States.442 All these factors create a general atmosphere that both discourages
malpractice suits and makes them unlikely to achieve much.
My goal in this section is to describe this atmosphere and explain how
Singapore's redressal system operates. Allegations of medical malpractice in
Singapore can trigger several distinct legal procedures, including criminal
sanctions, actions by the Singapore Medical Council, and civil liability. Here I
outline these procedures and assess whether they might provide adequate
recourse to foreign patients.
1. Civil Liability in Singapore
Physicians in Singapore may be civilly liable for medical malpractice under
theories of both contract and tort-though the most common allegation is simple
437. See, e.g., Kumaralingam Amirthalingam, Book Review, 2005 SING. J. LEG. STUD. 471,
472 (reviewing YEO KHEE QUAN ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF MEDICAL LAW (2004)) (noting that
Singapore cases "account for well below 10% of the cases mentioned in the book").
438. See Kumaralingam Amirthalingam, Judging Doctors and Diagnosing the Law: Bolam
Rules in Singapore and Malaysia, 2003 SING. J. LEG. STUD. 125, 143-44.
439. See Terry Kaan, Singapore, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: MEDICAL LAW
89-90 (Herman Nys ed., 1994 & Supp. 1998); D. Kandiah, Comparisons of the Interactions of
Health Care Delivery and Medico-Legal Practice Between Australia and Singapore, 25 MED. & L.
463, 467 (2006). Of course the decision to file a complaint is complex. Physicians and patients in
Singapore often prefer to use mediation and arbitration-or simply prefer to settle-to avoid legal
confrontations. Letter from Kumaralingam Amirthalingam, Professor, National University of
Singapore Faculty of Law, to Nathan Cortez, Assistant Professor, Southern Methodist University,
Dedman School of Law (Jan. 27, 2009) (on file with author).
440. See Liu Chun Fai, A Functional Review of Medical Negligence Law, 6 SING. L. REv. 188,
195 (1985).
441. Bolam v. Friern Hosp. Mgmt. Comm., [19571 1 W.L.R. 583 (Eng.).
442. See Amirthalingam, supra note 438, at 143-44.
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negligence in tort.443
As a foundational matter, Singapore inherits its common law from England,
and to this day, Singaporean courts often apply judicial precedents from English
courts. 44 Courts tend to treat English decisions as "highly persuasive if not
practically binding," although the Singapore High Court has held that courts need
not follow English common law.445 In addition, a 1993 statute allows courts to
reject English precedents if applying them would be inappropriate.446 Thus,
courts in Singapore have shown increased willingness to depart from English
common law and follow more patient-friendly precedents from Australian or
Canadian courts (though Singaporean courts remain reluctant to adopt U.S.
precedents).447 The Parliament of Singapore has grown more assertive in
regulating medical professionals, but medical practice remains governed almost
exclusively by the common law of contract and tort.
4 4 8
Courts in Singapore continue to adhere to the infamous Bolam rule, the
standard for finding medical negligence that has been widely criticized for
unduly favoring physicians.449 In Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management
Committee,45° the court explained that it would not find medical professionals to
be negligent if they "acted in accordance with a practice accepted by a
responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art."45! This famous
test simply states that the standard of care for physicians is not that of the
ubiquitous "reasonable man," but of a reasonable physician possessing roughly
the same special skills and competencies.452
On its face, the Bolam rule seems to be innocuous, even bland. But most
courts have interpreted Bolam to create almost insurmountable hurdles for
patients. First, if the standard of care is that of "a responsible body of medical
men skilled in that particular art,' ,4 53 who else but those same "medical men"
443. Kaan, supra note 439, at 70. As with most common law jurisdictions, Singaporean courts
apply the familiar duty-breach-causation formula in medical negligence claims at tort. Fai, supra
note 440, at 195; Margaret Fordham, Singapore Academy of Law, The Law of Negligence § 20.1.3,
http://www.singaporelaw.sg/content/Negligencel.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
444. Kaan, supra note 439, at 15-18.
445. Id. at 88 (citing Pang Koi Fa v. Lim Djoe Phing, [1993] 3 S.L.R. 317, 323D-E (Sing.)).
446. Application of English Law Act, Ch. 7A, Act 35 of 1993 (Sing.), available at
http://policy.mofcom.gov.cn/resource/flaw/f97ebOf-2 I ba-46d2-9014-025efl ab5dO9.pdf; see also
Kaan, supra note 439, at 18.
447. Kaan, supra note 439, at 18.
448. Id. at 16-18.
449. See, e.g., Amirthalingam, supra note 438; Fai, supra note 440; Fordham, supra note 443,
§ 20.4.10.
450. Bolam v. Friern Hosp. Mgmt. Comm., [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582 (Eng.).
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could identify what practices were appropriate in each case? Bolam requires
courts to refer to expert testimony to help determine the standard of care-as do
courts in most common law jurisdictions-but courts in Singapore rely
overwhelmingly on such testimony with very little independent, critical
assessment.454 In fact, courts applying Bolam do not grant themselves much
leeway to decide between conflicting medical experts.455 Most courts applying
Bolam prohibit non-experts like judges from independently determining whether
the physician was negligent as long as some evidence supports the defendant's
conduct.456 Courts have even held that the testimony of a single expert defense
witness can represent a "responsible body" of medical opinion, even if it
contradicts a larger body of opinion.457 Thus, courts applying Bolam often refrain
from finding negligence if only one expert finds the defendant's conduct
reasonable-even if multiple competent experts find it unreasonable.45 s
As a practical matter, therefore, medical negligence under Bolam is often
"determined by the lowest standard of care (accepted by the medical profession)
rather than reasonable contemporary standards. 459 One lawyer notes that
"barring a truly exceptional case, there will invariably be a body of medical
opinion that supports the allegedly negligent physician's practice., 460 Essentially,
courts in Singapore enforce standards that the medical profession set for itself
without independently assessing those standards.461 Scholars in Singapore
bemoan that courts have forgotten the normative interpretation required when
determining whether a physician acted in accordance with a "responsible body"
462
of professional medical opinion. Indeed, courts in Singapore seem quicker to
chastise themselves than physicians. For example, in one highly-publicized case,
the Singapore Court of Appeal fumed that:
It would be pure humbug for a judge, in the rarified atmosphere of the
courtroom and with the benefit of hindsight, to substitute his opinion for that of
the doctor in the consultation room or operating chamber. We often enough tell
doctors not to play God; it seems only fair that, similarly, judges and lawyers
454. See Amirthalingam, supra note 438, at 129.
455. See, e.g., Dr. Khoo James v. Gunapathy d/o Muniandy, [2002] 2 S.L.R. 414 (Sing.);
Amirthalingam, supra note 438, at 129.
456. Amirthalingam, supra note 438, at 129.
457. Id. at 129 (citing Gerrard v. Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh NHS Trust [2002] ScotCS II
89).
458. Id. at 129-30 (citing cases).
459. Id. at 129.
460. Paul Tan, The Doctrine of Informed Consent- When Experts and Non-Experts Collide,
2006 SING. J. LEG. STUD. 148, 153.
461. Fai, supra note 440, at 189.
462. Amirthalingam, supra note 438, at 129.
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should not play at being doctors.463
A recent trend suggested that courts might retreat from Bolam or at least
domesticate it, but this proved not to be much of a revolution. In 1998, the
English House of Lords left room for courts to depart from Bolam in its well-
known Bolitho opinion,464 where it held that courts should depart from Bolam
when the professional medical opinion "is not capable of withstanding logical
analysis., 465 Bolitho seemed to give judges an opportunity-albeit a narrow
one-to reassert themselves and critically weigh expert opinions in medical
negligence cases.466 Although several courts did use Bolitho to appraise expert
medical testimony more critically, Lord Browne-Wilkinson warned lower courts
in his House of Lords opinion in Bolitho to apply the case only in exceptional
circumstances. 467 Thus, many observers view Bolitho as only slightly altering
Bolam's status quo.468
In 2002, in the case of Dr. Khoo James v. Gunapathy d/o Muniandy, the
Singapore Court of Appeal systematically reviewed the common law in this
area.4 69 Reacting to public backlash against a S$1.4 million trial court award, the
Court of Appeal announced that judges should not determine the reasonableness
of medical opinions but should merely determine whether the expert medical
testimony is logically defensible.47 ° Indeed, the Singapore High Court noted in a
2002 case predating Gunapathy that Bolam and its progeny prevent courts from
finding negligence "even if the diagnosis or treatment were wrong.,' 471 As such,
the Gunapathy opinion represents the current law in Singapore,472 cementing the
near sancrosact status of the Bolam rule. One scholar has interpreted Gunapathy
as rendering malpractice cases more hostile to plaintiffs in Singapore than in
England.473
Professor Amirthalingam has called for courts to "reassert their role as the
463. Dr. Khoo James v. Gunapathy d/o Muniandy [2002] 2 S.L.R. 414, 3 (Sing.), available
at http://www.singaporelaw.sg/rss/judg/8318.html (English translation).
464. Bolitho v. City & Hackney Health Auth., [1998] A.C. 232 (H.L.).
465. Id. at 243.
466. Amirthalingam, supra note 438, at 132-33.
467. Bolitho, [ 1998] A.C. at 243.
468. See, e.g., Amirthalingam, supra note 438, at 132-33.
469. Dr. Khoo James v. Gunapathy d/o Muniandy [2002] 2 S.L.R. 414, 52 (Sing.), available
at http://www.singaporelaw.sg/rss/judg/8318.html (English translation); Amirthalingam, supra note
438, at 135.
470. Gunapathy, [2002] 2 S.L.R. 63, 65; Amirthalingam, supra note 438, at 137.
471. Amirthalingam, supra note 438, at 137 (quoting an unreported opinion from 2002).
472. Id. at 137.
473. See Margaret Fordham, A Life Without Value? JV and Another v. See Tho Kai Yin, 2005
SING, J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 404.
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final arbiters in determining medical negligence. 474 He criticizes Bolam for
allowing the medical profession to self-regulate and for allowing judges to
abdicate their responsibility to determine the legal standards of care and
negligence.475 Professor Amirthalingam also recommends that Singaporean
courts abandon the English approach in Bolam and embrace the more neutral
Australian approach enunciated in Rogers v. Whitaker, which reasserted the role
of courts in determining the standard of care.476 As it is under Bolam in India and
Thailand, expert medical testimony in Singapore enjoys almost talismanic power,
which of course lowers the chance that patients will successfully recover
damages.477
But Bolam is only one part of the medical malpractice atmosphere in
Singapore. As in India and Thailand, patients in Singapore face other obstacles in
478proving negligence. Indeed, a full assessment of Singapore's medical
malpractice system shows why patients remain so reluctant to sue.
First, lawyers in Singapore cannot accept contingency fees, thus
guaranteeing that litigation will be a sunk cost for patients.479 And those brave
enough to file suit have a strong incentive to settle because a court can impose
costs if the case goes to trial and the court finds that an original settlement offer
was reasonable. 480 Perhaps more importantly, patients are deterred from filing all
but the strongest medical negligence claims because a court may order the
plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs if the patient fails to prove negligence. 481
Singapore also does not provide jury trials in medical malpractice cases,482 which
may further disadvantage patients.483
Perhaps unsurprisingly, patients in Singapore seem to be among the least
litigious of wealthy, industrialized countries.484 Patients there historically have
474. Amirthalingam, supra note 438, at 125.
475. See id. at 130.
476. [1992] 175 C.L.R. 479 (Austl.); see Amirthalingam, supra note 438, at 127, 136;
Margaret Fordham, Doctor Does Not Always Know Best: Foo Fio Na v. Dr. Soo Fook Mun, 2007
SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 128, 132.
477. Fai, supra note 440, at 189; Fordham, supra note 473, at 406.
478. See Kaan, supra note 439, at 89; supra Sections II.A-B.
479. Kaan, supra note 439, at 89-90.
480. Id. at 89.
481. Id. at 90; Kandiah, supra note 439, at 467.
482. Kandiah, supra note 439, at 468 tbl. 1.
483. For a look at the complicated role of juries in medical malpractice cases, see, for
example, Nancy S. Marder, The Medical Malpractice Debate: The Jury as Scapegoat, 38 Loy. L.A.
L. REv. 1267 (2005).
484. See, e.g., M.K. Lim, Quest for Quality Care and Patient Safety: The Case of Singapore,
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been very reluctant to sue, 485 and very few medical negligence cases in Singapore
proceed to trial.486 Court records in Singapore show that the number of medical
negligence lawsuits has been trivial: three in 1998, seven in 1999, and ten in
2000. 4 11 In 2007, medical malpractice cases in the public health sector had fallen
from roughly fifteen cases per year in the late 1990s to around eleven per year,
counter to the international trend.488 In a comprehensive review of initiatives to
improve health care quality in Singapore, Professor Lim emphasizes that most of
these quality initiatives were pressed by the government rather than the public,
"and certainly not the medical profession. 4 89 By attracting patients from the
United States and other more litigious societies, Singapore may be inviting a
group of patients that is more aware of and ready to assert its legal rights.
Second, as in other jurisdictions, patients may encounter resistance securing
an expert medical witness to testify against a colleague-the so-called
"conspiracy of silence. 49 ° One possible solution would be for courts to rely more
liberally on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which allows a plaintiff to establish
prima facie evidence of negligence without relying heavily or exclusively on
expert medical testimony. 491 However, courts in Singapore historically have been
less willing to apply this doctrine than courts in the United States, 492 and it
logically applies only in the most unequivocal cases.
Third, as in most jurisdictions, physicians are winning the public relations
battle against medical malpractice suits, which generally creates a more hostile
atmosphere for aggrieved patients. Many countries claim to be on the cusp of a
malpractice litigation crisis that will drive up health care spending. The Straits
Times reported that malpractice insurance premiums rose almost 300% for
cosmetic and aesthetic surgeons in Singapore between 2002 and 2007. 4 9 3 Some
medical practitioners have used litigation statistics from the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Australia to warn that there is a crisis in Singapore.494
485. See Fai, supra note 440, at 199.
486. Amirthalingam, supra note 438 (noting that most cases settle and the details are kept
confidential, which precludes public scrutiny of the merits of the claims); Kaan, supra note 439, at
70.
487. Lim, supra note 484, at 74 (citing the 2002 Singapore High Court Registry).
488. Salma Khalik, Fewer Suits Filed Against Public Hospitals; S'pore Bucks Rising Global
Trend; Yearly Figures Here Fall from 15 Cases to About 11, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Oct. 20, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 20585394.
489. Lim, supra note 484, at 74.
490. Fai, supra note 440, at 195.
491. The doctrine was first enunciated in the 1863 English case, Byrne v. Boadle, [1863] 159
Eng. Rep. 299, in which the court presumed that a barrel of flour falling out of a second-story
window was prima facie evidence of negligence.
492. Fai, supra note 492, at 197-99.
493. Khalik, supra note 488.
494. Amirthalingam, supra note 438, at 143.
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Physicians groups like the Singapore Medical Association publish critiques of
patient complaints and malpractice litigation.495 Medical commentators propagate
these claims, contributing to the general atmosphere.496
This public relations campaign has driven a fear of a pending medical
malpractice crisis that has probably contributed to courts' reluctance to relax the
Bolam rule.4 9 7 Indeed, Professor Amirthalingam criticizes these tactics and
argues that providers in Singapore already enjoy low malpractice costs:
All first world countries have far higher medical indemnity and general
insurance costs, as well as higher compensatory awards. We cannot have our
cake and eat it; the move to first world status also means embracing an
advanced citizenry that is aware of its rights and desires to assert them.498
Fourth, even though Singapore enjoys a relatively high standard of living
and is the most developed among major medical tourist destinations,499
malpractice awards can still be quite modest. For example, in 2001 The Straits
Times published an article describing a S$2.55 million medical negligence
judgment by the Singapore High Court ($1.4 million). 50 0 The full-page article
describing this "astronomical sum" triggered a "torrent of letters to the
newspaper" and "terrified" local physicians. 50 1 The Court of Appeal swiftly
overturned the decision and reaffirmed Bolam's highly deferential standard. °2
Before this record award, the previous record in a medical negligence case in
Singapore appears to have been only S$356,000 ($200,000).503 However, in
2007, The Straits Times reported a medical malpractice award of S$2 million
495. P.Y. Cheong, Handling of Patients' Complaints, 39 SING. MED. J. 386 (1998), available
at http://www.sma.org.sg/smj/3909/articles/3909el.html. To be fair, some physicians do publish
honest self-assessments of their role in malpractice. See, e.g., S.Y. Tan, Blame the Pilots, Blame the
Doctors: Lessons from SQ 006, 43 SING. MED. J. 276 (2002), available at
http://www.sma.org.sg/smj/4306/4306e2.pdf.
496. See, e.g., Amirthalingam, supra note 437, at 471 (noting that the authors of the book he is
reviewing show "almost reverent support" for the negligence test in Bolam and issue "dire
warnings against any dilution of it").
497. See Amirthalingam, supra note 438, at 143-144.
498. Id. at 144-45.
499. Lim, supra note 484, at 71.
500. H.T. Liang, When Medical Experts No Longer Hold Sway, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), July
21, 2001, at H12. Using the exchange rate on July 2, 2001, this calculates to $1.37 million. See
Federal Reserve Statistical Release H. 10, Foreign Exchange Rates, Historical Rates for Singapore,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h I0/hist/dat00_si.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
501. Amirthalingam, supra note 438, at 125.
502. Id. at 125 (citing Dr. Khoo James v. Gunapathy d/o Muniandy [2002] 2 S.L.R. 414, 419
(Sing.)).
503. See Amirthalingam, supra note 438, at 143.
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($1.3 million) 04 and the resulting increase in malpractice insurance rates. 505
Thus, aggrieved patients in Singapore may be faring better than they have
historically, which could signal a better legal atmosphere for foreign patients.
2. The Singapore Medical Council
All physicians in Singapore must register with the Medical Council, a
component of the Ministry of Health.506 The Council has statutory authority to
discipline physicians for unprofessional conduct or other ethical transgressions,
usually by removing them from the registry, restricting their practice, levying
fines up to S$ 10,000, or censuring them.507 Although more severe cases of
medical malpractice may rise to the level of an ethical transgression, this is rare.
Further, the Council cannot compensate patients, nor can it compel physicians to
provide patients their medical records, which are necessary to support a
malpractice suit.
508
The overall number of complaints made to the Council is rising, from 84 in
2004 to 138 in 2008,509 although there has been no upward trend in the number of
complaints filed per physician.510 Around 20% of complaints allege medical
negligence, though a higher number could be categorized as such.51 1 The
Council's complaint form notes that investigations may take between six and
nine months, if not longer.512
The Ministry of Health is considering proposals to amend the Council's
504. Khalik, supra note 488. I used the exchange rate on January 2, 2007. See Federal Reserve
Statistical Release H.10, supra note 503.
505. Khalik, supra note 488.
506. Kaan, supra note 439, at 43, 47-49; Singapore Medical Council, Home,
http://www.smc.gov.sg/html/SMCHome.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
507. See Medical Registration Act § 40, Ch. 174 (Sing.); Kaan, supra note 439, at 43, 47-49,
51-52.
508. Singapore Medical Council, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.ifaq.gov.sg/
smc/apps/fcdfaqmain.aspx (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
509. Jessica Jaganathan, Quicker Action on Complaints: Higher Maximum Fines Proposed in
Changes to Medical Registration Act, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Jan. 15, 2009, available at
http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking%2BNews/Singapore/Story/STIStory-326369.html.
510. SING. MED. COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 16 tbl.1, available at
http://www.smc.gov.sg/htmlUMungoBlobs/629/548/Annual%20Report%20v06.pdf.
511. Id. at 16-17 tbl.2. The Council categorized the "nature" of each complaint. In addition to
"professional negligence/incompetence," other categories could qualify as negligence as a legal
matter, including for example "excessive/inappropriate prescription of drugs," "misdiagnosis," and
"over/unnecessary/inappropriate treatment."
512. Singapore Medical Council, Instructions on Putting Up a Statutory Declaration,
http://www.smc.gov.sg/html/SMCDownloadForms.html (follow link for "complaints/disciplinary
proceedings forms") (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
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grievance procedures. 1 3 For example, the proposals would 1) increase maximum
fines from S$10,000 to S$100,000, 2) speed up the complaint process, 3) broaden
the Council's powers to recommend outside mediation, and 4) allow patients to
appeal decisions to the Singapore High Court.51 4 Currently, patients can appeal
decisions by the Council's complaints committee to the Health Minister, but only
physicians can further appeal those decisions to the High Court.5" 5 Singapore
may try to use these proposed reforms to shift complaints away from civil tort
litigation.
3. Criminal Sanctions in Singapore
When a patient dies, Singapore's Criminal Procedure Code requires a public
coroner's inquiry to determine the precise cause of death.51 6 The coroner does not
initiate formal charges or recommend sanctions, but the coroner may identify
specific medical professionals as defendants for potential prosecution.1 7 Yet the
coroner's inquiry does not obligate the Attorney General to prosecute, nor can
plaintiffs use it as evidence in civil suits. 51 8 Given that only a patient's death can
trigger criminal action as well as the limited impact of coroners' reports, criminal
proceedings against physicians remain exceedingly rare.519
4. Foreign Patients in Singapore
Singapore is an established medical destination whose hospitals have
experience handling foreign patients. However, Singapore's medical malpractice
system generally favors providers and disfavors patients, and the few patients
that win judgments receive compensation that is modest not only by U.S.
standards, but by standards appropriate for a country with Singapore's wealth.
Scholars have called for courts in Singapore to reassert themselves in medical
negligence cases, but the common law remains a significant obstacle. The
general atmosphere also tends to encourage mediation and settlement over full-
blown litigation.
The bright spot for patients is that, overall, Singapore's health care system
513. See Medical Registration Amendment Bill, 2009 (Sing.), available at
http://www.moh.gov.sg/mohcorp/data/EConsult/752/draft-mra%20(amendment)-bill 140109.pdf,
Jaganathan, supra note 509; Singapore Ministry of Health, Legislation: E-Consultation,
http://www.moh.gov.sg/mohcorp/econsultationpast.aspx?ecid=752.
514. Jaganathan, supra note 509.
515. Id.
516. Singapore Criminal Procedure Code, §§ 273-277, Ch. 68, Rev. Ed. 1985 (Sing.); see also
Kaan, supra note 439, at 68-69.
517. Kaan, supra note 439, at 69.
518. Id. at 69.
519. Id. at 70-71.
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enjoys a relatively strong regulatory environment, 52 contrary to many other
medical tourist destinations. The Ministry of Health and the Singapore Medical
Association have initiated programs to study the incidence of medical errors and
reduce them.5 2' Moreover, practitioners have embraced evidence-based medicine
to guide clinical practice, which some believe may frame standards of care in
more concrete terms. 52 2 These developments should only help patients.
E. Mexico
Mexico has long been a medical destination for U.S. residents, 52 3 and
thousands on both sides of the border cross each day to purchase medical care,
dental care, or pharmaceuticals. 524 More recently, Mexican hospitals in cities like
Monterrey are earning stellar reviews from U.S. patients,525 and health care
providers in Mexico now actively compete for medical tourists. 526 Private
medicine is one of Mexico's most profitable industries, 527 and cross-border health
care between the United States and Mexico is a ripe market. At least 11.5 million
people reside along the border.528 Many U.S. residents seek health care in Mexico
because they are uninsured, have low incomes, or might prefer Spanish-speaking
providers. 529 Though prices may not be as low as in some Asian countries,
Mexico's competitive advantage is its proximity to the United States.530
520. See Lim, supra note 484, at 72-75.
521. See id. at 74 (noting that "no one knows what the true incidence of medical errors is, but
everyone knows it is certainly not zero").
522. See Kandiah, supra note 439, at 476-77 (noting, however, the complications of relying on
evidence-based medicine both in guiding clinical practice and in determining legal standards of
care).
523. BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 6, at 49.
524. Id. at 49; NOria Homedes, Globalization and Health at the United States-Mexico Border,
93 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 2016, 2017 (2003); David C. Warner & Pablo G. Schneider, Cross-Border
Health Insurance: Options for Texas, at xxiv, xxv (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
525. See, e.g., Alfredo Corchado & Laurence Iliff, Good Care, Low Prices Lure Patients to
Mexico, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 28, 2007, at IA.
526. Id.
527. BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 6, at 3 (citing Jorge Augusto Arredondo Vega, The
Case of the Mexico-United States Border Area, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN HEALTH SERVICES: A
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE, supra note 294, at 161, 166.
528. Homedes, supra note 524, at 2016.
529. Cortez, supra note 6, at 101; Marissa Paul Walker & Robert Guerrero, Cross-Border
Health Insurance Initiatives in California, Texas and Arizona 5, 8 (Jan. 30, 2003), available at
http://econdev.web.arizona.edu/pubs/az-mexico/pubs/Cross-Borderlnsurance.pdf (slides only).
530. BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 6, at 58 (noting that proximity is an important factor
for elderly and ill patients traveling from the United States and Canada to Mexico); Corchado &
Iliff, supra note 525 (noting that surgeries are 40% less expensive in Mexico than in the United
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Providers are using a combination of proximity, improved quality, and
comparatively low prices to target not only individual patients, but also U.S.
employers and insurers willing to outsource expensive surgeries or even routine
checkups.
31
But Mexico's geographic proximity, shared demography, and cross-border
commerce with the United States do not translate into many similarities between
the countries' health care systems. 32 Providers along the border collaborate
much less than we might expect, which some attribute to dramatically different
systems for organizing, financing, delivering, and regulating health care.533
Moreover, although Mexico is geographically closer to the United States
than India, Thailand, or Singapore, its malpractice compensation system may be
the most distant. Like Thailand, Mexico is a civil law country, and its courts do
not utilize juries or stare decisis. 5 34 Tort litigation in Mexico is virtually non-
existent, and medical malpractice cases are even rarer.5 35 Mexican law does not
allow non-economic damages like pain and suffering, and its economic damages
are deflated from being pegged to Mexico's workers' compensation statute.536
Mexican tort law is perhaps the most arcane, alien, and "contrastingly different"
body of law between Mexico and the United States.537 As with India's consumer
forums, Mexico's new National Commission for Medical Arbitration provides a
more efficient alternative to civil litigation, but the compensation it awards would
probably not satisfy most U.S. plaintiffs.
In short, U.S. patients traveling to Mexico for medical care should not
assume that its legal or arbitration systems will provide satisfactory recourse. On
the bright side, U.S. courts have demonstrated a willingness to hear complaints
by U.S. residents arising in Mexico,538 which may be the best option for most
American patients. In this section, I evaluate how Mexico handles malpractice
States); Kelly Arthur Garrett, Prices of Medical Services Are at Least 30% Lower in Mexico than in
U.S., EL UNIVERSAL (Mex.), Dec. 27, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 14869899.
531. Jason Beaubien, Mexican Hospitals Aim to Attract More Americans, NPR WEEKEND
EDITION SATURDAY, Jan. 3, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 135025; Corchado & Iliff, supra note
525; Gabriela Rico, U.S. Patients Turn for Care to Mexico, ARIz. DAILY STAR, Apr. 13, 2008, at
A].
532. See Homedes, supra note 524, at 2017.
533. Id.
534. Vargas, supra note 12, at 486.
535. Jorge A. Vargas, Tort Law in Mexico, in 2 MEXICAN LAW: A TREATISE FOR LEGAL
PRACTITIONERS AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS § 21.5 (West 1998) [hereinafter Vargas, Tort Law
in Mexico] (noting that very few Mexican attorneys handle tort cases, partly due to cultural
preferences for resolving these disputes informally, and partly due to Mexico's relatively simple
and limited compensation system); Garrett, supra note 530; Vargas, supra note 12, at 488.
536. Vargas, supra note 12, at 479, 484.
537. Id. at 484.
538. Id. at 476.
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complaints, beginning with a brief case study evaluating how cross-border health
insurers have handled the legal risks of relying on providers in Mexico.
1. The New Market for Cross-Border Health Insurance
Cross-border health insurance covering treatments in Mexico is becoming
increasingly popular. In California, HMOs offer less expensive insurance plans to
California residents willing to be treated in Mexico. 539 For example, HealthNet,
Blue Shield, and SIMNSA are selling plans with lower premiums and deductibles
to U.S. citizens in California,540 and SIMNSA is selling similar plans to Mexican
nationals residing in California. 541 These cross-border health plans generally cost
40-50% less than those that utilize U.S. providers only.542
The cross-border insurance trend emerged primarily after legislation in
California legitimized these plans by establishing specific requirements to
regulate them.5 43 Texas and Arizona have considered similar legislation, but
concerns remain over legal liabilities and other practical impediments.544
Interestingly, California decided to regulate cross-border health plans in
substantial part to protect consumers already using unregulated plans and to
provide legal recourse in the United States should patients need to sue.545
California was concerned that U.S. nationals would find it difficult to seek
redress in Mexican courts. In fact, California's statute prevents cross-border
HMOs from forcing U.S. residents to rely on the unfamiliar Mexican legal
539. David Warner and Pablo Schneider have published a comprehensive analysis of these
plans. See Warner & Schneider, supra note 524; see also Cortez, supra note 6, at 99-100; Ly Tran,
Sick and Tired of the Knox-Keene Act: The Equal Protection Right of Non-Mexican Californians to
Enroll in Mexico-Based HMO Plans, 14 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 357, 357-63 (2008).
540. Cortez, supra note 6, at 100.
541. Tran, supra note 539.
542. Sonya Geis, Passport to Health Care at Lower Cost to Patient; California HMOs Send
Some Enrollees to Mexico, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at A3; Tran, supra note 539, at 358.
543. Knox-Keene Act Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 1340-1399 (West 2008) (regulating cross-border health plans sold to U.S. nationals); Warner &
Schneider, supra note 524, at xix.
544. The Texas legislature considered several bills that would legalize cross-border health
insurance. A 1999 bill would have legalized cross-border insurance, but the legislature instead only
monitors the trend and has created an Interim Committee on Binational Health Benefit Plan
Coverage to study the issue. Additionally, the Texas Department of Insurance studies cross-border
insurance but remains concerned about the outstanding legal issues. Warner & Schneider, supra
note 524, at xxi, 83-87, 89, 117-118 (citing various Texas House and Senate bills); see also
Corchado & Iliff, supra note 525 (describing proposed legislation in Texas introduced in 2007 that
"would have allowed U.S.-based insurers to cover health services in Mexico"); Walker & Guerrero,
supra note 529.
545. See Tran, supra note 539, at 361.
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system, even if care was provided in Mexico.
546
The California statute protects U.S. residents in other ways. First, HMOs
offering cross-border plans not only must establish grievance procedures in the
United States but also must submit to California's jurisdiction.5 47 For example,
SIMNSA maintains offices in San Diego to receive member complaints.
548
Licensure by the California Department of Managed Health Care (DMHC) also
triggers jurisdiction by U.S. courts. 549 The DMHC has received very few
complaints about cross-border health plans to date,55° though these grievance
procedures may be a poor proxy for measuring the frequency of medical errors
by Mexican providers.
Second, HMOs offering cross-border plans in California must regularly
review the quality of Mexican providers55' and must publish an advisory
statement on health care in Mexico.552 For example, Blue Shield's "Access Baja"
plan states that both legal and medical standards differ in Mexico:
Legal requirements for and generally accepted practice standards of medical
care in Mexico are different than those of California or elsewhere in the United
States.... Any member who is not completely comfortable with the standards
of care for the practice of medicine in Mexico should not enroll in the Access
Baja HMO Health Plan.553
Unsurprisingly, Blue Shield disclaims liability for negligence committed by
physicians, hospitals, or other providers in Mexico and classifies them as
independent contractors. 554 Blue Shield's plan also requires Mexican physicians
to have their own malpractice insurance.555
In short, California addressed the problem of U.S. patients having to sue in
Mexican courts by requiring health insurers to submit to U.S. jurisdiction.
546. Tran, supra note 539, at 365; Warner & Schneider, supra note 524, at 23.
547. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1351.2(a)(10) (West 2008); Yran, supra note 539, at
371-72.
548. Warner & Schneider, supra note 524, at 54-55.
549. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1351 (West 2008); Warner & Schneider, supra note 524,
at 20, 23.
550. Tran, supra note 539, at 364 (citing Sarah Skidmore, The Mexico Option: Cross-Border
Health Insurance Is a Hit with Employers and Workers, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Oct. 16, 2005,
at HI).
551. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1370 (West 2008).
552. TEX. INTERIM COMM. ON BINATIONAL HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN COVERAGE, BINATIONAL
HEALTH BENEFIT PLAN REPORT PURSUANT TO HB 2498 AND SB 496, at 7, 53 (2003), available at
http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/senate/commit/c 1000/downloads/binational.pdf.
553. Id.
554. Id. at 57.
555. Warner & Schneider, supra note 524, at 37.
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Nevertheless, as in Blue Shield's case, insurers have shielded themselves from
liability for malpractice committed by Mexican providers. Patients may still be
able to sue these providers in U.S. courts, but they will have to establish personal
jurisdiction, which is by no means certain. Otherwise, patients will be left to
navigate Mexico's civil courts.
2. Civil Litigation in Mexico
Patients injured by medical malpractice in Mexico may sue in Mexico's civil
courts. Some contend that U.S. citizens have adequate legal recourse in Mexico
because patients are not only free to sue in Mexican courts but also to file claims
with Conamed, Mexico's new medical arbitration board.556 However, as in India,
Thailand, and Singapore, U.S. patients are likely to find these avenues of redress
to be inadequate. There are serious concerns that Mexican courts do not provide
any real recourse to victims of medical malpractice. First, most U.S. patients will
find the Mexican legal system to be unfamiliar, and Mexican tort law is perhaps
the most arcane and distinctive body of law between Mexico and the United
557States. Mexico's tort cases are governed primarily by the Federal Civil Code or
a corresponding state code.558 Mexico's Civil Code has been described as
"scant," "skeletal," "obsolete," and "simplistic"-and remains so because the
Mexican legislature has not modernized it.559 In fact, tort law does not really exist
in Mexico; 560 instead, Mexico characterizes tort law as extra-contractual
liability, 1 based on obligations arising from illegal acts.562 The legislature has
556. Tran, supra note 539, at 371; Warner & Schneider, supra note 524, at 24. Note, however,
that Tran acknowledges that the Mexican legal system differs from the U.S. legal system and
suggests that U.S. citizens try to avoid Mexican courts. Tran, supra note 539, at 374-76.
557. Ryan G. Anderson, Transnational Litigation Involving Mexican Parties, 25 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 1059, 1060 (1994); Vargas, supra note 12, at 484.
558. Vargas, Tort Law in Mexico, supra note 535, § 21.2; Vargas, supra note 12, at 478 (citing
Articles 1910-1934 of the Federal Civil Code and noting that the thirty-one state codes
overwhelmingly adopt these articles).
559. Vargas, supra note 12, at 478, 487-88, 499 ("[T]he legal principles that control personal
bodily injuries and wrongful deaths in [Mexico] have been kept in isolation and virtually untouched
in a legal time capsule that is today legally obsolete and completely out of sync with Mexico's
economic and industrial realities."); see also Vargas, Tort Law in Mexico, supra note 535, § 21.41.
560. Vargas, Tort Law in Mexico, supra note 538, § 21.2.
561. Codigo Civil Federal [C.C.F.] [Federal Civil Code], unamended, Art. 1910, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 26 de Mayo de 1928 (Mex.).
562. Jorge Mario Magall6n Ibarra, La Responsabilidad Professional De Los Medicos, 1
MEXICAN L. REV. 46, 54 (2004) ("[L]a conducta del que obrando ilicitamente o contra las buenas
costumbres cause daho a otro, resulta obligado a repararlo, a menos que demuestre que el dafio se
produjo como consecuencia de culpa o negligencia inexcusable de la victima."), available at
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/rev/derpriv/cont/l /dtr/dtr4.pdf; Vargas, Tort Law in
Mexico, supra note 535, §§ 21.11-21.13; Vargas, supra note 12, at 496-98.
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563not clarified when courts should find fault, negligence, or causation. As a
result, such questions are left almost entirely to the discretion of individual
judges. 64 Tort law and its attendant concepts are "alien to Mexican legal
thinking. 565 Mexican courts do not use juries, nor do they use stare decisis to
establish binding judicial precedents.566 Moreover, Mexican courts do not utilize
pretrial discovery, instead relying on courts to conduct discovery during trial.567
Together, these features suggest that medical malpractice litigation in Mexico's
civil courts will present foreign patients with significant burdens.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, foreign patients will be
underwhelmed with malpractice awards in Mexico. Mexican law does not award
punitive or exemplary damages, damages for pain and suffering, or damages for
loss of consortium.568 Even tort actions involving death only generate an amount
around $17,880 pursuant to the Civil Code's formula for calculating damages.569
Such paltry compensation undoubtedly encourages Americans injured in Mexico
to sue in U.S. courts.570
Courts in Mexico calculate tort compensation by referring to the workers'
compensation formula.71 Mexico's Federal Civil Code directs courts to calculate
economic recoveries in tort under the Federal Labor Act, as if the victim were a
Mexican laborer injured at work.572 Courts may award patients the costs of
medical care and rehabilitation, but economic losses are limited to four-times the
prevailing minimum wage in the state, multiplied by the number of days assigned
to the specific disability claimed under the Federal Labor Act. 573 As a result, tort
damages have been described as "outdated and less than frugal, 574 and very few
attorneys even handle-let alone specialize in-personal injury cases.
575
Third, tort cases are extremely rare in Mexican courts. Americans injured
563. Vargas, supra note 12, at 499-500. The Mexican Supreme Court refers briefly to
negligence and custom in its Jurisprudencias, but merely to emphasize that judges should use their
discretion. Vargas, Tort Law in Mexico, supra note 538, § 21.23.
564. Vargas, supra note 12, at 499-500.
565. Vargas, Tort Law in Mexico, supra note 535, § 21.7.
566. Vargas, supra note 12, at 486.
567. Anderson, supra note 557, at 1060.
568. Vargas, supra note 12, at 484; Vargas, Tort Law in Mexico, supra note 535, § 21.2.
569. Vargas, supra note 12, at 503.
570. Vargas, Tort Law in Mexico, supra note 535, § 21.2; Vargas, supra note 12, at 503. See
generally Anderson, supra note 557, at 1100-03, Kozolchyk & Ziontz, supra note 566.
571. Vargas, supra note 12, at 479.
572. Vargas, supra note 12, at 478 (citing Ley Federal del Trabajo [L.F.T.] [Federal Labor
Law], as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], Title IX, arts. 477-80, 487, 491-93, 495-
97, 500-02, 1 de Agosto de 1971 (Mex.)).
573. Vargas, supra note 12, at 479.
574. Id. at 488.
575. Id. at 501-02; Vargas, Tort Law in Mexico, supra note 535, § 21.5.
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while visiting Mexico greatly prefer to sue in the United States.576 In fact, U.S.
courts decide a far larger number of tort cases arising in Mexico than Mexican
courts do.577 Professor Vargas states bluntly that "the practice of tort law in
Mexico is simply non-existent" and proposes modernizing the framework by
borrowing principles from Europe and the United States.578 Adding to the danger
for patients, there is almost no product liability law in Mexico,579 leaving patients
exposed should they be injured by faulty pharmaceuticals or medical devices.
Fourth, as in India, Thailand, and Singapore, Mexican culture fundamentally
differs from U.S. culture on its desire and tolerance for adversarial litigation.58°
Mexicans remain pointedly distrustful that courts will resolve disputes fairly.
581
Of course, as in the other countries I examine, observers in Mexico firmly
believe that more and more tort cases are being filed, spurred in part by growing
consumer awareness. 582 Mexico claims to be beset by a surge of medical
malpractice suits, which observers attribute to "poor personal communication,
unrealistic expectations of performance, the high costs of medical attention, and
better informed and more critical patients. 583 Some lament that the growing
number of lawsuits creates a "vicious circle" of rising insurance premiums,
defensive medicine, and rising health care costs. 584 Unfortunately, as is common
in other jurisdictions, the critics decry the situation in Mexico but only cite as
support articles describing malpractice litigation in the United States and the
United Kingdom.585
Thus, foreign patients will likely find that Mexico's civil litigation system
provides inadequate redress for medical negligence. Tort litigation is almost non-
existent; damages are modest by U.S. standards and are limited by law. Further,
the legal system is arcane, costly, and not trusted by its own citizens.
3. Mexico's New National Commission for Medical Arbitration
As in India, the Mexican government confronted its flawed civil litigation
system by creating an alternative. Malpractice victims in Mexico now have
access to a new medical arbitration system, formed to provide a less formal and
576. Vargas, supra note 12, at 477.
577. Id. at 478.
578. Id. at 488.
579. Id. at 494-96.
580. Id. at 502.
581. Id. at 502.
582. Id. at 506-07, 519.
583. See, e.g., Carlos Tena-Tamayo & Julio Sotelo, Malpractice in Mexico: Arbitration Not
Litigation, 331 BRITISH MED. J. 448 (2005).
584. Id. at 448.
585. Id. at 448 (citing five articles, none of which address Mexico).
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costly alternative to civil litigation.586 In 1996, President Ernesto Zedillo created
by decree the National Commission for Medical Arbitration (Comisi6n Nacional
de Arbitraje Medico, or "Conamed"), residing within the Ministry of Health, and
composed entirely of government-paid employees.587 Zedillo's decree gave
Conamed jurisdiction to advise parties of their legal rights and obligations and to
investigate, hear, and resolve complaints concerning medical care.
588
Conamed has had some success with its efforts to resolve disputes promptly
by having a specialized consultant contact the parties. Between 2001 and 2003,
Conamed resolved 73% of nearly 15,000 cases within forty-eight hours of being
filed.589 If the special consultant fails and a complaint is filed, Conamed will
assemble the parties to negotiate during an initial, conciliatory phase.590 Fourteen
percent of cases filed are resolved by conciliation,591 in an average of three to six
months.592
If the parties do not settle, the case continues to a Conamed arbitrator.593
Conamed then gathers expert medical opinions, including the opinion of the
treating physician.594 Arbitration generally takes an average of fifteen months. 595
Conamed has a major advantage over courts because it enjoys credibility in
medical disputes. 596 For example, when selecting physicians and lawyers to
handle each dispute, Conamed "consider[s] their expertise, academic
background, impartiality in the specific case, and up to date knowledge in the
particular branch of the medical specialty involved. 597
586. Vargas, supra note 12, at 519-20.
587. Magall6n Ibarra, supra note 562, at 47-48 (describing the purposes and promise of
Conamed); Tena-Tamayo & Sotelo, supra note 583, at 449; Comisi6n Nacional de Arbitraje
M6dico, http://www.conamed.gob.mx/index.php (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
588. Magall6n Ibarra, supra note 562, at 47-48 ("[L]a Comisi6n Nacional de Arbitraje M6dico
• ..puedan contribuir de manera imparcial, al anilisis, dictamen y resoluci6n de las quejas y
controversias que surjan entre ellos, con motivo de lo que se consideren irregularidades en las
prestaci6n o negativa a la prestaci6n de los servicios medicos."); Jorge Femndez Ruiz, La
Comisi6n Nacional De Arbitraje Mdico y La Responsabilidad De Los Servidores Ptblicos [The
National Commission of Medical Arbitration and the Responsibility of Civil Servants], 3 MEXICAN
L. REv. 311, available at http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/rev/boletin/cont/92/art/
artl .pdf; Tena-Tamayo & Sotelo, supra note 583, at 449.
589. Tena-Tamayo & Sotelo, supra note 583, at 449, 450.
590. Id. at 449.
591. Id. at 449, 450.
592. Id. at 450.
593. Id. at 449 (citing Comisi6n Nacional de Arbitraje M6dico, http://www.conamed.gob.mx/




597. Id. at 450.
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If Conamed arbitrators find that the physician committed malpractice
(usually negligence), then it can award monetary damages under the same criteria
used in civil litigation, relying on Mexico's workers' compensation formulas.598
However, Conamed's National Commissioner acknowledged that the amount
awarded in arbitration is usually lower than that awarded by courts.5 99 In fact,
data from Conamed show that cases resolved through conciliation or arbitration
typically result in the health care provider solely agreeing to assume
responsibility for providing ongoing medical care.6 °0 Only 28% of the complaints
resolved through conciliation or arbitration resulted in damage awards, paying an
average of only $4841 to each patient.60'
In addition to the limited damages, Conamed has other limitations. Both
patients and health care providers must agree to resolve the dispute via Conamed.
Although either party may withdraw from Conamed at any time prior to signing
the arbiration agreement, 602 once the arbitration contract has been signed, neither
party may take the case to court. 60 3 Similarly, Conamed cannot resolve disputes
already being heard by courts.604 Moreover, "Conamed is not a judicial authority"
and cannot enforce its own judgments,60 5 though it is not clear if lack of
enforcement has been a problem.
Conamed maintains comprehensive data of its complaints and resolutions,
which aids potential medical tourists in understanding their likelihood of success
in Conamed. 60 6 As noted above, almost three-quarters of all cases are resolved by
special consultants before a formal complaint is filed.60 7 Of the cases that
proceeded to conciliation or arbitration, 47% were not resolved, either because a
party withdrew or the parties went to court.608 Of all the cases filed with
Conamed, approximately 12% were left unresolved.60 9
The data also show that of the complaints Conamed resolved through
conciliation or arbitration, 66% concluded that no medical malpractice occurred,
while 34% found evidence of malpractice. 610 A separate analysis of randomly
598. Id. 449, 450.
599. Id. at 449.
600. Id. at 449-50.
601. Id. at 450 (stating that Conamed awarded a total of $2.9 million to 599 patients).
602. Id.
603. Id. at 449.
604. Id.
605. Id.
606. Maria-Eugenia Jimenez-Corona et al., Epidemiology of Medical Complaints in Mexico:
Identifying a General Profile, 18 INT'L J. QUALITY IN HEALTH CARE 220, 221 (2006).
607. See text accompanying note 588.
608. Tena-Tamayo & Sotelo, supra note 583, at 449 box 1,450.
609. Id.
610. Id. at 450.
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sampled cases found evidence of malpractice in 36.5% of cases.6 ' Thus, this
study corroborated the outcomes reached in Conamed's arbitrations.
Additionally, this study found that 67% of the malpractice cases were attributable
to the provider's lack of skill rather than negligence.612
To date, patients and health care providers seem to be highly satisfied with
Conamed. In a survey of over 5500 patients and physicians that used Conamed,
97% of respondents rated the process as good or excellent.6 3
Before Conamed was created, there had been "no systematic review of the
annual trends of medical complaints and litigation in Mexico. ' 614 Thus, Conamed
has provided not only an accessible alternative to civil litigation, but also a
glimpse into trends surrounding malpractice complaints in Mexico.
Unfortunately, even a more efficient, neutral alternative like Conamed is unlikely
to provide much recourse to foreign patients if recoveries average only $4841 per
615patient.
4. Foreign Patients in Mexico
Under almost any scenario, Mexico will continue to compete for U.S.
patients. However, patients that visit Mexico to avoid wandering too far from the
United States should know that Mexico's legal system does not share the same
proximity. As in India, Thailand, and Singapore, seeking recourse in Mexico's
civil courts remains fraught with difficulties. And though Conamed provides a
relatively neutral, efficient alternative, compensation is still extremely modest by
U.S. standards. Moreover, it is telling that California, one of the only legislative
bodies to have addressed cross-border health insurance, took several steps to
minimize patients' exposure to Mexico's legal system.
Patients should also know that health care in Mexico differs from health care
in the United States much more than one might expect, given the countries'
shared border, demography, and commerce. The Mexican government approves
credentials for physicians and hospitals and provides legal recourse to patients,61 6
but these systems are evolving and are in some cases relatively new.617 Moreover,
611. Jimenez-Corona et al., supra note 606, at 221.
612. Id. at 221. The authors sorted the "malpractice" cases into lack of skill (67.4% of cases),
negligence (30.0%), and deceit (2.6%).
613. Tena-Tamayo & Sotelo, supra note 583, at 451 (citing an anonymous Conamed survey
conducted in 2002 and 2003).
614. Id.
615. Id. at 449, 450 (stating that Conamed awarded a total of $2.9 million to 599 patients, an
average of $4841 per patient).
616. Warner & Schneider, supra note 524, at xxv.
617. See TEX. STATE SENATE, REPORT OF THE INTERIM COMM. ON BINATIONAL HEALTH
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Mexico generally does not regulate medical services or impose quality controls
to the same extent as the United States. 61 8 Although these differences may wane
as more private hospitals in Mexico cater to foreign patients, Mexican health care
providers, insurers, and institutions remain distinct from their U.S. counterparts.
For example, researchers have found "profound distrust between decisionmakers
and health care workers on both sides of the border.' '6 19 Patients visiting Mexico
should thus consider how they might establish jurisdiction to sue negligent
providers in U.S. courts, as U.S. residents have done in other personal injury
contexts.
III. REALLOCATING THE LEGAL RISKS OF CROSS-BORDER HEALTH CARE
Medical tourists face real obstacles seeking recourse for medical errors. In
Part I, I described how aggrieved patients might struggle in U.S. courts not only
to resolve issues of jurisdiction, venue, and choice of law in their favor, but to
prove sometimes attenuated theories of liability. In Part II, I explained how
patients visiting India, Thailand, Singapore, and Mexico might not recover
adequate, timely compensation in those jurisdictions. Two themes join Parts I
and II: there are very real obstacles for patients seeking legal recourse for
medical errors committed overseas, and patients may not fully appreciate these
obstacles. As a result of patients' lack of understanding, these transactions might
not reflect the true risk tolerance of patients. This information deficiency may
generate not only inefficient, suboptimal outcomes, but also injustice if patients
agree to have surgery overseas based in part on assumptions that foreign legal
systems will provide adequate recourse.
It is difficult to predict how destination countries or the medical tourism
industry will respond. Some jurisdictions might "race to the top" by shoring up
relatively weak systems for regulating local providers and compensating
aggrieved patients, recognizing that inadequate legal protections might dissuade
patients from visiting.6 2 ° Or jurisdictions might "race to the bottom" (or remain
there) to keep prices low or offer treatments that are banned elsewhere. 621 Either
way, it is probably unrealistic to expect countries that are strapped for resources
and struggling with more pressing public health concerns to bolster legal
remedies for patients-and perhaps ignore protectionist impulses.
Thus, in Part III, I evaluate how other parties might respond. First, I evaluate
several private sector responses that have emerged, including certification,
malpractice insurance, and industry guidelines. After evaluating the promise and
weaknesses of these approaches, I suggest several methods the public sector
618. Id. at 12.
619. Homedes, supra note 524, at 2020.
620. Cortez, supra note 6, at 91 n. 178; Terry, supra note 6, at 466.
621. Cortez, supra note 6, at 105; Terry, supra note 6, at 466.
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might use to reallocate the legal risks of medical travel. I evaluate each response
by its ability to both inform patients and improve their chances of obtaining
adequate redress.
A. Private Sector Responses
The interests of patients and the medical tourism industry are not necessarily
incompatible. Poor quality care and inadequate legal recourse can deter many
would-be medical tourists, and defending litigation is burdensome and expensive
for providers and insurers. Moreover, legal uncertainties may be discouraging
both patients and insurers that would otherwise consider using foreign providers.
Thus, companies have some incentives to reallocate the legal risks of medical
travel more fairly. In this section, I analyze three different responses by the
private sector to date, and I comment on how these responses may not
accomplish their stated objectives.
1. Certification
Demand for reassurance in the chaotic medical tourism market has led the
industry to respond. A newly-formed industry group, the Medical Tourism
Association (MTA), recently began offering a pilot "Medical Tourism Facilitator
Certification Program., 622 The MTA intends to use certification to create "best
practices" among medical tourism "facilitators" and to assure patients, insurers,
and providers that certified facilitators meet certain minimum standards.623 The
form asks applicants to answer over 200 questions regarding how they do
business-including how they select foreign providers, handle patients, and earn
revenues.624 Approved facilitators receive a renewable, two-year certification for
$2500.625
Because the certification program is new, it is unclear how it will operate,
and more importantly, whether it will achieve the MTA's stated goals. For
example, the MTA claims that certification will generate "confidence, trust, and
... credibility" for medical tourism companies in the eyes of both patients and
insurers.626 However, as I have noted, industry self-regulation can be problematic
and could be a mediocre substitute for government oversight here.627 Thus, it
622. Medical Tourism Association, Medical Tourism Facilitator Certification Program, 2008-
2009, http://medicaltourismassociation.com/certification.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
623. Id.
624. Medical Tourism Association, Medical Tourism Facilitator Certification 2009-2010,
http://medicaltourismassociation.com/Certification%20Evaluation%2OForm.PDF (last visited Nov.
22, 2009).
625. Medical Tourism Association, supra note 622.
626. Medical Tourism Association, supra note 622.
627. See Sections II.B (India), II.C (Thailand), II.D (Singapore), supra.
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remains unclear whether the MTA's certification program will succumb to the
same problems that plague the other self-regulatory bodies I discuss in this
Article.
The MTA also claims that its certification program can help ensure patient
safety. 628 For example, the certification form asks whether the applicant: 1)
verifies that its foreign providers are accredited and/or certified; 2) personally
inspects foreign facilities and meets foreign surgeons; 3) tracks patient outcomes;
4) coordinates follow-up care; 5) validates the need for non-elective surgeries; 6)
uses a medical advisor; and 7) uses a process to handle patient complaints.629
However, the MTA does not explain how it will tally or weigh answers to
the application, nor does it explain the criteria it will use to grant or deny
applications. For example, will the MTA deny applications that answer "no" or
"not applicable" to some of these questions? The MTA also does not explain the
criteria it will use to revoke certifications or renew applications or whether it
would make such decisions public.
Notably, the MTA's application form also asks what information companies
convey to patients about their potential legal recourse. For example, the form
asks whether the company "adequately explains" the recourse available against
the surgeon or hospital, including the "specific legal recourse options for each
country" to which it sends patients.63°
But what do these companies really know about the medical malpractice
systems overseas? As I emphasized in Part II, it is difficult to navigate the
medical malpractice systems in these countries, and there are no comprehensive
and reliable sources of information. Most intermediaries disclose the legal risks
in densely worded legalese, if at all. Moreover, what explanations will the MTA
deem "adequate"? For example, must the company explain how Singaporean
courts use a strict burden of proof that defers greatly to medical experts? Must
companies explain how the civil code in Mexico calculates and caps damages?
Do companies have to disclose the limited universe of remedies in India? Or
would a general statement listing the possible avenues for recourse in each
country suffice, without any analysis of whether the patient might find such
recourse difficult to obtain or inadequate? Intermediaries may warn buyers to
beware of foreign legal systems without either highlighting specific deficiencies
with each system or demonstrating how such systems compare with U.S. courts.
Thus, although it appears that the MTA wants facilitators to disclose the legal
risks of medical travel, I remain skeptical that facilitators will disclose the critical
details that patients may desire to know-such as the average medical
malpractice award or the average length of time to recover. Moreover, even if
facilitators disclose these details, patients might not fully understand how to
628. Medical Tourism Association, supra note 622.
629. Medical Tourism Association, supra note 624.
630. Id. (Section C, "Legal Recourse").
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interpret and use such information.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the certification program could live up to
the MTA's aspirations of creating at least some standards and transparency in a
market that currently lacks both. In fact, if the MTA made its data public, the
program could achieve many of the objectives I have called for elsewhere, such
as: 1) certification or licensure for medical tourism intermediaries, with the threat
of decertification; 2) increased transparency in their business practices (to the
extent the MTA makes this information public); and 3) gathering more data
revealing what types of patients visit which countries for which procedures,
631including outcomes data. Moreover, the MTA's certification program seems to
encourage companies to think critically and creatively about patient safety, for
example, by asking whether facilitators offer patients "complications
insurance.632
Ultimately, however, the MTA is a trade organization, and its certification
program-however well-intentioned-may be susceptible to the same pitfalls
that plague other self-regulatory bodies. The companies applying for certification
are the same companies whose fees fund the program and whose membership
dues and advertising dollars fund the MTA itself.633 Can we trust the industry to
regulate itself? At this point, we have no other choice, although elsewhere I have
sketched out what government oversight of the industry might look like.634
2. Medical Malpractice Insurance for Patients
Companies that arrange for U.S. patients to travel overseas might consider
offering patients insurance that covers any resulting injuries or complications,
including the cost of any remedial care required back home.6 35
To date, there are few such products. Recently, Aos Assurance Company
began offering "Patient Medical Malpractice Insurance" to medical tourists.
636
Patients can purchase a policy that compensates them for lost wages, medical
expenses, rehabilitation expenses, disfigurement, and death from "negligent
injury or error" committed during a covered procedure.637 Policy coverage ranges
631. Cortez, supra note 6, at 123-27.
632. Medical Tourism Association, supra note 624 (Question E3, "Insurance").
633. Note that government regulators sometimes rely on "user fees" by regulated parties and
may be criticized for such. See, e.g., James L. Zelenay, Jr., The Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Is
a Faster Food and Drug Administration Always a Better Food and Drug Administration?, 60 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 261, 288, 330-34 (2005) (noting criticisms of the FDA for relying on user fees paid by
pharmaceutical companies).
634. Cortez, supra note 6, at 123-27.
635. Terry, supra note 6, at 466.
636. Aos Assurance Company Ltd., Patient Medical Malpractice Insurance,
http://www.aosassurance.bb/PublicHtml/readmore.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
637. Id. at 4; Aos, Patient Medical Malpractice Product Sheet, http://www.aosassurance.bb/
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from $100,000 to $1 million.638 Companies can also purchase group policies. 639
The policies cover only certain procedures performed by certain surgeons.
The application form requires the patient to select among several dozen
procedures and practitioners, though Aos may cover others not specifically
listed.640 However, Aos does require that all procedures be performed at a facility
accredited by Joint Commission International, by a board-certified physician or
equivalent.641
Aos markets this insurance as a way for patients to reduce the legal
uncertainty of traveling overseas for surgery. For example, Aos notes in a
brochure that "patients face dramatically increased liability exposure if a
negligent injury should occur" overseas, because destination countries "have
weak malpractice laws resulting in little to no recourse for the patient should
something go wrong. ''642 Aos also advertises that it will settle claims 80% faster
than patients would recover in U.S. courts. 643 Finally, Aos promises that it will
"handle and settle claims in accordance with the norms of the employee[']s home
country with local claim adjusters who understand the particular country customs
and standards. 644 This could mean, for example, that Aos will provide greater
reimbursement to patients from countries with higher standards of living, higher
wages, and more expensive remedial care-though Aos does not clarify.
This type of insurance should improve as other companies begin offering
competing products. For example, Aos charges policyholders $1000 simply to
file a claim and only refunds the fee if the claim prevails.645 Also, the prices
quoted on Aos's website show that purchasing a policy may add significantly to
the overall cost of the venture.64 6 Such prices and terms may become more
PublicHtml/Documents/PMMIIPMMI%20Product%2OSheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
638. Id.
639. Aos Assurance Company, supra note 636.
640. Aos Assurance Company, supra note 636 (Application Step 3).
641. Id.
642. Aos, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: MITIGATING NEGLIGENT INJURY RISK: MEDICAL TOURISM 3,
available at http://www.aosassurance.bb/PublicHtml/Documents/PMMI/
Executive%20Summary%20PMMl.pdf.
643. Aos, Group Medical Malpractice Insurance (GMMI) Coverages,
http://www.aosassurance.bb/PublicHtml/GMMI-Coverages.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
644. Id.
645. See Aos, Group Medical Malpractice Insurance (GMMITM ) Product Sheet,
http://www.aosassurance.bb/PublicHtmVDocuments/GMMI/GMMI%2OProduct%2OSheet.pdf (last
visited Nov. 22, 2009). Note, however, that Aos does not charge deductibles or copayments.
646. For example, purchasing the median policy with $500,000 of coverage for arthroscopic
surgery on an anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) would cost approximately $948. See Aos, Aos
Quick Quote, https://www.aosassurance.bb/Reaktor2K7/application/quickquote/
quickquote.aspx (last visited Nov. 22, 2009) (select "Arthroscopic Surgery - Anterior Cruciate
Ligament" from the "Procedure" menu and $500,000 from the "Amount of insurance coverage in
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favorable as more companies enter the market. Most importantly, these
competition-driven policies are likely to offer peace of mind to patients venturing
overseas. Intermediaries might even consider packaging these insurance products
into the menu of services they offer.
3. Industry Guidelines
Demand for standards in the medical tourism industry has also prompted a
response from the American Medical Association (AMA), which recently
published what it calls the "first ever guidance on medical tourism. '647 The
guidelines implore "employers, insurance companies, and other entities that
facilitate or incentivize medical care outside the U.S." to follow nine
principles.648 For example, the AMA calls for all travel to be voluntary and
instructs that financial incentives for patients "should not inappropriately limit
the diagnostic and therapeutic alternatives that are offered to patients, or restrict
treatment or referral options. 649
Like the MTA's certification program, the AMA's guidelines aspire to
"ensure the safety of patients considering traveling abroad for medical care. ' 650
The guidelines, of course, bind no one. But the AMA says that it will try to
codify these guidelines by introducing model legislation to state legislators. 651
Of course, like the MTA, the AMA is not exactly an objective bystander.
U.S. physicians may lose business to foreign providers, and the AMA has
publicly cautioned medical tourists about the quality of care overseas.652
Nonetheless, the AMA has been a valuable counterpoint to the chorus of industry
voices in the media that tend to downplay the risks of medical travel.
Finally, like the MTA's certification program, the AMA's guidelines are
somewhat aspirational. For example, the AMA calls for companies to inform
patients of "their rights and legal recourse prior to agreeing to travel outside the
U.S. for medical care., 653 However, as I demonstrate throughout this Article, it is
highly doubtful that most U.S. employers, insurers, or intermediaries know much
about the medical malpractice systems in destination countries, as this
information is elusive. Moreover, companies that try to inform patients of their
US$" menu).
647. Press Release, Am. Med. Ass'n, AMA Provides First Ever Guidance on Medical
Tourism, (June 16, 2008), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/
idUS38122+ 17-Jun-2008+PRN20080617.
648. American Medical Association, New AMA Guidelines on Medical Tourism,
http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/rm/31/medicaltourism.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
649. Id.
650. Press Release, Am. Med. Ass'n, supra note 647.
651. Id.
652. Edward R. Langston, Letter to the Editor, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 2008, at 20.
653. American Medical Association, supra note 648.
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legal rights in the United States cannot speak with much authority, given the
uncertainty surrounding these issues and the lack of test cases. Nonetheless, as
more and better information becomes available, parties should follow the AMA's
guidelines and disclose to patients the very real legal risks of having surgery
overseas.
4. Other Responses
The private sector undoubtedly will conceive more creative ways to
introduce standards and certainty to the medical tourism market, including ways
for patients to mitigate their legal risks. Hopefully, these attempts move us
toward a more equitable allocation of the legal risks and away from the current
654market allocation that shifts most of the risks to patients.
For example, patients and intermediaries might agree contractually to
resolve disputes through alternative dispute resolution, which could assure
patients access to at least some realistic forum for redress. Intermediaries might
also convince foreign providers to share the burdens of insuring against
malpractice, contributing to a patient compensation fund, or perhaps funding
alternative grievance procedures. Foreign providers might agree, for example, to
compensate for specified losses, such as medical expenses, lost wages, and
perhaps even limited payments for pain and suffering that are not available in
some jurisdictions. These contributions would obviously raise the cost of medical
tourism. But if foreign providers are going to avail themselves of patients from
wealthier countries, they should understand that these patients probably expect
larger recoveries.
Finally, a powerful tool may be negative publicity. As I have noted, negative
publicity generated by medical malpractice suits could be catastrophic for foreign
615providers, especially if it jeopardizes contracts with U.S. insurers. In fact,
demand for medical tourism services should be sensitive to perceptions of
quality. High profile malpractice cases could discourage patients from going
overseas. 656 Unfortunately, there are few incentives in the industry that would
encourage companies to publicize substandard quality care.657 Currently, we must
rely on anecdotal media reporting and academic inquiries.
B. Public Sector Responses
Can the government respond to a medical tourism market that
654. Cortez, supra note 6, at 119.
655. Id. at 101.
656. BOOKMAN & BOOKMAN, supra note 6, at 60.
657. Note, however, that medical tourism intermediaries do have a significant incentive to
avoid or cease contracting with substandard foreign providers, even if they probably would not
publicize substandard care already provided to their customers.
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disproportionately allocates legal risks to patients? Before answering, we must
note some limits to what the government might reasonably achieve. First, as I
note elsewhere, the government would have a difficult time restricting patient
travel (an admittedly unlikely option),658 or targeting advertising or other
commercial speech by medical tourism companies.659 Legislatures might
consider extending long-arm jurisdiction over providers or intermediaries located
overseas, but the federal Due Process clause would limit its reach.
Elsewhere I have called for a variety of government efforts that would
provide greater oversight of the employers, insurers, and intermediaries that
arrange for patients to travel overseas.660 Rather than repeating those
recommendations here, I focus solely on fairly reallocating the legal risks. I
propose a combination of methods below that would ease legal impediments to
suing in the United States and inform patients of the risks of agreeing to assert
claims in foreign courts. Importantly, these options need not replace private
sector efforts; public and private efforts should operate in tandem.
1. Impose Strict Liability
Governments could create vicarious, strict liability by statute for U.S.
employers, insurers, or intermediaries that send patients overseas. 661 For
example, a medical tourist injured overseas could receive predetermined
compensation based on the injury suffered, without needing to prove whether the
provider or the intermediary was somehow negligent.
A vicarious strict liability regime could address several problems. First,
vicarious liability would allocate legal responsibility to a U.S. company and thus
avoid the burdens of suing in foreign jurisdictions or trying to sue foreign
defendants here. Second, imposing strict liability would sidestep thorny legal
questions of how to prove that either the provider or intermediary was
negligent. 662 Third, strict liability might also encourage employers, insurers, and
intermediaries to choose foreign providers more carefully, monitor quality, and
perhaps purchase insurance to cover injuries-these companies are also in a
better position to regulate, confront, and negotiate with foreign providers. Thus,
vicarious strict liability would not only reallocate the legal risks more fairly, but
would more closely align the interests of patients and intermediaries. Currently,
employers and insurers save money sending patients overseas without bearing
many of the risks.
Though statutory strict liability might appeal here in theory, governments
658. Cortez, supra note 6, at 114-18.
659. Id. at 119.
660. Id. at 118-27.
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663could find the system difficult to create and administer. Strict liability would
require the government to administer a no-fault compensation system, much like
our workers' compensation system or the no-fault system used to compensate for
medical errors in New Zealand.664 The government would have to assign a range
of remedies for a range of injuries, and most governments may be reluctant to
devote the time and energy required to do so. Finally, as I have noted elsewhere,
such heavy-handed approaches might have the perverse effect of driving medical
tourism intermediaries overseas to less regulated jurisdictions.665
2. Mandate or Encourage Insurance
Governments should consider requiring employers, insurers, or other
intermediaries to insure patients against medical errors or other complications
arising from surgery overseas. Such insurance might take several forms. First, the
government could require intermediaries to purchase (or at least offer) individual
insurance policies covering each medical tourist, much like the policies offered
by Aos. For example, a U.S. insurer that contracts with a foreign hospital might
purchase accident insurance covering each patient sent to that hospital. Patients
could even select the precise coverage they desire, similar to the Aos policies.
The government could mandate minimum coverage just as states mandate
minimum automobile insurance. In the United Kingdom, the National Health
Service encourages (but does not require) patients that travel to another EU
member state for health care services under its Eli 2 program to purchase
insurance "to ensure any unforeseen emergencies are covered. 66 6 Second, the
government could require intermediaries to pay for all pre-screening or post-
operative care that might be required in the United States, including any
corrective treatments. 667 This requirement would be a form of de facto insurance
for patients injured overseas.
Although a mandate of either kind would increase the overall costs of the
venture, it would better approximate the true risk tolerance of patients and would
force suppliers of medical tourism services-both providers and intermediaries-
to internalize more of the risks inherent in these transactions. Policymakers can
require U.S. employers, insurers, or other intermediaries to pay for prescreening
and post-operative care in the United States unless the company is able to
procure an insurance policy meeting minimum standards.
663. Id.
664. Marie Bismark & Ron Paterson, No-Fault Compensation in New Zealand: Harmonizing
Injury Compensation, Provider Accountability, and Patient Safety, 25 HEALTH AFF. 278 (2006).
665. Cortez, supra note 6, at 120.
666. National Health Service, Going for Planned Treatment, Entitlement, http://www.nhs.uk/
Treatmentabroad/Pages/Entitlement.aspx (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
667. Cortez, supra note 6, at 122.
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3. Invalidate Liability Waivers
Legislatures might also consider prohibiting releases and waivers of liability,
thus allowing courts to iron out complicated questions of duty, fault, and
causation raised by medical tourist arrangements. For example, in the clinical
research context, Food and Drug Administration regulations prohibit informed
consent documents from including "any exculpatory language through which the
subject or the representative is made to waive or appear to waive any of the
subject's legal rights .'668 Some state laws also broadly prohibit contracts that
exempt one party from responsibility for negligence or violations of law.669
Likewise, legislatures may simply decide that courts should resolve liability in
medical tourist arrangements by removing the legal obfuscation created by
releases and waivers.
Without such legislation, it is not clear whether releases and waivers of
liability in medical tourism transactions are valid. In general, liability releases for
medical negligence are invalid as being contrary to public policy. 670 Under the
seminal case, Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, the California
Supreme Court refused to enforce a release signed by a patient that absolved
UCLA Medical Center from liability for negligence, on the basis of a state statute
prohibiting such agreements. 67' Releases in California are invalid only if they
affect the public interest, and the court applied numerous factors to find that
hospital-patient contracts do indeed affect the public interest.672 But because the
public interest is an amorphous concept, and because the freedom to contract
between patients and providers varies by circumstances, several jurisdictions
have departed from Tunkl.673 Medical tourist arrangements also complicate this
analysis because releases and waivers are being sought not only by foreign
providers who may not be subject to U.S. jurisdiction, but by intermediaries who
do not provide medical care and do not factor neatly into the Tunkl criteria.6 74
Legislation could render moot these uncertainties.
Such legislation would also respond to normative arguments that patients
668.21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2007).
669. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1668 (West 2009).
670. MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, MEDICAL LIABILITY AND
TREATMENT RELATIONSHIPS 419 (2005).
671. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963) (striking down the
release under CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668).
672. Id. at 444-47.
673. See Maxwell J. Mehiman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between
Patients and Health Care Providers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 401-03 (1989-1990) (discussing
alternative approaches adopted by courts).
674. It is not clear whether the factors enunciated in Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445-46, would support
invalidating releases of liability in medical tourist arrangements. In fact, application of each of the
factors raises interesting policy questions.
X:l (2010)
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should be free to waive legal rights in exchange for less expensive health care.
For example, in their new book, Nudge, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein argue
that patients should be allowed to waive the right to sue for medical malpractice,
which would free them to negotiate for lower physician fees.6 75 Other scholars
have also argued that in lieu of complete waivers, courts should enforce
agreements by patients to lower providers' ordinary standard of care.
676
However, even proponents of more moderate liability standards
acknowledge that few courts currently support this position. 677 And other
scholars are poking holes in the wisdom of allowing patients to waive liability for
malpractice, and even whether patients can or want to make these complex
tradeoffs.678 Moreover, medical tourism complicates even this debate. Medical
tourists do not exactly accept a lower standard of medical care by going overseas,
but the standard might differ in tangible ways. Moreover, medical tourists may
not be asked to waive liability completely, but simply agree to resolve disputes in
foreign jurisdictions. This choice further complicates the question of whether
medical tourists can make fully informed, rational, utility-maximizing decisions
to waive legal recourse in the United States in exchange for less costly health
care overseas. Again, legislation prohibiting such waivers or imposing strict,
vicarious liability could render these difficult questions moot. Combined with a
mandatory insurance requirement, the facilitators and suppliers in the medical
tourism industry would also have to share the risks.
675. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 207-14 (2008).
676. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Private Reform of Tort-Law Dogma: Market
Opportunities and Legal Obstacles, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143 (1986). Note that Thaler,
Sunstein, and Havighurst do not contemplate waivers in cross-border medical care arrangements
and thus focus on advantages to be gained from bargaining within the U.S. health care system and
its web of protective regulations.
677. Mark A. Hall, Paying for What You Get and Getting What You Pay For: Legal Responses
to Consumer-Driven Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 177 (2006) (noting the
distinction between patients agreeing to reduce the level of resources used versus the level of skill
used by the provider).
678. See, e.g., TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE
CONSUMER-DRIVEN MOVEMENT 86-118 (2007) (critiquing the application of traditional neoclassical
microeconomic theory to health care and patient decisionmaking); Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley
MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1929, 1998-2005 (2003) (arguing that waivers of liability for medical malpractice are
suboptimal even when patients accurately anticipate the risks); Tom Baker & Timothy D. Lytton,
Allowing Patients to Waive the Right To Sue for Medical Malpractice: A Response to Thaler and
Sunstein (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for L. & Econ. Research, Paper No. 09-06, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1349836.
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4. Correct Information Asymmetries
Finally, perhaps the least ambitious but most realistic way to begin to
reallocate the legal risks is to correct specific information asymmetries that
contribute to the current misallocation of risks. Patients should know what legal
recourse they will have under different medical tourism arrangements,
particularly those that ask patients to waive various legal rights or litigate in a
foreign jurisdiction. Patients should remain free to have surgery overseas-either
of their own volition or at the behest of an employer or an insurer-but patients
should fully appreciate what legal and regulatory protections they might be
sacrificing.
In this spirit, the public sector could try to correct specific information
asymmetries in the medical tourism market. For example, a government agency,
commission, or perhaps even a multilateral organization like the WHO, might
provide information to medical tourists and other payors regarding the legal and
regulatory systems in destination countries. These groups could publish country-
specific studies comparing foreign legal and regulatory systems and might
disseminate the findings through websites, press releases, ad campaigns, targeted
announcements, or other methods. For example, some news outlets have
provided checklists and answers to frequently asked questions to potential
medical tourists. 679 The government might do the same, except that it could
commission more robust data. Governments might even encourage companies
that arrange for surgery overseas to disseminate these materials as part of a
campaign to encourage full disclosure of the risks.
This method would preserve the status quo that allows patients to forego
potential legal recourse in exchange for lower prices, except that it helps patients
understand precisely what additional legal risks they are bearing. The current
market discloses the legal risks in vague disclaimers loaded with legalese and
potentially misleading reassurances that patients, ultimately, do have some legal
recourse, somewhere. The government should provide this information because it
is doubtful that the market alone will encourage companies to generate or
disseminate complete and accurate information.
Under the status quo, some patients may fully appreciate the tradeoffs they
are making. However, considering the minimal information available to them, I
suspect the majority do not. And those that do not would benefit considerably
from the prophylactic measures I propose. The government might supplement
these measures with existing regulatory tools, such as consumer protection
regulations, bans on unfair or deceptive trade practices, and the like. 680 Requiring
679. See Greg Allen, Employers, Insurers Considering Overseas Health Care, NPR ALL
THINGS CONSIDERED, Nov. 14, 2007, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld= 16294182.
680. Cortez, supra note 6, at 119-20.
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insurance and banning liability waivers would provide immediate protection for
patients in these potentially unbalanced contractual relationships. Collectively,
these measures could begin to reallocate more fairly the legal risks of medical
travel.
CONCLUSION
This Article began with an ambitious but straightforward goal: to recalibrate
the legal risks of cross-border health care by evaluating whether U.S. patients
injured overseas have adequate legal recourse, either here or in one of four
common destinations: India, Thailand, Singapore, and Mexico. The value, I hope,
in covering these four separate jurisdictions is to fill a major void in the literature
and give patients a sense of the variety of obstacles they might encounter when
seeking legal recourse overseas. The decision to travel for medical care should
accurately reflect patients' true risk tolerances, and providers and intermediaries
in the industry should share the risks of these transactions. I also hope to
encourage the industry to think more critically and creatively about how it might
reallocate the legal risks, so they do not fall squarely on patients. In the long run,
the industry would benefit from confronting these risks, rather than simply
deflecting them to patients. Finally, for the policymakers, I hope to demonstrate
how targeted intervention can fairly and efficiently redistribute the legal risks or
at least enable patients to make more informed choices about traveling overseas.
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